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ABSTRACT
This study addresses current educational, political, and social challenges that
many marginalized countries face, especially nations in the Broader Middle East and
North Africa (BMENA) region. The study examines the types of hegemony and its
effects by addressing political, social, and educational ramifications. It scrutinizes the
political, educational, and social history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and uses it as an
example for the region because of its political influence on the region. The study engages
in a critical analysis of globalization alongside its tools to highlight its advantages and
disadvantages to marginalized countries. It discusses the spread of the English language
in marginalized communities, together with the status of the Arabic language in both
lexical and mental dimensions. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was the methodology
used to analyze the G8-Broader Middle East and North Africa G8-BMENA Partnership
through examining documents produced by two entities in their annual meetings: first,
government officials, and second, representatives of civil societies. These documents are
organized by the type of discourse: first, official discourse (dominant) by government
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representatives, and second, public discourse by civil societies. The idea is to examine the
connections and disconnections between the two discourses in the proposed reform
efforts by the partnership. The study analyzes documents issued from 2004 to 2013, and
it reveals evidence of a hegemonic relationship between the G8 countries, BMENA
countries, and civil societies. It also uncovers some possible and dangerous political
changes affecting not only the BMENA but also the world.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
I start my introduction with questions that I have constantly asked myself in order
to give the reader an insight about the ideas that shape my thinking regarding this
research.


Why did I need to change who I am socially and culturally to be considered a
success in the eyes of my community?



Why was the English language imposed on me when I was 6 years old?



Why did I think less of myself when I wasn’t able to speak English?



Why did I enroll in the English language department for my bachelor’s degree?



Why did we look up to the West with admiration and with an opposite sentiment
to ourselves?



Why do we try to distance ourselves from our culture and values and strive to
adopt Western values?



Why do we see a connection between the West and civilization and intellect?



Why do we trust the West and dismiss the Rest?



Is it just my experience or is it a global phenomenon?



Why the Rest continues to send students to the West, spending billions of dollars
on their education, when the money could have been invested otherwise?



Will the Rest ever be independent to decide for itself?
I do not claim to have the answers to these questions nor do I attempt to answer

them in this research. But it is astonishing to me when I see the connection made between
being educated, civilized, and enlightened with the ability to speak English fluently or
with having a Western credential. This connection has been made by people across the
1

spectrum, from people with no formal education to those with the highest educational
credentials. I can share two examples, from many, that I recently experienced. First, I was
in Saudi Arabia on an airplane on a domestic flight in December of 2014 and found
myself sitting next to an older man; both of us were wearing our thawb and ghutra
(traditional Saudi dress for men). I was watching something on my iPad, and then we
started conversing in Arabic about local topics, and I was so excited to hear in our native
language his perspective about things, especially when I had been away from home for
much of the previous eight years, except for vacations to my homeland about once a year.
Then suddenly he spoke to me in English, saying, “I am an educated man.” I was
perplexed and disturbed by his reasoning to prove himself to me that he is an educated
man in English even though the entire conversation had been in Arabic and was cordial in
nature. My first reaction was surprise—which I am certain he noticed by my facial
expression. Subsequently, I brought the conversation back to Arabic. It was ironic that he
felt a need to prove his value to me by speaking English. I suppose that he believed that
by doing so he was showing to me, a much younger man, that his ability to speak English
was evidence that he was “educated.” I was crestfallen. I had wanted to hear his
perspectives on local matters, but he turned the conversation back to the topic of my
dissertation. In essence, due to his sudden use of the English language, the conversation
shifted from what I considered to be one of a substantive nature to a superficial one.
The second example occurred at Johns Hopkins Hospital in February 2015 when I
was talking to a physician who was from East India, but he was trying to hide his foreign
accent. He said to me: “I don’t know about your background, but you seem to be highly
educated when I hear you speak in English.” His comment was related to specific exams I
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was preparing to take and whether I needed a translator. These two examples—with the
man on the airplane and the doctor at the hospital—were hurtful to me because of the
general assumption or perception that for one to be considered educated and to be an
intellectual, it is necessary to be able to speak English. Such a viewpoint ignores one’s
personal accomplishments in a host of other venues. It appears that this common
perception is not limited to any geographical location on the map regardless of race,
color, level of education, or cultural background. I see this scenario in the Middle East
and in countries in East Asia—which speaks to the ingrained or imposed ways of judging
and stereotyping people.
Those two experiences, and others, have impacted me in a great way. They have
altered my view of the world and its peoples. Sometimes, when I speak English, I even
try to accentuate a heavier Middle Eastern accent—just to see the reaction of native
speakers and the level of respect I might receive from them, depending on the fluency of
my English. It is of great importance to me to try to understand why this perception
persists and why it is reproduced in many different cultures. It also makes me wonder: Is
there a way to stop this, what I consider to be a vicious circle? Therefore, I chose to
analyze formal documents produced by global entities, such as the United Nations, World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and Teaching English Speakers of Other
Languages (TESOL) Association in my literature review. Not only that, I analyzed local
documents in the Middle East region and the Gulf States to try to determine to what this
phenomenon is attributed. My experience with the English language and with Western
education has not been a pure choice of mine but rather was the dominant discourse in
my society. At the time, I looked at immersing myself into Western culture and into the
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English language as a strategic choice to gain personal benefits, such as social status and
employment. When I graduated from college with an English language degree, I was told,
“Now you have the key to knowledge and science,” referring to the ability of knowing
the English language, which in essence meant that the Arabic language would not get me
anywhere. I was happy at the time and even proud of the accomplishment. But today, I
think about it differently because I think I could be more successful and competent if I
had immersed myself into other fields during my undergraduate years. It is true that
English has given me a window to see and understand the world from a different lens, but
I am certain that I lost part of the original me in the transaction. I think I am lost between
two or rather many cultures—or what Martin and Nakayama (2007) described as living
on the border. By that, they meant physically living on the border by traveling frequently
to different countries or a psychologically by interacting with different people from
different cultural backgrounds, which in return creates bicultural or multicultural
individuals such as me.
I came to a realization that this is a macro-level challenge (global structure), and it
takes deeper local and global analysis, starting with my local society and its people and
also by looking at different nations and their experiences with Western hegemonic
influence, not only in the realm of education but in economy, society, and even in our
aspirations. My approach to this endeavor stemmed from my own transitional
positionality due to my extended stay in the United States and to my visits to my
homeland and to other nations in the Middle East. Furthermore, I come from a place of
antinomy, and now hope to re-envision a better future for my nation, language, and
personal and collective identities from the United States rather than from my homeland.
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But the main reason for such irony is because of an evolvement in my thinking and
understanding of education and language and their purposes. I was faced with two
options, either to be a functionalist and reap the most benefits that I can because I am
seen in a higher status, according to current global arrangements, or to expose the
superstructure of the world and its hierarchy. I chose the latter because I believed it was
my moral obligation, and as a scholar in-training, I needed to set my own expectations
for future projects.
Statement of the Problem
In response to globalization, nations are faced with reform choices that do not
necessarily respond to local needs, whether we are talking about education, economy,
language, or even politics. In turn, policymakers and educators operate in a
homogenizing fashion when looking at policy or reform (Broadfoot, 2001). I use the
word choices loosely because I claim that some nations do not have the luxury to choose
but rather must adhere to international agendas. With this in mind, I am afraid that
globalization in this sense will generate inequalities, because it stems from the
neoliberalism that dominates the world. It promotes competition, and with competition
there are winners and losers. Therefore, we can see a legitimized stratification within a
society and even between countries. That is to say, the system portrays itself as fair, but
people do not begin from equal starting points, and when they compete for the same
privileges, those studying at bad schools with limited resources and unequipped teachers
will be the losers at the end of the day. Yet, the elite blame the underachievers in their
eyes as opposed to looking at the structure critically. Hoogvelt (2001) considered
globalization as a new form of colonization. In other words, this covert arrangement in
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the world strips nation states and societies from their natural right to create or reform
their educational systems without foreign influences guided or misguided by economic
factors and neoliberal agenda. I believe that there is a greater power and structure that
supersedes local communities that follow a prescribed approach, whether in educational
and economic reforms or improvements to mainly benefit the center and at the same time
restrict the periphery regions’ advancement. In other words, globalization maintains a
hierarchical relationship between the West and the Rest. I argue that globalization has an
increasing influence socially, politically, and educationally. The question becomes: How
and why is this hegemonic relation maintained and preserved across the planet? I wonder
if there is an uprising, counter-hegemonic movement that may help us visualize
alternative realities.
Research Outline
In my dissertation, prior to addressing my research questions, I planned to study
three major areas that are inseparable in my literature review. My starting point was to go
back in history and understand the genesis of the Saudi educational system. Not only that,
but also go deeper and research the establishment of the country—its political and
socioeconomic conditions and the introduction of modern education. This research would
address the Saudi social structure and social stratification as well as look for
contradictions between the official purpose—dominant discourse—of education by the
government and what actually was happening with the Saudi population and how it was
affected by educational policies or political structure.
I examined the influence of religion on the construction of Saudi Arabia and its
educational apparatus (Akkari, 2004; Moaddel, 2006; Saleh, 1986; Trial & Winder,
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1950). I investigated the stakeholders of that era and how they gravitated to their
positions and the reasons behind their collaboration. I was skeptical because of the
outcomes that I witness today on a wide range of issues, and therefore, I questioned their
reasons for that collaboration.
It appears that there are two campaigns when it comes to education; one that
advocates for secular and the other for traditional, and I think it is imperative to know the
basis for each. Furthermore, I researched the foreign influence on the Saudi educational
apparatus as well as the Saudi influence on other nations, either educationally or
ideologically (Abir, 1988). It was equally important to investigate the purpose and policy
of education in Saudi Arabia as the first step in my analysis because it had a lot in
common with the Broader Middle East and North Africa region. What was the mission
and vision of introducing education in the modern sense? I also needed to learn about the
nature of the relationship between education and society. I needed to explore the
connections and disconnections between the two and find out who and what shaped the
Saudi social structure. Was it education that shaped society, or vice versa? Or did
different factors shape what we know today as the Kingdom Saudi Arabia?
My second interest in this research was the role of globalization in education and
society. Because of the global economy and the promise of free markets, nations are
under pressure to adhere to the roles of the markets and the nations that control those
markets. Globalization influences, or rather threatens, several dimensions in many
nations. That includes economic, social, political, and educational influences caused by
liberalism, neoliberalism, and capitalist ideologies (Conway, 1995; Fitzsimons, 2000;
King, 1995; Wells et al., 1998).
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I explored cultural effects of globalization (Barber, 1996) and its influence on
social structures, not only in peripheral areas but also in dominant countries such as the
United States. I investigated the different types and aspects of globalization and its
positives and negatives (Pieterse, 1994). We always hear that people have equal access to
education and the benefits of “free market” in the age of globalization; however, my
research investigated the premise that many consider to be a fallacy. With that in mind,
locating the Saudi society or country on the globalization spectrum was useful for my
understanding of this phenomenon, and it helped me understand similar trends in similar
countries (Abo-Arrad, 2004).
The role of globalization is well documented in curriculum, schools, and the
overall facade of the educational apparatus. Some claim that globalization uses education
as a hegemonic tool that perpetuates economic and social inequalities (Apple, 1990). I
believe it is imperative to juxtapose the role of different countries in this dynamic, and I
analyzed this dialectical relationship, not only on an educational level but also on social
and political levels.
There seem to be different views in the periphery region about education, even
though some have experienced the same overt or covert fashions of colonization and
exploitation and most importantly, of mental decapitation. The region of the Middle East
is in a state of stagnation, with many observers seeing the role of Western powers as the
reason for this backwardness, yet at the same time, the Western influence is seen as the
savior for better social, economic, and political conditions (Neal & Finlay, 2007).
Therefore, I examined the global education view, regardless of economic classes or
national GPD because education—content, communication style, medium of instruction
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and even human values—has aspired to follow a Eurocentric model in countries such as
Japan, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and many others. In my research, I attempted to uncover
this hegemonic discourse, even by researchers who are considered followers of critical
theory. I hear some rhetoric highlighting the deficit theory that marginalized people have
in many areas such as science, business, and even in human treats such as progressive
values, honesty, and hard work (Neal & Finlay, 2007).
I looked for cross-cultural examples and reasons behind failed educational
alternatives. With this work, I strived to offer hope for better education for generations to
come, considering globalization pressure and challenges. I undertook this work fully
understanding it would not be an easy task. I did not know what the outcomes might be,
but I planned to challenge the system and its structure. My view stemmed from a critical
school of thought, and I planned to utilize its methods of analyzing the status quo.
The third part of my research dealt with language and its importance in human
lives and its role in shaping identity. I was intrigued to know what views there are
regarding language and its influence in communities. It is important to know the meaning
or the concept of a national language in a nation. What does it mean, and is it normal to
only have one language? The reason for my interest grew from my experience as a native
speaker of Arabic. I believe Arabic is underutilized, even neglected. Not only that, it is
not seen as an important language or even necessary to know for one’s success.
The global spread of the English language is vital to address in my work because
it is intricately connected to educational policies, success, socioeconomic status, social
perception, and social stratification. I addressed the debate between two campaigns: one
that advocated for more English and Western models and one that called for complete
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resistance. I hoped to analyze the situation critically and arrive at alternative views that
might inform society and policymakers. I examined the language aspect in the Saudi
society from a worldwide superstructure that was connected to globalization, race, and
imperialism.
The fourth part of my dissertation was about answering my research questions
through analyzing an international initiative that was created in 2004; it is known as the
G8-BMENA Partnership, which is dedicated to educational, economic, and social
reforms in the Broader Middle East region using critical discourse analysis (CDA) as my
methodology to learn more about its inception, agenda, ideology, and outcomes. I wanted
primarily to critically analyze this partnership to uncover power relations between some
Western countries and the BMENA region and their understanding of reforms by looking
at their expectations. This research helped me to establish connections between this
partnership and the global structure discussed in the literature review by using the tools of
CDA to understand the types of discourse, discourse control, and mind control and how
they were present in the documents produced by the G8-BMENA. My analysis focused
on 41 documents published by the partnership via its two main sources: government
representatives and representatives of civil societies, which I discussed in Chapter 3.
Purpose and Significance of the Study
The purpose of this study first was to understand education and its purpose in
society. However, my main concern was education and modern education in developing
countries or the so-called Third World countries. I needed to understand the working of
the system and its role in shaping identities and realities. My specific focus was on Saudi
Arabia and the BMENA region. Another important aspect of the study was to examine
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the role of globalization in creating norms and realities. The English language has a
major role, and I intended to demystify its hidden agenda and the damage it does to the
structure of society. I do not think it is just a language or a tool that helps nations achieve
their potentials. Rather, I assert that it destructs societies, values, communication styles,
and it influences expectations, intellectual abilities, and perceptions. Furthermore, the
introduction and use of the English language in a nation in which English is not the
primary spoken and written form of communication causes low self-esteem for secondlanguage speakers and adds a layer of discrimination known as linguicism (Tsuda, 2008).
Such discrimination affects not only ordinary people but also many intellectuals and even
me as the researcher, because I often find myself looking at the world from a colonizer
lens. That is because we Saudi Arabian natives already have the expectation ingrained in
our consciousness, and it is the only standard or model we know. Therefore, I examined
this internalized colonizer’s view from the psyche of a marginalized people. It is crucial
to end the cycle of dependency and self-flagellation in order to end the reproduction of
inequalities (Bourdieu, 1977). It is important to highlight the power of hegemony that
marginalized people specifically adhere to, consciously or unconsciously (Gramsci,
2000).
The significance of my research is to contribute to the resistance and critical
literature, which I believe is categorically lacking, in the Saudi context and the BMENA
region. I argue that these countries should decide for themselves when addressing and
considering any type of reform. It is important to address the history of the Saudi
education system in order for us to understand the status quo through highlighting the
tactics used by local or international powers to domesticate the masses. I hope that my
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study contributes to the social reproduction theory by looking at it from two angles: first,
social construction within a nation due to the type of education and medium of instruction
(the English language), and second, the position of Saudi Arabia as a nation and its
people in the world hierarchy.
Finally, when civilizations are faced with challenges (such as what I propose in
this research), they tend to respond to challenges in one of two ways: Zealotism or
Herodianism (Toynbee, 1948). Toynbee explained Herodianism as mimicry where
nations try to find the secrets of the colonizer or the hegemon and then try to become like
them. This appears in non-Western nations as they imitate Western models in education,
language, communication styles, music, etc. On the other hand, Zealotism is a rigid and
nostalgic structure that some nations use when under distress, which is an attempt to fall
back on the past. There are problems with the two reactions: First, mimicry is a pale
imitation and would never become as good as the original, and second, Zealotism is a
dead end (Toynbee, 1948). There has to be a third way to gain true psychological and
mental emancipation, such as by investing in indigenous educational and social
institutions.
Research Questions
1. How has the G8 and the Broader Middle East and North African (BMENA)
Partnership affected and shaped educational and social reforms in the region since
its establishment in 2004?
2. What type of discourse was deployed to perpetuate hegemonic and hierarchical
relationships that sustain unequal status between the G8 and BMENA countries?
3. How do the G8 representatives control the BMENA public discourse?
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4. How does such discourse control the mind and the action of the BMENA
countries, and what are the social consequences of such control?
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
A Historical Look at Saudi Arabia: Political, Educational, and Social Structures
Saudi Arabia is the largest geographical and political entity in the Arabian
Peninsula. Early on, the Ibn-Saud royal family envisioned that improvements and
investments in education would be a great tool in legitimizing the regime. Before
indulging in the details of the establishment the new kingdom, it is imperative to
understand the sociocultural and political circumstances of the Arabian Peninsula and the
region due to the importance of those circumstances in the construction of education and
society.
The most important factor in the region’s construction was and remains the
religion of Islam, which includes education (Trial & Winder, 1950; Moaddel, 2006;
Akkari, 2004; Saleh, 1986). This took us back to the 600s A.D. and the force of the new
Islamic faith when it grew rapidly from the region to the world. The Ottoman Empire
controlled most of the Arab region in 1517 and withdrew from the region in 1917. The
400 years of Turkish rule of the region impacted the construction of all aspects of life.
However, the Turks could not subjugate the inner Arabia. This was evident in a new
movement in the Arabian Peninsula known today as Wahhabism, named after its leader,
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. He was a native of the center of Arabia (Najd). The
essence of his movement was to influence the tribes to return to the pure version of the
faith and to again become Unitarians (Moaddel, 2006; Prokop, 2003; Trial & Winder,
1950). This movement became a spiritual and political one that created allegiance with
the house of Saud that became again the royal family ruling what today is known as
Saudi Arabia. King Abd al-aziz Ibn-Saud was described as tactician and firm, both of

14

which contributed to the unification of the tribes in 1932 that at one time feuded
constantly with one another. In that year, King Abd al-aziz proclaimed the existence of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Prior to the declaration of the kingdom as we know it today, Ibn-Saud in 1926
created a smaller kingdom in the western region of Arabia; this area was known as the
Kingdom of Hijaz. His educational ambitions started there; I will elaborate on it later in
this paper.
The kingdom was a poor and mostly desert region, but the collaboration of IbnSaud and the Wahhabi group’s leader remained intact. Educational opportunities at that
time were both formal and traditional, and the people generally were characterized as
“cultured but illiterate” (Trial & Winder, 1950, p. 122). That is because people in that era
were able to narrate their history, were able to recite the Quran from memory, and were
exposed to poetry.
Modern Education
Traditionally, the ulama (religious scholars) had the greatest influence on
educational activities. For example, the ulama opposed the collaboration with the
Arabian-American Oil Co. or Aramco (Rugh, 1973) that was established in the early 20th
century to drill for oil. At the time, Aramco established vocational schools for the natives
to educate them with the necessary knowledge and work for the company. The hope was
that any cultural invasion among the Saudi youth by Western values and education styles
would be limited (Trial & Winder, 1950). The first sign of modern education in Arabia in
the Western sense was in 1926 when Ibn-Saud created the Directorate of Education by
hiring an Egyptian adviser (Abir, 1988). This decision set the tone of the educational
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policy in Arabia for many years afterwards. The directorate of education opened the first
secondary school and reformed existing schools. The directorate also introduced modern
subjects in addition to religion and the Arabic language (traditional education) where they
were dominant.
From 1926 to 1931, many teachers from Egypt were hired, and some local
students were sent to Egypt for education purposes, and that created tension with the
ulama. However, the king found it important for his new and expanding Kingdom and
therefore tried to pursue his agenda without confronting the religious clerics. The king
also realized the value of compromise, a strategy that sometimes let remain on clerics’
good side. During the 1930s, education was negatively impacted because of an economic
recession; this gave the ulama a de facto domination over education. For a snapshot of
education status in the early 20th century, it must be noted that the illiteracy rate was as
high as 95 percent (Abir, 1988).
Modern Education 1946-1958
The Saudi government increasingly understood the importance of education and
hired more teachers from Egypt and other Arabic-speaking countries, hoping to create a
pool of Saudi-educated graduates who could replace the foreign experts. However,
financial difficulties hindered the acceleration of this process in the 1940s. Nonetheless,
in 1946 and with the commercial exploitation of oil, the Saudi government had
progressively “Egyptianized” the nation’s educational system by hiring more Egyptian
teachers and sending Saudi students to Egypt. Not only that, the government transferred
the Egyptian educational model, which was imposed by the United Kingdom in the era of
overt colonization.
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In 1949, Aramco launched its first development plan for its employees, including
Saudis, by sending them to American universities in the region or in the United States
(Abir, 1988; Trial & Winder, 1950). Aramco was not motivated necessarily by
philanthropy per se but rather by a desire to improve its operations. Abir (1988) believed
that this contribution by Aramco should not be underestimated in the realm of modern
education, especially in the eastern province of Arabia where oil is concentrated. As what
could be considered as a counter effort by the ulama and probably as a compromise by
the king, the ulama established their version of modern educational facilities, which
focused primarily on Islamic studies and Arabic studies, including history and
civilization. The ulama resented the evolution of what once was their domain (education),
but they eventually realized that they could not turn back the clock. Rather, the ulama
realized that they needed to be adaptive and to function in a supervisory fashion over
education in general. It appears that this was the period where competition became visible
between two educational systems: an education system controlled by religious agenda
and another controlled by the state, in other words, traditional versus secular. However,
the latter could not deviate from general Islamic principles or from what was perceived as
Islamic at that time. King Saud became the new king after his father’s death and restored
the relationships with the ulama, in part by ordering all Saudi students were studying
abroad to return home. That demand was a clear signal to the religious establishment that
was worried about foreign influence that could undermine the coveted political and
religious power of the ulama.
There were also other major highlights in this era, one of which was the
foundation of the Ministry of Education (MOE) in 1953; that development triggered a
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tripling and quadrupling of the number of students and played a key role in increases in
the Saudi budget allocated for education. Another highlight of the era occurred in 1957,
when the first university was established in Saudi Arabia. In 1958, the MOE adopted the
current three-cycle sequence of education: six years of elementary school, three of
intermediate school, and three years of secondary education.
Modern Education 1958-1986
Faysal became the new king and followed the example his father’s (Abd al-aziz)
leadership style by keeping a strong alliance with ulama and featuring the relationship
with concessions and compromises. A historic event occurred in 1960 when female
education became formalized and legal. The new king faced violent opposition from the
ulama after this innovation, but Faysal established new General Directorate of Girls’
Education under the Grand Mufti (Abir, 1988). Consequently, education for girls fell
under the control of the ulama, and this is why the kingdom has been a gender-segregated
school system ever since. The segregation also included teachers, and if there is a need
for a male teacher to teach females, it is done via closed-circuit television. In the 1970s,
female student enrollment reached 50 percent, and by the 1980s, the number of females
nearly equaled the number of male students.
Ironically, in its initial stages, the ulama opposed modern education, but they
controlled the educational system during the Faysal ruling period. This has affected the
curriculum as Islamic and Arabic studies constituted a third of the curriculum in all
elementary school, intermediate school, and secondary school levels (Abir, 1988; Prokop,
2003). Furthermore, elementary school graduates could opt for religious studies for their
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remaining schooling years, but even if they did not, religion had an organic—
unbreakable—relationship with Saudi state education.
In 1960, there was a slowdown in the development of the national education
system due to financial constraints, and the focus shifted from increasing the number of
schools to the quality of education (Rugh, 2002a). This period also revealed something
about Saudi society and its distaste of manual work because it was not as prestigious as
formal education, and that attitude led to a decrease in student enrollment in vocational
and trade schools (Prokop, 2003). The greatest boom of the Saudi modern education
system occurred in the 1970s and 1980s because of the increased state revenue with the
expansion of the Saudi oil production machine. The government also issued its first fiveyear plan for education from 1970-1975. It was generally characterized by massive
expansion at all levels of education. Nevertheless, the quality of education suffered in
both periods when foreigners were in charge of educating Saudi nationals and also when
the Saudi teachers assumed powerful positions, especially at the elementary school level
because these teachers were trained by others who had low standards.
The number of students had risen in 1986 by 35 percent (Abir, 1988), and there
was an impressive decline of illiteracy rates in comparison with the illiteracy rate of the
1960s. However, Abir raised a concern about the lower standards in the country.
Educational programs and opportunities differed according to the geographical location
and the social backgrounds of students. For example, Bedouin (nomadic) people tended
to drop out from school because education did not fit their lifestyle and thus did not help
them economically because they needed to work and help their families, which is not the
case with middle class Saudi society.
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I believe that this marked the initial signs of divergence between social classes in
Saudi Arabia. Abir (1988) stated that the Saudi statistics did not pay attention to the
disparity between social classes. However, only one third of the lower class students
make it to the intermediate level, and only 6 percent make it to the secondary level. Abir
(1988) stated that middle class and upper class students (urban population), especially
from major towns or areas such as Hijaz and Najd, were much more prepared for modern
education because they were taught by better qualified teachers and their schools were
better. Consequently, middle class and upper class students dominated secondary school
education and also were the beneficiaries of university education abroad.
The government was aware that the first two education plans (1970-1980) focused
on the schools and students in urban areas, but it planned to rectify the situation in the
rural areas in third and fourth plans (1980-1990). Interestingly, Abir (1988) claimed that
having minimal education in the rural areas did not hinder the ability of the “lower class”
people to move up socially, and they were accepted in the middle class.
King Fahd assumed power in 1982, and he understood the need to maintain and
maybe even advance the relationship with the ulama because it was a great contribution
to the kingdom’s political stability, especially because of economic struggles, political
turmoil in the region, and the struggle in the ruling class. Therefore, the ulama were the
best political allay for Ibn-Saud and the government, and this was effective because the
population could not dispute anything stemming from their trusted religious leaders.
Consequently, the liberal movement from 1960 to 1970 was reversed, and religious
studies were again at the heart of education at the expense of secular education (Abir,
1988).
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Higher Education
According to Abir (1988), the journey of higher education in Saudi Arabia started
in (1957), and there was a rivalry between the government and the ulama in establishing
institutions reflecting each of their views of education. The ulama focused on religious
teaching and did what was possible to attract students by giving generous scholarships to
join their institutions. The population trusted the ulama because they were seen as the
true representation of their faith.
The first university, in the Western sense, was established in 1957, and it
facilitated the second boom in higher education, which occurred between 1957 and 1975.
The universities followed the Egyptian model, which in essence followed the British
system of higher education. However, since 1975, Saudi universities adopted the
American higher education system. In 1985, Saudi Arabia had seven universities and 14
colleges for women colleges, and by 2011, according to Denman and Hilal (2011), the
number has increased to 24 government universities, 15 private universities, and 20
private colleges.
The American influence on the Saudi education started with Aramco in 1958
(Abir, 1988) and was formalized in 1975 by establishing the United States and Saudi
Arabia Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation, which dealt with education and was
a bilateral agreement between the two countries. The ulama were not thrilled with this
development, especially because of the increasing number of Saudi students studying in
the United States. That was seen as a threat to the Saudi people’s faith and culture. The
ulama viewed it as westernization of Saudi Arabia, and this triggered tension between the
religious establishment and the government. Furthermore, conflict grew between Saudi
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university graduates and American university graduates because each saw the other as a
threat to them, economically and to their country, ideologically.
Abir (1988) acknowledged the massive development of the Saudi education
system, especially when the illiteracy rate was 95 percent in the 1950s, but also
questioned “whether Saudi Arabia can afford its extensive, wasteful and inadequate
educational system” (p. 49).
Education in the 1990s
The status of education remained the same in the 1990s, generally balancing the
relationship between modern education and the ulama and expanding education to
increase the rate of students admitted to Saudi’s higher education system. On the one
hand, “Islam continues to be the main legitimizing source of al-Saud family; however,
the strong identification with Islam invites the regime’s opponents to use it as a standard
by which to judge their rulers” (Prokop, 2003, p. 77). Therefore, the government had to
make concessions to the religious leaders and give them (even in the ideological sense)
control over the educational apparatus.
In essence, the education system represented by both the state and the ulama
agreed on the same message regarding education, which promoted loyalty and obedience.
The state and the ulama expected education to:
. . . promote a spirit of loyalty to Islamic law by denouncing any system or theory
that conflicts with it and by behaving with honesty and in conformity with Islamic
tenets; it should ‘awaken the spirit of Islamic struggle, fight our enemies, restore
our rights, resume our glory, and fulfill the mission of Islam’ and project the unity
of Muslim nation. (Prokop, 2003, p. 79)
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It is crucial to magnify this cooperation between the state and the ulama and its
impact on Saudi society. It is clear that a political and ideological struggle existed
between the two, and in the same time, it is ironic that they claim working for the people
without including the people in the pursuit.
Interestingly, the discipline of history taught in Saudi schools reveals an intended
or perhaps casual dismissal of other histories within Saudi society. In schools, one
particular region, Najd, is the focus of history books and its people, who are described by
Abir (1988) and Prokop (2003) as the aristocratic class. However, history books try to
unify the country around the first king (and then the royal family), who unified the tribes,
and how he chose the path of Islam to do that. However, the history books neglect the
bloodshed and the battles preceding the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore,
history books also neglect to mention critical events in the neighboring countries, such as
revolutions and the collaboration between the king and United Kingdom in the early days
of establishing the kingdom.
A major characteristic of the Saudi education system (Prokop, 2003; Rugh,
2002b; Roy, 1992) is its focus on rote learning, memorization, and unquestioning
attitudes—because obedience is at the core of the system. Schools also lack an emphasis
on analytical and creative thinking, which is not a surprise because the system
(educational and political) wants to sustain its legitimacy and domination.
Saudi Influence on Education Abroad
Prokop (2003) addressed the global Saudi influence financially and ideologically.
In other words, the Saudi government was involved in spreading its interpretation of
Islam through education in many parts of the world, “from Morocco to Central Asia, to
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Bosnia, and elsewhere in Europe . . . African countries . . . and [even] including a
province in China” (Prokop, 2003, p. 85). This occurred either by direct funding by the
government or by the Saudi missionaries around the world, including those in the United
Kingdom and the United States. Furthermore, the Saudi curriculum is taught in Saudi
schools in many countries that have high Saudi populations.
This was one of the reasons that the Saudi education system was attacked,
especially from Western nations, because it was involved in spreading its version of
Islamic teaching, which is characterized by many as promoting extremism (Prokop, 2003;
Rugh, 2002b). A great example is the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New
York City in which 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals. In other words, the Saudi
education system found itself under new and more scrutiny than ever from the liberals
within the country as well as from many Western nations. However, the official
government response was the denial of these accusations that blamed the Saudi education
system. Some Saudi officials stated that education is just one way of shaping students’
identities. On the other hand, the government has admitted the need for economic and
educational reforms, but the debate becomes about who is proposing the reforms and the
role of education in the Saudi political system. Prokop (2003) raises the following
questions:
To what extent has the education system been shaped by and used by religious,
political, and socioeconomic forces and interests? What are the domestic and
global factors that are undermining the current system? What are the economic
and social ‘side-effects’ of the heavy emphasis on religious teachings? What are
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the links—if any—between the education system and the message propagated
inside the kingdom, as well as abroad, and Islamic extremism? (p. 79)
Government’s View and Policy of Education
Roy (1992) shed light on what he understands as the eight major factors in the
Saudi education policy in basic education, listed as follows:
1- The planning of education and the use methods of instruction in a manner that
is in harmony with the teachings of Islam and derives from its principles.
2- The provision of basic religious instruction throughout the period of
education, from basic through higher education.
3- Given every individual’s desire for knowledge, the state must—within the
limits of its resources and abilities—give the opportunity to everyone, male or
female, to acquire that knowledge.
4- Within the dictates of Islam, turning to account all forms of useful human
knowledge so as to develop the community and improve its way of life.
5- The methodology, writing and teaching of science and learning and their
various forms and resources must be in accord with an Islamic orientation.
6- The linking of education and instruction at all levels with overall national
development planning.
7- The judicious use of interaction with international developments in the fields
of science, culture, and literature.
8- The use of the Arabic language as the language of instruction in all subjects
and at all levels, except where it is necessary for teaching to be in another
language (for example language courses) (p. 489)
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The question remains whether this vision of education was reached or not. It seems that
the policies are macro in nature, and nothing is tangible. By the third plan (Roy, 1992),
however, there was some evidence of being focused, at least on giving access to
education to the majority of students, males and females. Yet the quality of the education
was questionable. Further, education was seen as a fight against illiteracy, but that does
not necessarily translate to a better economic future for the graduates. Roy (1992) asked:
“What then is the logic of educating them?” (p. 482)
Saleh (1986) cited the same vision in his article, placing Islam at the core of any
educational endeavor. He stated:
The purpose of education is to have the student understand Islam in a correct
comprehensive manner, to plan and spread the Islamic creed, to furnish the
student with values, teaching and ideals of Islam, to equip him with the various
skills and knowledge, to develop his own conduct in constructive directions to
develop the society economically, socially and culturally, and to prepare the
individual to become a useful member in the building of his community. (Saleh,
1986, p. 19)
He also highlighted the goals of higher education in the country, which were similar to
the previously noted goals.
However, some of the desired outcomes of the development plans and the
massive budgets were to decrease the number of Saudi students studying abroad and to
limit the reliance on the English language as the medium of instruction in many
educational institutions. Such action, I believe, functioned as a gatekeeper that prevented
many students who did not have the desire to learn another language in order to be
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educated or perceived as such. King Abdullah started a foreign scholarship program that
has sent almost 130,000 students abroad since 2006, a third of whom have studied in the
United States. Clary and Karlin (2011) stated: “the United Sates, with 15 times Saudi
Arabia’s population, only had 260,000 students studying abroad last year” (p. 17). Keep
in mind the Saudi number is 130,000. The purpose of the scholarship program was to
qualify those students in different fields and hope that those students would become the
new reformists in Saudi Arabia when they finished their schooling. Another reason was
the huge influx of new high school graduates (half of the population is younger than 24)
and the limited chances of gaining access to local universities. In other words, there was
no planning to contain the new graduates in the Saudi educational system.
This fact is troubling in so many ways—financially, culturally, and politically. To
the observant eyes, the scholarship agreement came after a meeting between the king and
U.S. President George W. Bush, even though we do not know the nature of the
conversation between the two leaders, especially after 9/11 and the real intent of the
program. The Saudi government has paid $5 billion for Saudi students’ education in the
United States (Kurtz, 2012). This is a red flag because we do not know about the politics
carried out behind closed doors: Was this initiative a free choice by the king, or was it
demanded by Bush for other reasons, such as economic benefits to the United States or to
expose Saudi youth to Western culture to promote tolerance. However, those billions of
dollars could have been invested in the Saudi educational system and its universities to
reduce the total dependence on Western educational models that most likely would not fit
local Saudi needs and the aspirations of Saudi students.
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Since the early 20th century when the first scholarship for Saudi students to study
abroad was offered, the educational situation remains the same, with the government
looking for temporary solutions to major problems rather than facing them head on. I ask
hypothetically: If the government, which is the responsible for education in Saudi Arabia,
were to deal with these challenges with honesty and integrity, what would happen? I
speculate that some major political changes would take place, and that belief made me
wonder if these challenges are ignored purposefully to maintain the status quo. I consider
this situation as the absolute opposite of what Akkari’s (2004) depicted education in the
second half of the 20th century as post-colonial education, where the governments in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) control the education apparatus for the purpose of
developing nations economically and giving all individuals, regardless of their tribes,
regions, faith denominations, or religious backgrounds, an equal chance for the upward
movement in the society.
Akkari (2004), however, stated clearly that countries in the MENA region have
many similarities in their overall construction—socially, religiously, and culturally, as
well as with overall achievements in the realm of education, i.e., increased literacy rates
and access to schools. Yet, there is a common thread between them that the system did
not meet the needs of the poorest and the disadvantaged populations, and therefore, they
function in the lowest rung in their societies. Here, they cannot be blamed for their
position in society because we realized (Abir, 1988; Trial & Winder, 1950) that schools
and teachers were better in the urban areas and its population were able to benefit from
the financial resources and gained scholarships to get better education than the rest of the
people.
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Akkari (2004) cited some reasons behind the dropout rates and slow education
growth in MENA’s region as the following:


the inadequate quantity and quality of elementary and secondary schools;



the excessively long distance from home to school, which is a particularly
important obstacle for girls in rural areas;



the lack of parent responsiveness to the laws mandating compulsory
schooling, in light of the low private economic returns of schooling;



the inability of schools to offer an attractive environment to children;



the economic difficulties of some families who are forced to put their children
to work early. (p. 149)
Education and Society

In this section, I look into possible paradoxes in the official view of education,
philosophy, and purpose and compare that with what is actually happening in Saudi
society. I would like to investigate whether the education system serves all people
equally. Furthermore, I need to know if the education system helps the political stability
of the government as its main purpose rather than providing education to the masses.
First, we will look at possible purposes and philosophies of education and try to
determine if the Saudi education system aligns with any of the purposes and philosophies
in order for us to place the education system in a certain category or give it a label. It is
important to note that defining the purpose of education is difficult and depends on many
factors, but nonetheless, it is imperative to navigate the possibilities.
The primary purpose of a liberal education . . . is the cultivation of the person’s
own intellect and imagination, for the person’s own sake. . . . True education is
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meant to develop the individual human being, the person, rather than serve the
state. . . . Formal schooling actually commenced as an endeavor to acquaint the
rising generation with religious knowledge: with awareness of the transcendent
and with moral truths. Its purpose was not to indoctrinate a young person in
civics, but rather to teach what it is to be a true human being, living within a
moral order. That person has primacy in liberal education. (Gow, 1989, p. 545)
Furthermore, Descartes (as cited in Vaughan, 1914) believed that the purpose of all
education is “to enable one to reach sound judgment” (p. 695). Alexander (1994)
indulged in extensive debate about education and its role in advocating for peace,
capitalism, and nationalism as its purpose. However, Alexander’s (1994) depiction of the
purpose of education is the following:
The purpose of education should be to define and teach the difference between
peace for oppression and peace for liberty, the difference between competitive
self-interested capitalism and a laissez-faire spirit that provides for a “harmony of
interests” for the general uplifting of society. (p. 28)
The final view I consider is the one of Rossides (1984), as the author depicted education
and its purpose as a type of monopoly. He summarized his view of the purpose of
education as “history’s diverse educational systems have one all-important similarity—
they serve the interests of the powerful first and foremost” (p. 16). However, he saw the
hidden purpose. Rossides (1984) claimed that the purpose of education, whether agrarian
or industrial, is to establish and maintain a class difference in societies independently
from any functional purpose. Moreover, Rossides (1984) argued that the situation in
modern education becomes tricky because in a feudal society, education is openly for the
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elite class without hypocrisy that we witness today because today people are bombarded
with an elusive equality. That is to say, when lower class students fail or drop out from
modern schooling, society (elite) blames them for their failure, neglecting the inequitable
system in the first place. In other words, modern education is used to stratify society, and
it was the same idea in ancient Greece, medieval Europe, China, etc. as they used
different marks of distinction to separate themselves from lower classes by things such as
poetry and dance (Rossides, 1984). At the end of the day, the rules of modern education
have evolved, but the purpose remains the same. In other words, the education apparatus
functions to legitimize and protect a certain class in societies that Rossides (1984)
described as incompetent elites by using what seems to be an objective tool (education)
that superficially claims equality and fair competition.
Saudi Social Structure
The signs of incongruence between the ruling family and the close circle of elites
in Saudi Arabia and the masses started early in the newly born kingdom. Ibn-Saud had
established a solid partnership with the so-called Wahhabi movement and the ulama
(religious scholars) to establish the new country based on their interpretation of Islam.
The message that Ibn-Saud brought to the desert was received with great hopes by the
nomadic tribes in which he brought an end to the wars between them, the result of which
appeared to be one entity. However, the tribal armies that were instrumental in IbnSaud’s success in establishing the kingdom were slowly but surely isolated and became
antithetical to his administration and the formation of the modern country. Instead,
stronger coalitions were formed between the royal family and the elite of Hijaz (western
region) and rulers of Najd (the heart of Saudi Arabia) (Abir, 1988; Moaddel, 2006).
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When addressing the oneness of the nation, it seems that the condition of the country and
the royal family was inseparable.
In the late 20th century, there was a large social divide in the country stemming
from limited economic opportunities due to the country’s vulnerability because of its
reliance on one commodity (oil) and price fluctuations (rentier economy). This type of
economy was defined by Luciani (1990) as “an economy where the creation of wealth is
centered around a small fraction of the society; the rest of the society are only engaged in
the distribution and utilization of this wealth” (p. 87). This situation polarized the
country, one group adhering to the Islamic values (their interpretation) to awaken the
nation and bring it back to the right path and the other group considered to be liberal
reformists (Moaddel, 2006). Both groups agreed on the need for restructuring the
country. However, a highlighted incident in recent Saudi history was when a group of
Muslim militants took control of the Holy Mosque (Mecca) in 1979, forcing the
government to consolidate with the religious movement. With that change, the
government scored high on peoples’ trust because the nation was under attack while their
religion was being hijacked by extremists. Consequently, the momentum for the
reformists’ movement was demolished.
In Saudi society in the early 20th century, (Abir, 1988; Rugh, 1973; Zuhur, 2011)
was described as a society without social classes as we know it today (Western sense)
simply because Arabia at the time consisted of mostly nomadic tribes. Exceptions were
the merchants in the Hijaz region and the ulama in Najd. Changes occurred after Ibn Saud
consolidated power of the new ruling class (aristocracy). With the production of oil in
1938 and modernization efforts after World War II, the system produced new social
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classes and social structures. Abir (1988) claimed that this structure did not stem from
wealth or education but rather from the degree of affiliation to the royal family or
regional origins. However, in later stages, education was used as another crutch to stay on
top of the social hierarchy because the elites had better schools and better teachers.
Furthermore, their sons were sent abroad to receive better education than the rest of the
people, and therefore, they used educational credentials to remain atop the social ladder
by using what seemed to be an objective and neutral criterion.
The king’s partners, who helped him financially and logistically in consolidating
the kingdom, were incorporated into the Saudi aristocracy. It is important to concentrate
on this behavior because I believe it set the tone for the entire nation socially and made
nepotism and patronage more entrenched in the society. “Together with the royal house
and the ulama they are considered to be a component of the ruling class” (Abir, 1988, p.
7). Furthermore, in the 1970s, another component was added to the ruling class, which
was the umara (chiefs of tribes). Abir (1988) depicted this situation as rule by oligarchy.
The key elements in being part of the ruling class were “origin, seniority, prestige, and
leadership qualities” (p. 10) in addition to the overarching element that has been aligned
with Wahhabi ideology because it was the hegemonic power in the region. To further
legitimize this class and its power, they established a Consultative Council and were
members of it. In essence, by being followers of Wahhabism, they domesticated the
population because the movement was established on the premise of being a
representation of pure Islam (Unitarian), especially with the rise of polytheism. This
established the ideological power, and the Consultative Council has given them the
political authority to dominate.
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Moaddel’s (2006) study touched on the social construction and Saudis’ attitudes
toward many concepts, such as religion, religiosity, and democracy among others. It is
interesting to note that the lower class people were proponents of Western style
democracy and did not see these changes as a cultural invasion. On the other hand, the
elites and the upper class, keeping in mind their easier access to better education, ability
to travel and to study abroad, and with more exposure to democratic ideas, were reluctant
to accept democracy. This was because democracy would undermine their interests, both
political and financial, and protecting the status quo (structure) was more beneficial,
especially in the rentier economy. Moaddel asserted that “Rentierism thus reinforces the
state’s tribal origins, because it regenerates the tribal hierarchy consisting of varying
layers of beneficiaries with the ruling elite on top, in an effective position of buying
loyalty through their redistributive power” (p. 103).
In a study conducted by Khashan (1984) where the author measured the
perception of some Saudi university students and found that unlike what is happening in
Western universities where students strive to maintain a middle-class status, Saudi
students aspired to join the wealthy segment of the society. The author contributed this to
their family socioeconomic background, as most of the university students interviewed in
his study belonged to the upper socioeconomic class. In Khashan’s study, 58 percent of
the students reported that they came from a high income population, and this was
reflected in their income expectations as well because they wanted to maintain the status
quo. Interestingly, Khashan (1984) claimed that “there is no clear evidence that the lower
income groups are excluded from college because the regime wants to keep them out” (p.
21). Nevertheless, he stated that the bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia was corrupt and that
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personal relationships get things done and people from upper socioeconomic segments of
society get better services, including education. Another observation the author made for
the greater enrollment of more affluent segments was that because this segment valued
education more than other socioeconomic groups. This observation, in my view, comes
from anything but a critical lens, especially when the author immersed himself in Saudi
society. I take this stance because as a reader, there is a hidden message that the lowerclass population has deficiencies or an intrinsic dislike for education and can be also
viewed as less motivated to pursue higher education or education in general. It is vital to
look at the history of modern Saudi education and society to at least have a broader
understanding of the social construction and stratification.
Nieuwenhuijze (1965), in his book, Social Stratification and the Middle East,
examined societies in the MENA region and how people attained a position in the
middle-class. He compared the situation with that of Europe, concluding that societies in
general are bipolar, where one group is on the top (elite) and the other is on the bottom
(the masses). His argument was about the creation of the middle class and who becomes
eligible to be part of that strata. The author cautions us that we do not attribute upward
mobility strictly to modern education because elites throughout the history of mankind
did not necessarily have modern education under their belt to attain their status, but rather
they had different tools that sustained or prolonged their position at the top. The Saudi
case is an example of this situation, where the ruling class established partnerships with
representatives of the most sacred element of the mass’s life (religion) to legitimize their
ability to rule the nation. Also resulting from this partnership was the creation of social
stratification.
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Furthermore, modern education and certain credentials, for example, Western,
enhanced individuals’ chances to move up socially. But the question remained: Who is
the major beneficiary of that, especially in the foundation of Saudi Arabia and its modern
education? I believe that the answer is complicated to some because state historians and
scholars would agree with the actions by the government regarding the expansion of
education during the early 20th century and its initial focus on specific regions and
populations in order to stabilize the country in its initial stages. But we can look at the
elite top—excluding the royal family—and see who they actually represent. We can
investigate the important positions in the government and examine who occupies these
positions. We realize that most if not all come from a common socioeconomic class,
which not only hindered the mass’s chance of moving up socially but also kills the
aspiration of generations to better themselves socially, economically, and intellectually.
Brichs (2013) explained it best:
. . . the process of creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the consolidation
of the ruling elite has led to the identification of the al-Saud family with the state,
blurring distinctions between one and the other. The resource ‘state’ is therefore
under absolute control of the core elite, i.e. the royal family and their immediate
circle, as are all the resources deriving from it: capital, coercion, ideology, and
information. . . . This redistribution (monetary) took place first between the
members of the royal family, then between the members of tribal elite comprising
the founding elite of the Saudi state and finally the religious, commercial and
military elites through different clientelistic mechanisms but mainly through the
generation of managerial and administrative positions in the state. (pp. 162-163)
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Akkari (2004) paid attention to the situation in the entire Middle East and North Africa
region and said, “The least privileged and the poor are those most strongly affected by
precarious situation of the education system” (p. 149). However, the Saudi education
system adds insult to injury because it is a wealthy country and has huge political and
economic influence in the region and in the world. The condition of the education system
does not promise a better future. That is to say, the nature of a rentier economy would not
be sustainable for a long time, and other economic and educational alternatives should be
explored to avoid a disastrous future.
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Views on Globalization and Saudi Arabia
Overview of Globalization
There is an interest to discover the genesis of globalization. Wallerstein (1974)
suggested that it emerged in the 15th century under the world capitalist system. However,
the term has been used in a larger scale since the 1970s (Abo-Arrad, 2004) and 1980s
(Robertson, 1992). Even though globalization has been commonplace for years, Allen
(2001) questioned the recent tendency of Western and even global discourse about
globalization and reinforcement even though humans have been globalized for centuries.
Jameson (1998) believed that a new and more intense version or form of globalization
emerged in the late 20th century. For example, the globalization in the 15th century was
different. This difference was crystalized in easier movement beyond borders of
commodities, ideas, capital, among others. This could not have happened without
advanced technologies.
The discrepancy between those different globalizations was caused not only by
material conditions but also by different ideas and perceptions of people who lived during
these eras. Robertson (1992) believed that globalization means “the compression of the
world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (p. 8). The world
has been compressed politically, economically, and by the nature of cultural
relationships, not only among people but also between nation-states, which have become
more interconnected. Furthermore, people perceive and discuss the world and its events
differently. People see the world as smaller, and some refer to it as a village because of
today’s instant exchange of information, ideas, and even recent revolutions through
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media and the Internet, such as the recent Egyptian revolution (Eltantawy & Wiest,
2011).
It is imperative to shed light on the nature of globalization, as Tomlinson (1999)
considered it as multidimensional phenomenon. Previously, globalization was examined
from an economic angle, but many scholars, such as Robertson (1992), also have begun
to investigate cultural aspects influenced by globalization. Therefore, it is pivotal to
deeply understand globalization to investigate it from these two dimensions. Giddens
(1991) contributed to an understanding of globalization by framing it as a “dialectic of
the local and the global” (p. 22). That is to say, globalization can be seen as both a
homogenization and as a heterogenization force. In essence, globalization homogenizes
the world through the intensified connectedness between people, ideas, and nations, and
at the same time, the world is heterogenized because people and perhaps nations become
conscious of the differences between localism and globalism.
The Economic Dimension of Globalization
The economic dimension has polarized people’s perception of globalization
because it seems that there are two major perceptions regarding globalization. The first
celebrates globalization because it is seen as an economic opportunity for the peripheral
countries, and the second condemns globalization because of its negative consequences.
Fitzsimons (2000) argued that a parallel relationship with the emergence of globalization
and the neo-liberalism movement exists by considering the latter as the theoretical
foundation of the latest type of globalization. In other words, neo-liberalism goes handin-hand with globalization. Conway (1995) described classic liberalism in action as a
civil society that consists of rational individuals who track their interests freely. King
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(1995) stated that liberalism ascribes a society as just when there is a free-market
exchange. Furthermore, this understanding of liberalism is tied to capitalism because of
the postulation that a civil society can be achieved through a capitalist economy. Wells,
Carnocha, Slayton, Allen, and Vasudeva (1998) stated that neo-liberalism became
prominent over the past two decades because of its advocacy of “free, unregulated
markets coupled with aggressive individualism” (p. 324).
Globalization that aligns with neo-liberalism can be seen as positive by some
because it weakens formerly rigid borders between nation-states by creating a global
market that in return eases economic activities and exchanges between different nations.
Marx and Engels (1848/1985) discussed the globalizing nature of the capitalist economy
by stating that “the bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country” (p. 83). The
purpose of capitalism is to gain profits. In the same vein, Martin (2000) stated that neoliberals who advocate for a capitalistic economy consider what happens in the peripheral
country by being part of globalization and that the global market is the greatest
achievement since the end of war. In other words, neo-liberalism considers nation-states
as an impediment to the global market. Bryan and Farrell (1996) said it best: “The only
participants who can cause real havoc in the global capital markets are the national
governments themselves because they have the power to distort the market through their
influence on capital flows” (p. 8). On the other hand, national governments in the Third
World countries most likely would not disturb the current arrangements because they
benefit the most from it, and the alternative might erode their elite status. With this in
mind, even though nation-states in the periphery may, in theory, hinder capitalism, in
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actuality, capitalism needs nation-states as “a defense mechanism” (Wallerstein, 1974, p.
402) to protect capitalism. In other words, Wallerstein (1974) argued that the nation-state
system was initiated to protect the interests of capitalists in the core as well as the nationstates but at the same time hurt the nation-state system and weakened the periphery
nation-states. Globally, capitalism is connected to racial constructions, and Allen (2001)
argued that “the nation-state system is a type of ecosystem for the survival of the white
body and white mind” (Allen, 2001, p. 480). In the global sense, I might add, the nationstate system is a type of ecosystem for the survival for the white polity as well.
This shows the complexity of the relationship between nation-states, capitalism,
and neo-liberalism. On the one hand, the nation-states in the core were the beneficiary
from this system for wealth accumulation via colonialism and exploitation of peripheral
areas by preventing the creation of nation-states to resist colonization as countries. On the
other hand, in order to control the capitalist economy, the nation-states system functions
via strengthening borders for the nation-states, which in return enhances nationalism in
the core states.
Allen (2001) analyzed globalization from two lenses: first, through the Marxist
viewpoint, which considers capitalism at the core of the global structure, and second,
through critical race theory perspective, which considers race and “white supremacy is
the most totalizing” (p. 468) superstructure in globalization. Furthermore, Allen
considered Marx and Engels’s views that focus on class analysis as inadequate and
instead asserted that race should be at the center of any globalization analysis. That is to
say, the Marxist discourse fails to clearly state the role of neoliberalism in racializing the
globe into white and nonwhite.

41

Neoliberalism is not producing a retraction of the nation-states as much as it is
restructuring of it for the further perpetuation of white identity politics in national
and international domains. (Allen, 2001, p. 473)
Moreover, Allen (2001) engaged further in his critique of the Marxist view of
globalization because it did not acknowledge to a satisfactory degree “the European
motivation, desire, and racialization for centuries of imperialism, genocide, and slavery”
(p. 476).
Globalization, capitalism, and neo-liberalism have shifted the function or the
meaning of nation-states. To demonstrate, Harvey (1990) and Miyoshi (1993) paid
attention to the economic power by the private corporations that have transitioned to be
multinational and finally transnational corporations (TNCs). The TNCs, according to the
maximum financial profit, moved its locations overseas, away from restrictions, seeking
cheaper labor and lower taxes. This became possible because of the global market and
also because of the important role of the nation-state system by controlling the economic
and financial activities both in the core and periphery areas (Hirst & Thompson, 1995).
Nonetheless, the intensification of the TNCs, which coincided the superficial
independence from colonialism after World War II, may have shifted the role of nationstates in the core where they become unable to control the former colonies overtly and
therefore used TNCs to do the job covertly (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, 2002). As a result, it seems that these corporations are the main beneficiary
of globalization.
What does globalization do? As mentioned, it means further domination over the
global market from the TNCs, which results in more capital growth. On the one hand,
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Smith (1997) described globalization as an “increasingly pure form of imperialism” (p.
182), and on the other, Miyoshi (1993) considered it as “intensified colonialism” (p.750).
It is perceived as such because there is acceleration in unequal development in which
globalization widens the gap between the rich and poor, not only between nation-states in
the core and periphery but also within nations. Therefore, we have a massive discrepancy
between the top socioeconomic class and the lower ones.
The Cultural Dimension of Globalization
Globalization intends to homogenize the globe and at the same time provokes
heterogenization (Barber, 1996), which shows a dialectical relationship between the two
effects. In other words, people around the world consume the same products (e.g.,
Hollywood movies) and also impose norms, values, and mass culture (McDonalization)
that are foreign to periphery states where people simultaneously develop a parochial
localism and nationalism by clinging to their ethnic, local, and national identities (Ritzer,
2000). Hall (1997) stated that “the return to the local is often a response to globalization”
(p. 33). Featherstone (1996) said “the difficulty of handling increasing levels of cultural
complexity, and the doubts and anxieties they often engender, are reasons why localism,
or the desire to return home, becomes an important theme” (p. 47). Due to the huge
influence of ideas, products, values, and ideologies disseminated via global avenues,
people become more confused because their local view and interpretations is no longer
the only way to read and understand the world around them. Therefore, people or nations
develop strong local, ethnic, and national attachments to face the homogenizing force of
globalization.
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The debate remains between scholars in the way they analyze globalization and
on what they should concentrate on. For example, Appadurai (1996) considered
globalization as more of a heterogenization story, even though he acknowledged its
homogenizing force. However, Ritzer (2004) emphasized more of the homogenization
thrust of globalization even though heterogenization is considered within the process.
Different Globalizations
The effect of globalization is not the same in different part of the world because it
is a multidimensional phenomenon: homogenization and heterogenization. Pieterse
(1994) claimed that globalization produces a third type of globalization called
hybridization, but he cautioned missing critical aspects of globalization in different
contexts, such as “the actual unevenness, asymmetry, and inequality in the global
relations” (p. 54). That is to say, globalization has given people from different cultural
backgrounds access to other worldviews and products, but there is uneven access for all
people to offer counter views, which thereby creates a situation where the hegemonic
worldview, values, products (the core and the transnational class) dominate peripheral
areas. Therefore, the transnational classes in nation-states in periphery areas are
disconnected from the population in their states, and they have more common interests
with other transnational classes in other nation-states because they share economic
interests, culture, and language. At the end of the day, this creates a gap between the
transnational class (elite) in the periphery areas and the population of their state because
the elite adopted global economic practices and assimilated to Western cultures (Miyoshi,
1993).
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This practice of the transnational class is referred to as globalization from above.
However, this triggers transnational activists to initiate globalization from below. To put
it in perspective, Brecher, Costello, and Smith (2002) depicted globalization from above
as increasing development in communication, technologies, and transportation that at the
same time causes inequality, poverty, environment and democracy destruction, and also
the spread of neo-liberal ideology in peripheral nations. On the other hand, globalization
from above gives transnational activists advanced tools to monitor human rights issues
and environmental concerns by pressuring nation-states to tackle local and global
concerns. This is considered globalization from below where in essence activists use the
tools provided by globalization to resist inequalities or other negatives that emanate from
globalization.
Today’s globalization highlights local and global problems and helps populations
be aware of them via advanced communication tools. Globalization from above that
advocates for technological advancement, massive communication, the spread of the
Internet and making the world smaller also is accused of promoting colonization,
domination, homogenization, inequality, exploitation, capitalism, and neo-liberalism for
the world. As a result, globalization triggers a resistance known as globalization from
below, where activists aim to fight negative consequences of mythological globalization.
How will this resistance (globalization from below) function in the 21st century? Will it
gain more momentum within the transnational class and periphery areas, or will it
dissolve between homogenization and heterogenization?
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Saudi Arabia and Globalization
Globalization is a domination of economic, educational, and cultural aspects of
life, which is considered to be colonization of the market and the mind. Abo-Arrad
(2004) argued that globalization from above in the case of Saudi Arabia can be seen in
the following three areas: economic, political, and cultural. First, Abo-Arrad (2004)
claimed that the economic effect of globalization from above occurs when international
groups engage in a capitalization process that takes over the Saudi market. Second, AboArrad (2004) argued that the political effect of globalization from above is where the
American influence impacts constructing nations, which creates divisions within nations.
As a result, nations become unable to resist capitalism and become reliant on it to
survive. Lastly, Abo-Arrad (2004) claimed that the American cultural invasion is a third
effect of globalization from above, whereby nations and individuals are not capable of
seeking other alternatives that stem from their critical thinking and problem solving, and
instead, they rely on Western models.
Abo-Arrad (2004) examined the reasons behind the entrenched globalization in
Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Third World. He argued that the strategy used to
force globalization includes the freeing up of international trade, the flow of international
investments, a technological and information revolution, and the role transnational
companies. However, the most important aspect of globalization is the technological
advancement represented in the use of Internet and other forms of media. Abo-Arrad
(2004) asserted that the main aim of globalization is cultural domination, which can be
secured by the other factors, such as economic and political.
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Education as Globalizing Instrument
As an effort to explore the concept of hegemony, which I do not distinguish from
globalization, Apple (1990) stated that there is nothing known a neutral educational
institution. Every institution has an agenda, overt or covert, and that agenda is a result of
conscious or unconscious practices. Apple (1990) sought a better understanding of the
relationship between education and economic structure, and how that relationship relates
to the concepts of knowledge and power. Apple (1990) wanted to find about how
education plays a role in perpetuating economic inequalities. Moreover, he questioned the
efforts of education to preserve and distribute cultural capital.
Three aspects of education are necessary to investigate: “first, schools as
institutions, second, the knowledge form, and third, the educator him or herself” (Apple,
1990, p. 3). The role of schools is creating a false consensus by teaching what is
supposedly legitimate knowledge. Questions emerge: Who chooses that knowledge to be
legitimate? Whose knowledge is it? On the other hand, schools teach students a specific
way to inquire, rather than letting or helping students develop their own approach to
inquiry. They follow agreed-upon techniques that students are expected to follow
(homogenization).
Intellectuals participate in creating relationships between social activity and
education that make students objects of hegemony. Intellectuals legitimize the process of
education and make it seem to be a fair process—yet that is an illusion. Apple (1990)
suggested that reform can be attainable by educators’ efforts to examine the relationship
between ideology and curriculum—that is, not only by questioning how students acquire
this knowledge but also by including how and how much collective culture are presented
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at schools. Furthermore, Apple questioned the hidden curriculum at schools and the
norms that have been taken for granted. The nature of the knowledge being taught at
schools is problematic, because educators do not fully know, or they ignore, the source of
the knowledge and the social strata it supports. To me, education in this scenario
functions as an agent for globalization to implement its agenda.
Apple (1990) saw individuals in educational and cultural apparatus interested in
social control and reproduction of existing hierarchies. That is to say, schools are more
concerned with distribution of dispositions and norms rather than with giving equal
chances to learn skills and to acquire qualifications by all, regardless of students’ societal
attachments. The reason for that behavior is to maintain the hierarchical nature of
societies. Apple (1990) addressed ethical obligations by researchers that make life more
livable with the hope of making improvements and changes. He saw the fulfillment of
that obligation as possible through collective and structured action by educators. They
need to continue the journey for a more ethical and poetic understanding of curriculum in
order to have a new social order and perhaps social justice.
Wexler and Whitson (1982) explored the failure and disappointing results of some
radical education efforts to change the outcome of mainstream education. They noticed
the active participation of students in sustaining hegemony and the reproduction of
socioeconomic classes. Therefore, they believed that specific analysis of hegemony is
important in order to understand the reasons behind the failure of radical changes. At
first, Wexler and Whitson attempted to define hegemony as a starting point by paying
attention to socio-historical context. The authors considered hegemony as the following:
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A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a
structure. It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and activities,
with specific and changing pressures and limits. In practice, that is, hegemony can
never be singular. (Wexler & Whitson, 1982, p. 31)
Moreover, hegemony is defined as “the imposition of dominant culture on non-dominant
groups, particularly since the era begun by Reagan and Thatcher international economic
policies” (Olaniran & Agnello, 2008, p. 69). In other words, and in a global view,
educational hegemony is imposed by economically developed countries (EDCs) on less
economically developed countries (LEDCs). Olaniran and Agnello (2008) argued that the
globalization era began in the 1970s by the actions of corporations and by manufacturing,
in which the focus was on transferring capital and consequently resulted in more
production and sales more than anything else. Additionally, the researchers argued that
the globalization movement sought not only economic reform but also educational and
occupational restructuring. In essence, EDCs attempted to dictate the agenda for the
world according to their worldview and how they wanted it to be. In return, the less
developed countries have no choice but to adhere to the rules because “resistance is
futile” (Olaniran & Agnello, 2008, p. 69). The economically developed countries have
information technology, which is the tool and capital in the process of globalization.
According to Olaniran and Agnello (2008), globalization has divided the world into the
three main powers of Western Europe, America, and Asian Pacific, in addition to the rest
of the world, which has no choice but to form alliances with the three main powers and to
follow the rules.
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Consequently, in order for the rest of the world to survive in the new world order,
technologically underdeveloped countries must alter their educational systems and
embrace the technological system. If not, it is inevitable that they will remain
economically excluded and will reside at a lower economic status. Therefore, it is
assumed that transforming local educational systems to be identical to the Western ones
would be a successful move across the globe. Yet that would ignore other factors, such as
cultural, social, political, and ecological factors that are unique to those countries. In
essence, it would be a misuse of brainpower in those nations (Olaniran & Agnello, 2008).
It is imperative to know the dimensions of education, especially in the
globalization era where societies tend to be alike in curriculum, structure, and goals due
to the political nature of the world. Olaniran and Agnello (2008) stated:
There is an increased realization that globalization policy implies that education
control is no longer under the direct control of a given society, especially the
LEDCs who have never been involved in globalization policy setting and their
chances at influencing the policy is equally small at best. . . . Education has long
been seen as a way to control how people learn and also serves as agency for
bringing about social and cultural changes and reproduction. . . . The pressure is
to create one global culture, education, and economy whether intentional or
unintentional is a direct consequence of technology and policies perpetuated and
embraced by EDCs. (pp. 72-73, 76)
However, there is confusion about the concept of hegemony, and that was seen in
Anderson’s criticism of Gramsci’s work (as cited in Wexler & Whitson, 1982). Anderson
said that “Gramsci’s work [is] unsuccessful and contradictory” (p. 31). Hegemony,
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according to Gramsci (as cited in Wexler & Whitson, 1982) is more intellectual and
moral leadership rather than coercive action. In addition to the former understanding of
hegemony as false consciousness, the notion of process and ideology is included to
become the way a dominant social group articulates the interests of other social groups to
benefit itself. This is through making the situation neutral. Wexler and Whitson (1982)
saw hegemony (I may add globalization) as one component of the capitalist arsenal in
addition to the processes of ideology and coercive power.
Hegemony in Wexler and Whitson’s (1982) perspective is shaped by a wide range
of cultural domains. They include interaction and identity, organization, and education.
They suggest that hegemony is maintained by not only culture and social structure, but it
is also “accomplished in our day-to-day interpersonal relations” (p. 38). Hegemony
contains any kind of opposition by making it just for display and expression. Therefore, it
is permitted as long as it does not challenge existing structures.
The Periphery Region
It is vital to offer background on my targeted education system(s), which are in
the Middle East and North Africa. However, Saudi Arabia is my specific concentration,
but it is also important to investigate the educational situation in the region because of the
similar cultural and educational experiences of nearby peoples. Formal educational
systems in some of these countries had been initiated by colonial powers in its current
compulsory modern education form. However, according to Akkari (2004), education
was limited to natives for two main reasons: First, the colonial powers did not want to
provide education to the natives, which could contribute to the natives challenging the
colonial power; and second, this restriction in education—especially, European-language
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education—has maintained colonial administration and weakened pro-independence
tendencies. It is not only important to know that but also to know the aftermath of these
policies, which have created a stronger religious education that focuses primarily on
opposing Western education and hegemony. The bottom line is that “the story of
education has also been the story of post-colonial government control of education for
purposes of nation building and economic development” (Akkari, 2004, p. 145).
Therefore, I believe that those countries that chose to be religion oriented have isolated
themselves from the rest of the world and thus are suffering the consequences. In other
words, this has diminished the slightest hope of a beautiful (my imagination) organic
relationship between the traditional and secular educations because in my assessment,
they are not and should not be antithetical.
Globalized Education
Creating a one-size-fits-all global education is evidentially failing, where history
shows that societies resist hegemonic endeavors, either subtly or militantly. Olaniran and
Agnello (2008) raised questions about the notion that technology would save the LEDCs
where in fact it does not and instead deepens the dependence of those countries on
industrial cultures and capital and further contributes to monoculturalism, which in return
continues to marginalize the less developed countries and their cultures. Ironically,
Olaniran and Agnello (2008) claimed that if the less developed countries embraced
technological globalization through global education policies, they would not be able to
succeed because the policymakers might change the rules of the game, or the rules might
not apply equally on all participants.
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Neal and Finlay (2007) explored the effects of American hegemony on education
in Arab societies. The purpose of the study, which was conducted in Lebanon, was to
discover the type of hegemony that existed in the region, both as externally or internally
hegemonic to Arab values. Neal and Finlay (2007) raised a question: “Does the spread of
American business education involve the spread of progressive business values to
unprogressive parts of the world?” (p. 39). Further, the authors stressed the fact that
education has a great role in social change, especially with gender inequality and corrupt
leaderships in the region. However, what the authors call Arab values may prevent such
progressive ambitions. Yet, discussing Arab cultural values is beyond the scope of this
paper and its relation to the outcomes of schooling or of the current economic or political
atmosphere.
There is a claim that American hegemony in education might produce good
results for the people because the American model has given students a chance to look at
corruption differently, especially when students see the Arab traditional values as
perpetuating corruption. Therefore, students adapt the progressive spirit from the
American textbooks (Neal & Finlay, 2007). In other words, the hegemonic influence
might help underdeveloped countries, such as Lebanon, to make desirable changes. To
better understand the progressive values in question that are embedded in American
textbooks, the authors investigated the following values: equity, tolerance, accountability,
consultation, and transparency. The question becomes, are these values embedded in
hegemony, or did they pre-exist in the society prior to the introduction of American or
Western education? In other words, the authors were not clear about whether the
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American education style changes the values of the students to be progressive or if this
hegemony reinforced pre-existing human values.
Neal and Finlay (2007) confirmed that American business education is externally
hegemonic where worldwide educational systems adopt to their institutions, practices,
and systems. This is not necessarily bad because it may result in fighting corruption, as
claimed in the article. On the other hand, examining the idea that American education is
internally hegemonic is not as clear as the external notion, for two reasons: First, it is
incorrect and unsustainable to have Western ownership of progressive values, and
second, the accuracy of measuring the change in Arab students’ values because of
exposure of American textbooks is hard to prove. However, the authors believed that
American business education was internally hegemonic in two fashions: First, it may
reinforce pre-existing progressive values such as tolerance and consultation, or second, it
may change some traditional values antipathetic to progressive values. However, I can
argue that such values (transparency, accountability, and equity) used to be the norm in
Arab and Islamic societies, but something in history changed that and made them seem
foreign to the region, which evidentially confirms the dynamic nature of societies where
values change according to many factors.
Neal and Finlay (2007) did not believe that “the hegemonic dominance of
American systems, standards, curricula, resources, and textbooks is meeting the
educational needs of students in the majority world” (p. 66). The authors had reasons to
believe the monopolization of the American mainstream ignored local issues and
circumstances. Furthermore, this might have prevented meaningful learning because
students could not relate knowledge to their local communities and realities. On another
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note, students in the Arab world would be working in the region and the constant
marginalization of their realities would not help them to be creative, and therefore, their
local issues and realities should be the center of education.
According to Neal and Finlay (2007), there are challenges in changing the status
quo. First, the completeness of American textbooks does not allow for inner desire or
room for local creativities that discuss the local problems. In addition, busy teachers do
not have the time to be creative and thus rely on materials provided by the school.
Second, using the English language as a medium of instruction is troubling as well
because students cannot read as fast as native speakers of English and they end up with
no time to focus on local issues. Another problem is that Arab universities lack materials
in Arabic that touch on local issues and, therefore, busy teachers see it as practical to use
the readily available option of American textbooks. Moreover, the reliance on foreign
material also introduces pedagogical problems when marginalizing local issues. Neal and
Finlay (2007) summed up the education struggle in the Arab world in the following
statement: “there is tripartite struggle going on between hegemony, tradition, and
education” (p. 67). I argue here that the profit for international companies from textbook
production supersedes local interests, and this can be done in a globalized world and
capitalist societies.
A Cross-cultural Example
I am an advocate of the improvement of educational systems because there is
always an opportunity for better educational practices. But the questions are how we can
do that and who has the right to perform this laborious task. Baker (1997) discovered this
after spending lengthy time in different parts of the world, including Sri Lanka, Vietnam,
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Morocco, Tanzania, Cuba, Ethiopia, and aboriginal Australia. Those countries represent
different cultures, religions, customs, and traditions; however, they have one common
feature, which Baker (1997) classified as resistance to Western hegemonic influences.
Baker (1997) found that their ways of resisting were diverse but that restoring their
cultures and values was the motive (globalization as heterogenization). Most of the
nations he visited follow formal teaching approaches and understand education
differently.
The idea of reforming educational systems is important, but, at the same time, is
complicated. The process of reformation includes three primary obstacles: First, who the
legitimate entity would be to undertake the process; second, the knowledge (curriculum)
must be legitimate and relevant; and third, the method of implementing change is crucial.
Therefore, these complex situations require complex solutions that stem from specific
cultural contexts. In contrast, pedagogical imperialism does not produce great results but
rather worsens the relationships between the dominant groups and the dominated groups.
It created interruptions and misunderstanding because minorities did not fully conform to
dominance; therefore, the time for new alternatives was overdue, and hopefully trust and
good intentions would be the driving force for reformation efforts.
Possible Reasons behind Failed Educational Alternatives
Wexler and Whitson (1982) addressed the reasons behind the distortion of other
educational alternatives to change the nature of reproduction and globalized education.
The failure is attributed to external constraints and mixed agendas. First, external
constraints are the result of bureaucratic states and political accountability. These
political constraints determine what is attempted in schools as well as distorting
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unwanted alternatives. Mixed agendas, on the other hand, are related to the ambiguous
role of teachers and their teacher-student relationships. This ambiguity results in a
number of dilemmas that could be solved only if the teacher-student interpersonal
relationship were repaired. However, the authors stated that there is no general solution
for these dilemmas, but apparently interpersonal relationships are crucial in shaping
identities to fit within hegemonic systems.
Knowledge of infrastructure (Wexler & Whitson, 1982) is the way to counter
hegemonic theory and practice as well as to understand the mechanisms that support
hegemony, especially when social methods are patterned and amenable to change.
Counter-hegemony means reorganization of the different elements and the belief of the
possibility of change to a new vision of social order. There are different means of
achieving this goal, and education is one of them.
A Vision of Reform in the Globalization Era
Educational reform in the case of Saudi Arabia to resist the negative effects of
globalization and hegemony could be achieved through some strategies. Abo-Arrad
(2004) suggested three strategies. The first is by quantitative expansion. This entails
increasing the number of teacher preparation institutions at all levels, especially at the
college level and in graduate programs. Furthermore, Abo-Arrad believed that increasing
the acceptance capacity in higher education is crucial, especially when half of the Saudi
population was under the age of 24 (Clary & Karlin, 2011). Second, this quantitative
expansion should be balanced by regions where students across the country have equal
chances in access as opposed to only the elites. I believe this would start a debate
between equality and equity.
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The third strategy is a qualitative expansion that entails first, improving teaching
pedagogies to include discovery, critical thinking, dialogue, knowledge induction, and
problem solving as opposed to rote methods. Second improving curriculum to
concentrate on both national and international issues. Third: improving students’
evaluations and testing. Fourth: a material improvement in school conditions to provide
students with the needed technologies and structure that help them achieve their goals.
Fifth: raising the awareness of the nature of capitalism that advocates for unnecessary
consumerism. Sixth: investing in scientific research. Abo-Arrad (2004) highlighted the
shocking status of research where the entire Arab world invested about only 1% of its
GDP in research and development.
Furthermore, the statistics came from an American research entity (Abo-Arrad,
2004), which draws my attention, first, to the interest of American entities to assess the
research centers in the Arab world, and second, to the lack of monitoring agencies in
Arab nations to such an important issue. However, the Saudi education system focuses on
hard sciences that gear students to enroll in such fields, which in return has marginalized
the importance of sociocultural research that would address inequalities in Saudi society
(Clary & Karlin, 2011). Clary and Karlin (2011) believed that the focus on hard science
is understandable because of the challenges that accompany the design of a social-science
curriculm.
Abo-Arrad (2004) introduced a new educational structure that suggested moving
from the traditional Educational Ladder model to the Educational Tree model, which
advocates for organic relationships between different fields in education and programs.
The connection is rooted in a common culture and national identity so that the challenges
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of globalization and Western hegemony can be faced. Hence, Abo-Arrad (2004)
challenged the current hierarchical structure because it prevented reform efforts.
Possible Future Reform
First and foremost, I believe that a socioeconomic analysis is needed in Saudi
society to examine the different generations that comprise the nation. According to
Yamani (2000), Saudi society consisted of three generations: those born in the 1930s in
the time when the country was united; those born in the 1950s who experienced the
wealth of the oil boom; and those born in the 1970s and 1980s, who faced economic and
political instability and were exposed to unprecedented Western influence and values
through media (cultural hegemony). Yamani’s (2000) focus was on the clash between the
third generation and the other generation: It has been documented that there was a huge
gap between them, especially in the areas of social and political values and in the modern
economic infrastructure. The major concern is on how to create a balance between the
openness of the Saudi youth reformers to Western modern values—hybridization—and
the local cultural values (Pieterse, 1994). The problem is that this issue has not been
addressed, and therefore, the dependency on Western solutions, whether in educational,
economic, or political issues, remains intact. This view, especially with members of the
new generation, would result in idealizing Western societies, which in return colonizes
the minds of the coming generations (conformity).
Most of the research I have examined was written by Western researchers, which
is a clear showcase of the bad situation and made me question the Saudi scholars and
their research efforts to provide insights for policymakers about reform. What did those
educators, politicians, and other researchers who were funded by the Saudi government to
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study in the West since the 1950s and 1960s do to reform their nation’s education
system? I ask this because reform can be interpreted differently according to the
background of the researcher. For example, Rugh (2002a) saw a sign of education reform
when there was “increasing use of English as medium of instruction in the [Saudi]
classroom” [emphasis added] (p. 44). I believe it is ironic to impose another language on
all students to acquire a minimum of technological development while they suffer an
enormous loss in their culture, identity, and native language. In the same vein, I am not
opposing everything Western. I would rather choose the necessary approach in
transmitting knowledge from any possible source to make the necessary reform—and
then transition to independence. We do not need to impose the English language, for
example, on all but only on those who need to make contact with other educational
systems to facilitate the reform movement. Interestingly, Rugh (2002b) was content with
the new trends in Saudi society and education because there was an increase of Westernstyle learning, as if critical thinking and problem solving approaches are Western
trademarks as opposed to human traits, and also because schools increased the dose of
English language and focused more on scientific subjects. It is implied that Arabic
language and culture are antithetical to success and reform. In other words, Saudis need
to give up their language and culture and become more civilized and successful—and this
happens when they imitate anything Western.
A lengthy study by (Maroun, Samman, Moujaes, & Abouchakra, 2008) addressed
the status quo of the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) educational systems and
socioeconomic status in those countries, of which Saudi Arabia is one. Expenditures on
public education, when viewed as a share of the Saudi GDP, from the 1980s to 2005,
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were almost 7% greater than many developed countries (or compared with). But
ironically, these expenditures did not contribute to a desired outcome on many levels.
First, the Saudi illiteracy rate remained high at 24 percent, compared with Singapore,
which had an illiteracy rate of 7%, and Argentina, 3%. Second, the average enrollment
rate in the GCC countries for tertiary education was 24% compared with Canada, 57%,
and the Republic of Korea, 89%. Third, the official Saudi unemployment rate was 15%
(conservative figure) in 2005. However, Bremmer (2004) claimed that the actual
unemployment rate was greater than 20%.
Allam (2011) affirmed that the Saudi government spent $38 billion of its 2011
budget on education, but again, the outcome was disappointing because of a radical
resistance that has an extreme view of education. Because Saudi students ranked almost
at the bottom on international assessments in science and math, a partnership has been
established between the Ministry of Education and international companies to create a
new curriculum to develop an education industry that will create smart schools.
One may question the future of the Saudi reform in education and in general when
looking at the large number of students studying abroad and whether those students
would be functioning as agents (conscious or unconscious) to implement the agenda of
globalization or would they work to tackle the issues in a critical way by using what they
have learned to improve the nation in all areas without absolute dependency on foreign
models. In other words, there has to be a breaking point in social institutions that
generates solutions from within the country, and Saudi Arabia must reduce its imports
and its consumption.
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I consider some recommendations from different studies that address reforming
the Saudi education system. Allam (2011) addressed different areas in reform to include
improving curriculum that focuses on math and science and less on religious studies.
Decentralization of the education system represented by the Ministry of Education, even
in the private schools, is essential for future reform. Decentralization does not necessarily
mean privatization.
Maroun, Samman, Moujaes, and Abouchakra (2008) believed that a holistic view
of education reform is the right course of action for Saudi Arabia. First, the capacity of
educational istitutions to provide access to many students who do not have access to
university level education must be expanded. Second, education that concentrates on the
market demand for highly skilled employees must be provided. The authors believed that
the effect of globalization cannot be neglected but rather should be integrated into the
system, with an emphasis on local values and culture. But how can this be done,
especially when the Misistry of Education hires an international company to develop a
national curriculum?
Third, technological development and its applications must be a focus of any
educational reform. Most importantlly, Maroun, Samman, Moujaes, and Abouchakra,
(2008) argued that the Saudi government has crafted a great strategic plan, but there was
a problem with its implementation. Most importatnly, the authors recommend involving
all possible stakeholders in the educational reform process.
Critical Vision for the Future
First, we need to acknowledge that Saudi society and the reform process are
complicated because of internal and external factors. There are global and international
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pressures because of the Saudi status in the world in producing oil (one third of
worldwide oil production). As for the educational pressure, there is an increasing demand
for expanding English programs that entails cultural aspects, but with limited resources
have been made available to achieve the goal (Donn & Al Mathri, 2010).
Second, there is a gender inequality in the Gulf States. That is to say, 48% of
students in high schools are females, and only 20% of the labor market is female. Those
figures call attention to the need to conduct socioeconomic studies that address the issues
of gender, regional, and political inequalities.
Donn and Al Mathri (2010) introduced the idea of soft governance, which uses
none-coercive language and discursive mechanisms as tools of globalization to achieve
compliance from developing countries to the dominance of the developed countries
(magistracy). Soft governance has two key features. One is in the language use, which
includes “targets, outcomes, relevance of education, and education as a driver of
economic prosperity” (p. 151). The second is in the labor market and includes “teacher
training, public-private partnership” (p. 151).
Soft governance relies on soft tools of networking, conferences, seminars,
consultations, advisory groups, and publications. The language of policy documents and
publications is an important indicator of the manner in which soft governance operates in
the Arab Gulf States (Donn & Al Mathri, 2010, p. 152). In other words, the dominant
development discourse comes from the lens of world vision or rather Western, which is
not necessarily compatible with all regions in the world and may trigger resistance
(heterogenization). In other words, this kind of resistance may help achieve the initial
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goal of globalization set up by the core nations to maintain the periphery regions in a
lower status.
Philip Altbach (2006) states: “In a world divided into center and peripheries, the
centers grow stronger and more dominant the peripheries become increasingly
marginalized” (p. 24). In essence, this makes the Gulf States race to meet the
globalization requirements in higher education, and that generates problems. Donn and
Al Mathri (2010) argued that privatization of higher education in the region should not
diminish the creation of indigenous knowledge. The authors noted that the Gulf States
have become nations of consumption, not of production.
It has been proven that Gulf States are influenced by magistracy, which could
result in disastrous higher education outcomes because of current attempts to transfer
Western models to the region. Ritzer (2006) calls it McDonalization of higher education
because we find the same courses and qualification wherever we go. This analogy
compares the quality control of fast-food to the quality control of curriculum and courses,
which are the same in private or public universities. This raises a question about the
benefits of imported knowledge and its long-term benefits to the Gulf States socially,
academically, and economically. In other words, educational institutions become degreedelivery machines because there is no exchange of knowledge or ideas between the
center and the peripheries.
Therefore, some nations recognize the need for the creation of indigenous
programs based on relevant knowledge. It is imperative to ask: “Where, in the countries
of the Arab Gulf States, lie capacity building, knowledge creation, and the culture of
imaginative ideas that rest at the root of any civilization (Clary & Karlin, 2011, p. 159).
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Finally, opportunities in the periphery nations do not match those in the center.
The periphery nations become consumers of the created knowledge. However, the nature
of knowledge is dynamic because today’s knowledge becomes dated tomorrow, and
further knowledge is created. There is a need for a strategic plan for education reform,
but the nature of such a plan is a key issue for development. Most of the research
suggests imported plans from Western nations, but Donn and Al Mathri (2010)
fundamentally disagreed with this premise because the authors aspire for a reform that
comes from within. Their critical view envisions creating a nation that generates
knowledge, not only consumes it. Donn and Al Mathri (2010) stated:
It may be that this is indeed a challenge to center-periphery conceptions of
knowledge-generated societies; however, as ‘international expertise’ and
‘innovation consultants’ appear to be the backbone of the establishment of such
societies, we may find once again, the reins of the progress are tied to chariots
built elsewhere. (p. 162)
In the same vein, the global structure stemmed from the neoliberal ideology that
racialized the world to whites and non-whites tends to blame Third World nation-states
(people of color) for their failures, which are seen, for example, in the policies of the IMF
and World Bank. Allen (2001) stated in this regard:
These prominent institutions do the bidding of the global white polity through
blaming the educational conditions of these countries [financially dependent] on
the lack of competition rather than the globalization of white supremacy. (p. 483)
Allen (2001) suggested alternatives to counter the effects of globalization and its
instruments, first by inverting the nature of class and race relationship in the Marxist
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interpretation of globalization by making race at the heart of discussion and second, by
creating alliances between the powerful and privileged (whites) with the marginalized
(people of color) around the world. I believe it is a great alliance to have. However, I
would like to problematize the issue further: Isn’t that also a form of dependency on the
white savior who would help us solve our problems? Isn’t that a psychological and
emotional defeat for people of color because we cannot succeed without this help? I do
not claim to have the answer.
Finally, if we examine the state-nations’ relations between Arab countries, for
example, we realize how deep the divergence is between most of these countries for
political, economic, and religious sectarian reasons. That saddles us, however, with the
dreadful notion of nationalism that drives people apart as opposed to creating a collective
entity. It makes me question the dysfunctional groupings in the region, such as PanArabism movement, the Arab League, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Questions
emerge: Does the current global structure fight these groups or support some to continue
their hegemonic endeavor? Do the ruling class and the bourgeoisies in the periphery
nations favor the current arrangements with the superstructure of the world? If yes, how
can the masses break this ugly partnership of exploitation?
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The Language Status in Saudi Arabia: Arabic, English, or Both?
Views on Language
It is important to explore different views and considerations on language.
Language is tied with identity, nationalism, and culture, but there are two dominant
views. First, language is seen as idealism, and second, as instrumentation (Volosinov,
1973; Williams, 1977). Idealism depicts language as a spirit that unifies a community that
shares the same language. It is also seen as an artistic phenomenon. The second view
depicts language as an instrument. Therefore, it can be analyzed in a systematic and
scientific manner. In other words, language is separate from human motives and
emotions. It is its own entity. To clarify the two positions of language, idealism places
language in the creativity and psyche of individuals, and that entails linguistic changes.
Language as an instrument is a rigid system, and any variation from the norm is
considered distortion.
Arabic is the national and official language of Saudi Arabia and most of the
Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) countries. But, English exists in other
important capacities, which I will delve in later in the chapter. Here, I discuss the
meaning of having a national language. Herder (1772/2002) demonstrated the position of
European intellectuals in the 18th and the 19th centuries, which signifies the role of a
national language as a crucial entity in unifying nations. Herder claimed that language
was the “characteristic word of the race, bond of the family, tool of instruction, hero song
of the fathers’ deeds, and the voice of these fathers from their graves” (p. 153). That is to
say, language is not one thing or entity but consists of many important matters.
Furthermore, “language is a natural product of the human spirit” (Herder, 1772/2002, p.
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150). In the same vein, Humboldt (1836/1988) saw language as “the outer appearance of
the spirit of a people; the language is their spirit and the spirit their language” (p. 46). In
essence, language represents the national character and identity. If we apply the view of
idealism in this understanding of language, it means that a specific language in a nation is
an expression of national distinctiveness, which distinguishes it from other nations. On
the other hand, Mill (1861/2001) argued that a nation does not fundamentally have only
one language, but language here is used as an instrument to create a “fellow feeling” to
unite people around their nation. But again, the idealism’s view of language does not
detach language from its cultural and social roots, and it cannot be seen as only an
instrument to unify a nation.
The Global Spread of the English Language
The current form of globalization goes hand-in-hand with the English language.
The beginning of the English language invasion around the world started with the
colonization of many areas of the world by the British Empire. In a later stage, the heavy
role of the United States, politically, culturally, and economically, intensified the spread
of English as the language of the world and of capitalism (Mauranen, 2003). As a result,
English became the language of business, technology, civilized cultures, and, I may add,
the perception of being educated is tied to one’s ability to speak English. Some scholars
label English as a global language (Crystal, 2002), international language (Smith, 1983),
world language (Conrad, 1996), and also the world lingua franca (Jameson, 1998;
Mauranen, 2003). However, Kachru and Nelson (2001) stated that other languages also
have been global languages, such as Arabic, Spanish, and French, but the scale of the
spread of the English language has far exceeded all predecessors. To show the magnitude
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of its global spread, Crystal (2002) claimed that 25 percent of the world’s population is
able to communicate in English. It is important to signify the shift in the tactics regarding
the language policy, as Canagarajah (2005) stated, “While non-Western communities
were busy working on one project (decolonization), the carpet has been pulled from
under their feet by another project (globalization)” (p. 196) where the first
(decolonization) attempts to reject English, and the other (globalization) demands it.
Moreover, transnational corporations have a major role in the use of English
around the world (Gray, 2002), which in essence shows the links between money, power,
and the political entity that almost solely benefit from the current arrangement. This is
not to say English is used only for economic purposes: It also has an important cultural
dimension. This takes me to the “English language conspiracy” mentioned in the work of
Fishman (2006) that looked at language policy through a critical lens. The claim was that
the British council and TESOL (American based) have successfully implemented a plan
to teach the language around the world—overtly for educational goals but surreptitiously
to empower British council and TESOL’s policy and reap more economic benefits. These
two agencies support the use of their textbooks and materials that subtly foster the
expansion of Western culture, which in turn affect negatively local cultures and native
languages. It is worth addressing an important point made by Fishman (2006) that some
nations that demonstrate resistance against Western agendas—the author mentioned two
countries in particular, Cuba and Saudi Arabia—concentrate on teaching English heavily
in their educational apparatus to resist “conspiratorial imperialists” and also to support
their own agendas through the use of the English language. In other words, some nations
claim to use the English language as an instrument to resist the Western hegemonies.
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A question emerges: Does that work? I claim that the English language becomes a
marker of distinction and a cultural capital that only few can master, which results in
socioeconomic benefits. In other words, English has two negative effects: First, it
functions as a gatekeeper because students in a certain socioeconomic class can afford
good schools with good English language teaching, and second, it negatively impacts a
national language, culture, and identity. Al-Hazmi (2006) stated that the number of Saudi
students enrolling in Anglicized scientific institutions has dropped from 32.4 percent in
1985 to 15.2 percent in 1992 and that the number of students enrolling in institutions that
use Arabic as a medium of instruction has risen from 59.2 percent to 77.3 percent. In
essence, these statistics show that students chose Arabized education, even though it was
limited to social science and humanities, not necessarily out of desire, but rather they
escaped Anglicized education (scientific and technological) because the English language
is blocking their aspirations due to their lack of English proficiency. This does not
necessarily help them move upward socioeconomically.
Economic Factor
English language teaching and usage as a medium of instruction is a huge benefit
for Western countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
Canada (Kaplan, 2001). International students come to those countries to learn English
and to acquire academic degrees because those degrees have more weight and value in
their home states and increase their chances in securing higher paying jobs. To give a
sense of a scale to the contribution of international students to the U.S. economy, the net
economic contribution in the year 2011-2012 was $21.81 billion (NAFSA, 2012). Saudi
Arabia has sent approximately 130,000 students (Clary & Karlin, 2011) abroad since
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2005, which adds approximately $6 billion to the Saudi annual national budget (MOHE,
2013). The number of Saudi students in the United States alone is approximately 71,000
(NAFSA, 2013) since the scholarship program began in 2006. This makes the industry of
higher education in the United States the fifth largest service (Economist Global Agenda,
2002) and also a great financial exploitation for many nations. It is also important to note
the importance and value of the industry of English teaching, which entails writing and
publishing textbooks, private language institutions, standardized exams, and many other
endeavors. This clearly produces great financial profits, mainly for nations in the West
(Gray, 2002).
Three Positions on English Language
Tsuda (2008) addressed English language hegemony and defined it as language
domination through education, communication, economy, among others. However, this
domination also causes an English divide. The English divide concept refers to a division
created between English language speakers and non-English language speakers in terms
of power and resources. In essence, Tsuda (2008) argued that this causes discrimination
and inequalities. Furthermore, the English divide also stratifies English language speakers
hierarchically because it creates an English-based Class System (Tsuda, 2008, p. 51).
That is to say, native speakers of English would be at the top of the pyramid, followed by
ESL speakers (English as a second language, people in India for example), then EFL
speakers (English as a foreign language, people in Saudi Arabia), and finally at the
bottom are the silent speakers (people who cannot speak English). A great analogy made
by Tsuda compared the language class system to the race class system where native
speakers of English are the elite or the bourgeoisie, ESL speakers are the middle class,
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and EFL speakers are the working class where learning English becomes a lifetime labor.
Finally, the silent class resides the bottom of the status ladder, but it is important to
mention that the classes below the native speakers strive to move up in ladder (Figure 1).

Native
speakers
ESL

EFL
Silent
class
Figure 1. English-based Class System
The first position regarding the spread of the English language is pro-hegemonic
and is supported by many authors, such as David Crystal (British linguist), who shows
the inevitable force and domination of English around the world and claims that no other
language has reached its success and outreach and no one can stop its spread (Tsuda,
2008). This movement has no shame in advocating for English to be the language of
world in economy, politics, education, and in other venues and arenas.
The second position is called ‘Functional/Ideological’ (Tsuda, 2008). It looks at
English as “neutral function and functional diversity,” simply to equalize the status of
Standard English and nonstandard varieties of English (Indian English, Singaporean
English, etc.). As a result, the World Englishes term emerged and has been adopted by
sociolinguists such as Braj Kachru. Moreover, Tsuda (2008) stressed the word
ideological in this functionalist approach because it affirms the domination of English
and does not look at the power structure associated with the global spread of English.
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The third position is ‘Critical/Transformative’ (Tsuda, 2008). In essence, it looks
at the inequality, discrimination, domination, and injustice caused by having English as
the world’s dominant language. It also exposes the ideological work and power structure
that English encompasses throughout the world. Tsuda (2008) is worth quoting at length
on this matter:
Phillipson and Pennycook are right in pointing out that we live in the world where
English dominates and threatens other languages, functions as a domestic and
international gatekeeper to create and reproduce the structure of inequalities
between the English-speaking people and the non-English-speaking people.
English hegemony causes English divide, affecting almost all the domains of our
life including economy, politics, social classes, education, science, media and so
on. The problems of English hegemony and English divide do not remain within
the domain of language and communication, but it goes beyond that and affect all
aspects of our life all around the world. (p. 49)
The Effects of English Language Hegemony
The English language is considered a foreign language to 86 percent of the
world’s population (Tsuda, 2008), and suggesting it is a language of free choice is a
fallacy. That is because if nations have the free choice to use English as a medium of
communication, we should ask: Do they have a free choice not to adopt English? I
believe the answer is no for many reasons.
The English language poses a threat not only to the Arabic language and other
native languages around the world, but it also imposes a Western communication style.
Cameron (2002) states the English language via globalization is “promoting particular
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interactional norms, genres, and speech-styles across languages, on the grounds that they
are maximally ‘effective’ for purposes of communication” (p. 69).
This threat to native languages is described as linguistic imperialism by Phillipson
(1992). It is perplexing that people in different nations are willing to learn the English
language to have a better education, as Al-Jarf (2004a) revealed that 70 percent of her
participants in the Saudi context prefer that English language teaching begins at the
kindergarten level. Furthermore, 50 percent of her research participants speak to their
children in English at home to improve their language skills and eventually to have a
better education.
There is a dilemma in this situation because globalization via its agents demands
more English language teaching, but its spread threatens native languages, cultures, and
nationalism, not only in the former colonies of the West but also in Europe. According to
Eurostat (2001), 90% of all European students prefer to learn English at the high school
level. It becomes clear through these examples that Gramsci’s (2000) understanding of
hegemony is evident, because his concept refers to the willingness of people in different
countries and backgrounds to learn English. In other words, there is no overt coercion to
adopt such educational policies, but policymakers and people come to these conclusions
through consensus. In essence, English gives people a sense of symbolic power and
actual economic power. It provides them with cultural capital and projects a notion of
higher status or what Bourdieu (1977) called habitus. Kachru (1984) depicted the power
of the English language as “a symbol of modernization [that] offers an extra arm for
success and mobility in culturally and linguistically complex and pluralistic societies” (p.
176). Therefore, people want to learn English not just because they are obsessed or
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mentally colonized, but also because the English language provides them with financial
gains by securing jobs.
Canagarajah’s (1999) definition of pedagogical imperialism contains two
characteristics. The first refers to the use of the center’s textbooks and teaching materials,
such as those from the United States and United Kingdom. The second characteristic is
the use of the same teaching approach that is used in the center: for example, adapting the
teaching method to a process-oriented versus product-oriented approach that periphery
communities such as the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. The situation in Saudi Arabia is
different. Prior to 9/11, textbooks and teaching materials were prepared by the Saudi
Ministry of Education, but later textbooks began to include certain aspects of Western
culture. In this case, we see a clear linguistic imperialism but for different reasons. It is
not just in the teaching of the language but also in how to teach it, what to include, and
what to exclude.
In the same vein, Tsuda (2008) reminded us of two possible devastating outcomes
of the dominance of the English language. The first is “Linguicide,” which means the
killing of languages; this phenomenon initially was attributed to the spread of Western
modernization that began in the 16th century. Tsuda believed that humanity has lost 6,000
languages in the past 500 years, along with their values, cultures, philosophies, and souls.
The second outcome of the English language hegemony is “linguicism,” referred to by
Phillipson (1992) as “ideologies and structures where language is the means for effecting
or maintaining an unequal allocation of power and resources” (p. 55). Macedo (2003)
demonstrated an example of this outcome when some students at MIT petitioned the
administration to not hire professors with foreign accents because it was difficult for
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them to understand their English. Here, Macedo (2003) stated, “These students could
have kept Albert Einstein from teaching in U.S. universities” (p. 12). This scenario
demonstrates the English divide in action.
English in Saudi Arabia
Historically, and according to Al-Abed Al-Haq and Smadi (1996), English
appeared in Saudi Arabia in 1924 in elementary schools, and English teaching constituted
12 percent of teaching in general. The status of English language remained the same until
1943 when a decision was made to stop teaching English at the elementary level and
instead to introduce it at the intermediate and secondary school levels. The number of
classes was six per week but later was reduced to four. The debate remains the same
about when to start teaching English (Al-Hazmi, 2003). English was the only foreign
language taught in both regular and evening Saudi schools. In 1936, the government
established the first evening school that was devoted solely to teaching English. In higher
education, the first English department was established in 1957 at King Saud University
for male students and in 1972 for female students. Private centers recognized the
importance of English and, therefore, established the first center in 1960 for both male
and female students.
Saudi Arabia falls in the third circle (expanding circle), according to the
description of Kachru and Nelson (2001). This means English is used for pragmatic
purposes such as trading, communication, and for technical use. However, this status
most likely will not be permanent, especially after 9/11 and its consequences on Saudi
Arabia and the entire region.
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The recognition of the importance of the English language was not only for
educational purposes but also for Saudi ministries and public establishments, such as the
Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Petroleum and
Minerals. I believe the latter considers English a very important asset due to the vital role
of oil production in both the Saudi and global economies. The private sector was also
aware of the role of English in the world and, therefore, established centers for teaching
English as well as private schools that teach English as a main subject beginning in
kindergarten (Al-Abed Al Haq & Smadi, 1996).
The reason for introducing English in these schools was because families of high
socioeconomic status wanted their children to be better educated in English than their
counterparts who graduated from public schools. In addition, parents wanted their
children to be exposed to Western-style education, which would help them pursue their
education at Western universities (cultural and language capital). This approach would
also help them to gain native-like competence in English.
The aims of teaching English are slightly different depending on the level in
question, but at the secondary level, the aims are stated by the Ministry of Education as
follows as cited in the work of Al-Abed Al-Haq and Smadi (1996):


To afford the secondary schools pupil a window on the world.



To give secondary school pupils an experience of delight through reading
samples of English that have universal appeal, in both arts and sciences.



To cultivate the pupil’s critical thinking, a useful adjunct to intelligent reading
of English texts.
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To give play to the pupil’s imagination by means of imagery in poetry and
visualization of character.



To provide the pupil who intends to join the university with an adequate
knowledge of English to help him in his future studies.



To provide the pupil who finishes his formal education with sufficient
knowledge of the language to help him in his vocation.



To enable the pupil to gain a reasonable command of English in order to be in
a better position to defend Islam against adverse criticism and to participate in
dissemination of Islamic culture. (p. 461)

Al-Abed Al-Haq and Smadi (1996) surveyed 54 religiously committed individuals with
the minimum qualifications of a first university degree. The main findings of the authors
were that, religiously committed people in this study strongly desired the use of the
Arabic language as a medium of instruction at schools and universities for both science
and humanities. However, at the same time, teaching English was seen as both a religious
and nonreligious instrument. For religious purposes, English can be used in teaching nonArab Muslims and also for preaching Islam in non-Arabic speaking communities outside
of Saudi Arabia. The desire to learn English is constituted by a need for modern
technological assimilation, better job opportunities, and economic development.
However, I disagree with the words technological assimilation, because English prevents
Saudi Arabia in the long run from being technologically independent.
The participants did not believe that teaching English would negatively influence
their identities or the status of the Arabic language because the languages are used in
different domains. In other words, exposure to English does not translate to linguistic or
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cultural inferiority. That is because of the strong ideological and sentimental attachment
to the language of one’s religion. However, they believe that Arabic is more expressive,
more logical, and more sacred, and thus, the religion will be sustained (Al-Abed Al Haq
& Smadi, 1996). The participants differentiate between the language and its native
speakers and culture, and, therefore, they do not correlate learning English with
imperialistic purposes. That seems to be justified because of the low percentage of people
in Saudi Arabia who watch or listen to foreign media at the time of the study.
New Look at the English Language in Saudi Arabia
In the wake of 9/11, Saudi Arabia was put under huge pressure from the West,
especially by the United States, to enact reforms in its educational system (Elyas, 2008).
The White House attributed this notion of extremism to the curriculum (religious
teaching) in the system. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on the demand for
changes from the United States regarding English teaching in Saudi Arabia. The United
States required Saudi Arabia to begin introducing English alongside Western cultural
studies in elementary schools in an attempt to create some sort of tolerance among the
Saudis toward the West and to establish understanding of the other. This raises a
question: which American culture are we talking about? This initiative faced great
opposition through the media from 61 Saudi sheikhs (religious leaders), including
university presidents, professors, and educators, because they thought this would lead to
Westernization of students and threaten local and Islamic values. Under tremendous
pressure from the American government, the program was implemented, and Saudi
Arabia recruited 935 English teachers from abroad. However, due to inadequate financial
resources to support the program, especially after Saudi Arabia came out of the second
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Gulf War, the result of implementing such a program has been to reduce the daily number
of religion classes from four to one. Teaching had become more about English and less
about Islam and Arabic (Elyas, 2008). This raises a question: What kind of relationship
does Saudi Arabia have with the West/United States? Regardless of the reasons behind
this new policy, it says something about a hierarchical and hegemonic relationship. Elyas
(2008) stated:
English is served in the Middle East, and especially in the Gulf States, as a
container of ideologies which may result in reshaping the ideas impeded in it, and
therefore, [it sends] the wrong messages to the society in general. . . . English
language was (and still is) one of the major weapons with which the West
launched its massive intellectual and cultural onslaught against Muslims. (p. 36)
Therefore, the role of the English language at present has been to de-Islamize Saudi
Arabia as opposed to the situation under the British Empire. Then, the English language
served as a tool for linguistic imperialism and cultural alienation. This situation in Saudi
Arabia has created debate among Arab English teachers on the TESOL Islamia
discussion forum. The reason is that most EFL materials in the Arab world are EuroAmerican inspired and do not relate to local values or issues. This role of hegemonic
English could create more conflict and clash between “Us and Others” (Elyas, 2008).
Interestingly, by looking at the results of the study conducted on a group of
freshmen students at King Abdulaziz University in Saudi Arabia, Al-Abed Al Haq and
Smadi (1996) found different attitudes among the students, Arab linguists, and English
teachers. The students agreed (for the most part) that teaching the English language along
with Western culture is necessary to improve Saudi Students’ English comprehension.
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After the changes were made in the Saudi educational system, the students did not
believe that teaching English was for imperialistic purposes or that it negatively affected
their Arab identity. Half of the surveyed students believed a greater emphasis on teaching
English would not negatively affect their values to the extent that their Saudi Arabian
culture and Islamic identity would be diminished (Elyas, 2008). I question this notion
because the nation probably has internalized/normalized the situation. It became
abnormal, and when one proposes revitalization of the Arabic language, especially in
today’s globalized world.
Elyas (2008) suggested that due to increasing globalization, English is needed
now more than ever in the Arab world and in Saudi Arabia, the heart of the Islamic
world. After 9/11, Arabs needed to know English because a lot has been said and written
about them and their faith. They, more than any other peoples, need to know how to
interact with the West.
The Status of Arabic and Possible Ways to Save It
Al-Jarf (2004b) advocated the importance of focusing on Arabic as a first
language because of national identity, linguistic, and psychological reasons that would
affect children. She believed that having a strong foundation in one’s first language
would help students learn a second. The author recommended correcting misconceptions
that parents had regarding second-language acquisition by paying more attention to how
schools teach English rather than when to teach it. Interestingly, she also recommended
improving the teaching of the Arabic language to make it more appealing, and she also
emphasized the importance of improvements in teacher training. She suggested including
attractive short stories in Arabic, which would make students interested in improving
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their learning and help them become more attached to their language and culture. Finally,
the use of new technology, such as the Internet, is important to enhance students’ learning
of their first language. The author’s main concern was the possibility of the abandonment
of Arabic language in science, math, and other fields caused by the domination of the
English language.
Al-Jarf (2004a) conducted another study that explored the attitudes of youth about
the usage of Arabic and English as mediums of instruction. She found that 45 percent of
the participants, from both The Jordanian University (Jordan) and King Saud University
(Saudi Arabia) preferred to educate their children in international schools where English
was the only language of instruction. On the one hand, 96 percent of the participants in
the study believed that the Arabic language should be used only in the fields of Arabic
literature, history, and education studies. On the other hand, the same group believed that
English should be used in the fields of medicine, engineering, and computer science.
Most importantly, students showed a great respect and appreciation for the English
language while they did not show the same to the Arabic language and believed that
because of the big gap between the two languages pertaining to terminology and research,
it is a crippled language.
Interestingly enough, the participants did not see Arabization efforts in the fields
of medicine, engineering, pharmacy, and computers as something useful because such a
process would occur only over a long period of time and would result in transliteration
instead of having genuine Arabic terms. The participants saw doing so as confusing
because those terminologies are attached to English more than to Arabic, and the use of
the English language helps one to communicate with the rest of the world better than
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does Arabic. Supporting their claims, students did not consider the Arabic language a
good medium of instruction at the university level because of the lack of scientific
research and resources.
Al-Jarf (2004a) stressed the important roles that should be taken by the Arab
governments to promote the use of Arabic in hospitals and companies in an attempt to
limit the harm of English invasion. She also advised the Arab governments to learn from
the experiences of other countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, and France—in preserving their
local languages. For example, France established a French academy to protect its
language by making a law that forbids the use of English words instead of French words,
even if the English word is more common and widespread. On the other hand, Arabic
organizations such as TESOL Arabia, unfortunately and ironically, promoted the use of
English as the medium of instruction in Arabic schools and universities. Al-Jarf
concluded her study by warning Arabic educational institutions not to surrender to the
new pressures facing their countries, especially after 9/11. She condemned the retreating
status of publishing in Arabic juxtaposed with the increasing publications in English.
Misconceptions among students today who favor using English exclusively in local
schooling systems need to be looked at from an ideological and a critical lens.
As an effort to promote the use of the Arabic language and to enhance its status
among its speakers, Al-Zoman (2003) studied the possibilities of using Arabic letters and
numbers in Internet domain names instead of Roman letters and numbers. Usage of the
Internet is an indication of a country’s development, both economically and
technologically. The percentage of the population in the Arab world who use the Internet
is 1.6 percent, according to a 2003 report of the United Nations Development Program—
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and that is exceptionally low. The author believed that this could be attributed to the use
of English in the network and that not all Arabs were capable of dealing with English. AlZoman (2003) saw a necessity of using Arabic language instead of English on the
Internet to create more opportunities for a wider range of people in Saudi Arabia and the
rest of the Arab world. However, this is no easy task because of the complexity of the
Arabic language. For instance, the Arabic language uses diacritical marks to distinguish
between words and also uses a discursive writing system.
Consequently, Al-Zoman (2003) considered Arabizing Internet domain names as
a vital action for future plans of electronic government and trading. Therefore, the
Internet should be available to all, not just to those who know English. Nevertheless, AlZoman strongly believed that technology should serve the language—Arabic—and not
the opposite. In other words, he thought the Arabic language should be protected from
harming its core rules, such as unifying the letters instead of using each letter separately.
Therefore, technology should be adjusted to serve that purpose. The solutions should be
derived from the language itself and should not use solutions from other languages or
incorporate characters from other languages, such as English.
Al-Jarf (2005) shed light on the historical influence of Arabic on many languages
in the world. The Arabic language holds the fifth place, according to the number of
speakers, which is more than 200 million speakers. On the other hand, most influential
languages have borrowed heavily from Arabic. For example, English has borrowed
almost 3,000 words, and Spanish more than 5,000. Al-Jarf’s exploratory study showed
that the situation is the reverse now. Her subjects were 350 female students at the
colleges of medicine, science, pharmacy, and computer engineering at King Saud
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University. Her survey revealed that the English language is the medium of instruction in
those colleges and that students do not study the Arabic equivalents of English technical
terminologies because most of the textbooks are in English. The study showed that the
students have misconceptions about the Arabization process. They thought the process
was limited to transliteration or borrowing words from other languages. As a matter of
fact, students do not know about the “Saudi Arabic Terminology Databank hosted by
KACST” (Al-Jarf, 2005, p. 2), an organization that deals with Arabization.
Therefore, Al-Jarf (2005) recommended the inclusion of courses in the
Arabization process as part of Arabic language requirements in those colleges. On the
other hand, students at those colleges should study Arabic equivalents of English terms,
and that should be part of their grades. To promote Arabization, Al-Jarf suggested that
faculty members participate in this process by publishing books and articles in Arabic
with Arabized terminology. In addition, Al-Jarf suggested using Arabic should become a
requirement for faculty promotions. As for the students’ promoting Arabization, they
should be encouraged to write their theses or dissertations in Arabic, and that should be
made a requirement. Finally, Al-Jarf stressed the need to familiarize students and faculty
with the terminology databank and to make it accessible to them. Moreover, it is
important to update the “terminology databank and [it] must be used in writing
specialized books in Arabic” (Al-Jarf, 2005, p. 2).
The Status of Teaching English in Saudi Arabia
Al-Jarf (2004a) believed that English teachers’ preparation in Saudi Arabia is
problematic; therefore, on-the-job training is the way to improve their teaching through
more exposure to new teaching methods. Al-Hazmi (2003) described EFL (English as a
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foreign language) preparation as “nonsystematic and inadequate” (p. 341). When looking
at the outcomes of teaching English at Saudi public schools, the results are not
encouraging. Stimson (1980) stated:
Sadly, at the other end of the scale, six years of English teaching in the [public]
schools has almost no effect at all, and many pupils can hardly utter or write a
correct sentence, apart from one that has been learned by heart. (p. 1)
After studying English for 11 years in the Saudi public school system, my English
learning experience is equivalent to the findings described by Stimson (1980). This
speaks to the poor teaching methods in Saudi Arabia and accounts for the time wasted on
learning material not beneficial to students for future use. Therefore, I believe that the
entire protocol of teaching English in Saudi Arabia should be examined and evaluated
seriously. Why do officials continue to teach the language without useful teacher training,
and why does the government waste resources in developing materials? I believe efforts
should be directed to help promote Arabization and to retrieve the Arabic language status
in the hearts of its speakers, thus enhancing research and publications in our beloved
language. It disturbs me when some participants showed disrespect to the Arabic
language because they think Arabic is not the language of science. Sincere efforts from
the government are needed to rescue the language and to reduce independence on a
foreign language or educational models, standards, and communication styles. Saudi
Arabia has a wide range of problems—primarily literacy—along with other educational
and social issues. I believe that the right action is to focus critically on these challenges:
Arabization, illiteracy, native language status, local culture—and not so much on
teaching English. It is clear that not all Saudi people will learn it nor desire to learn it.
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Therefore, why do policymakers focus on English? Are they interested in stratifying the
society based on the possession of a language capital? Who can afford to possess it? It is
apparent to me that the English language has become a marker of distinction to those on
the top of the hierarchy. The claim that schools offer equal opportunities to learn English
is a proven fallacy, because it takes more than six years (600 hours) to learn a second
language and also better equipped schools.
Reasons behind Anglicized Higher Education in Saudi Arabia
I previously mentioned the official status of the English language set by the
Ministry of Education, which is supposedly limited and used when necessary to keep up
with advancements in science and technology. However, in reality, it became the official
language of science and technology, and the pedagogic rationale behind using English as
an instrument is described as fallacious (Troudi, 2002). Troudi delved further in his
argument to pinpoint the damages inflicted on the Arabic language:
Arabic will be seen as the language of literature, theology, social and
emotional communication. Educationalists put forward many reasons as to
why Arabic cannot be used to teach the sciences namely, lack of resources
and textbooks in Arabic, the huge translation effort and long term projects
needed for such an endeavor, and the time needed to train lecturers to switch
to another language. The other argument in this competitive world,
developing countries need to race against the clock to catch up with
technological and industrial innovations and information technology. One
needs to think of the scientists in Japan, China and Taiwan to see the
weakness and fallacy of this argument. (p. 6)
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Hence, this is why Al-Jarf’s (2004a) participants preferred English instruction in the
realm of science and preferred Arabic in other areas. That is not to say that the
situation in Japan, for example, is near perfection because English poses threats to
the national language, culture, and identity (Kawai, 2004). However, I speculate that
Troudi meant that the Japanese language is used in a greater extent in science
compared with a much worse situation of Arabic. In essence, there is a cultural and
ideological division in the Saudi context and in Arab nations at large that coincides
with the language division of the use of Arabic in one domain and English in
another, which was described by Al-Shammary as “the most malicious conspiracies
of post-colonialism” (as cited in Al-Hazmi, 2006, p. 3).
Students in higher education become victims of this language policy, in
addition to further abandonment of Arabization and translation, and finally of overdependence on Anglophone universities. Al-Hazmi (2006) argued that Saudi
policymakers should diversify their political and educational relationships by
establishing new ones with other nations, such as Japan, China, and Russia.
Future Vision for English and Arabic
An Arabization effort is one way to alleviate the status of the Arabic
language among the Saudi population (Al-Hazmi, 2006; Al-Jarf, 2004a). However,
Al-Abed Al-Haq (as cited in Al-Hazmi, 2003) added that the Arabization process
does not start with lexical focus but rather with psychological and ideological
assessment. Al-Hazmi (2006) said in this regard: “Arabizing lexical items is of no
use so long as foreign influence dominates the Arabic mentality” (p. 5).
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One may ask why Arabize because the process involves a great deal of
financial and human resources? First, Al-Hazmi (2006) argued that human beings
are capable of understanding thoroughly, expressing themselves clearly, and
thinking creatively in their native tongues. Second, Saudi studies showed positive
attitudes toward using Arabic as a medium of instruction in the field of
engineering where 75% of faculty and 73% of the students in a Saudi university
favor Arabic (Al-Hazmi, 2006). Furthermore, 80% of the surveyed medical
students reported that they saved a third of their time when they read their
materials in Arabic compared with English. Likewise, 72% of the students saved a
third of their time when writing in Arabic compared with English, and 75%
reported that their ability in answering discussion questions was better when they
used Arabic. Third, many Saudi students have a linguistic problem in the Arabic
language, and it has shown a clear deterioration in recent years. Al-Saad stated (as
cited in Al-Hazmi, 2006):
The Ministry of Education has completely sidestepped public opinion and
embarked on an extensive campaign to promote the English language at the
expense of Arabic. We wished if such concern was directed at promoting
Arabic at a time when the mother language is experiencing a dangerous
slide at many levels. The ministry is well aware of this deterioration and
possesses documents that substantiate it. The deterioration is especially
evident among our college students where writing, speaking and expressing
oneself in Arabic is a real problem for many. (p. 9)
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Additionally, a report prepared by the United Nations (United Nations
Development Program , 2003) stated that the condition of the Arabic language was
severe and faced a real crisis involving vocabulary, grammar, usage,
documentation, creativity, and also in terms of theory. To show the scope of
translation and Arabization efforts in Saudi Arabia from 1931 to 1992, only 502
books were translated from foreign languages into Arabic and all were in social
sciences (Al-Hazmi, 2006). The UNDP report found that only 4.4 books were
translated from foreign languages into Arabic in the Arab world between 1980 and
1985, which means less than one book per million juxtaposed with 519 books per
million and 920 books per million in Hungary and Spain respectively.
Arabization is not an easy task, but for it to succeed, Arab nations must
move from the state of consuming knowledge to the state of producing knowledge,
as stated by Donn and Al Mathri (2010) and also by Barakzai (2002), when he
said:
It is the education system of Japan, Taiwan, and Korea that are the sources
of research, innovation, and production. The body of knowledge that is
constantly produced and accumulated in indigenous languages, like
Japanese, is then transmitted through the Japanese language in the
education system. The crucial question is what knowledge, information,
and technology are being produced using the Arabic language, in the
Arabian Gulf countries, or in the Arab world, for that matter? (p. 43)
Al-Jarf’s (2004b) work interests me because it helps me, first, in understanding the nature
of the teaching system in Saudi Arabia, especially during its early stages. Students need
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to be better motivated and have stronger engagement in their education in order to attain
greater achievements. In short, her critique about the preaching tone in the Arabic
language classes should be reconsidered, especially when students already have many
classes that teach religion. In other words, the suggestion is that Saudi Arabia should
offer reading classes using Arabic for science, technology, and critical thinking.
On the other hand, according to studies of Al-Jarf (2005) and of Al-Abed Al-Haq
and Smadi, (1996), students’ attitudes, especially in higher education, show that there is a
consensus about the sole use of English as a medium of instruction. I am not in a position
to make a judgment on those participants, but I inquire about the status of Arabic in the
future, either in the hearts of the population or as a language of science, research, and
education. I believe the way to rectify the current situation and prevent more damage to
our beloved language is through Arabization efforts. Arabization efforts should be
enhanced to convey knowledge from the English language and then build on a solid
foundation. Arabization may appear to be a laborious task, but without empowering the
language used in academia, the status of the language will continue to deteriorate.
What Can be Done Regarding this Dilemma?
Al-Hazmi (2006) advocated for a twofold solution facing the deteriorating status
of the Arabic language. First, he looked at the language policy in Saudi Arabia from a
critical lens to include the Arabization process that deals with mental colonization
(ideological aspect) and technical aspect (lexical aspect). Al-Hazmi (2006) and Al-Jarf
(2005) acknowledged the importance of the English language and its influence and the
benefits it brings locally. However, there is a great need to improve teaching pedagogies.
Al-Hazmi (2006) proposed that the “600 hours of English that students receive over a six-
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year period be lumped together and offered as obligatory intensive courses for science
sections and optional for literary ones during the last two years of secondary school” (p.
8).
What can be done about language in education policy? Al-Hazmi (2003) and
Canagarajah (2005) seemed to agree on the principle that this issue should be taken to the
larger local communities to determine policy. Al-Hazmi envisioned the process as a
bottom-up process, not top-down.
The reliance on the English language and on Western models is a symptom of a
bigger problem. I think Saudi Arabia is mentally colonized, and making the matter worse
is that many people consciously or unconsciously are oblivious to the issue. They chose
an easier way by being functionalists to gain some benefits instead of being morally
cognizant of the role of education in a society. My hope is not to end mental colonization
because it would take decades, but I want to start a movement or organize resistance and
change, and I believe Palmer (2007) said it best:
I began to see that there is a “movement mentality,” in which resistance is
received as a place everything begins, not ends. In this mentality, not only does
change happen in spite of institutional resistance, but resistance helps change
happen. The resistance itself points to the need for something new. It encourages
us to imagine alternatives. And it energizes those who are called to work toward
those ends. (p. 171)
Tsuda (2008) provided a counter narrative for the global spread of the English language.
He outlined three possible alternatives to tackle the invasion of the English language.
First, Tsuda (2008) suggested a monolingual approach. It refers to choosing a politically
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neutral language in global communication, which may well be a language with the
smallest number of speakers. The other option in this approach is using an artificial
language, such as Esperanto (created by a Polish doctor in the 19th century). The rationale
behind this approach was to debunk the English language because it was politically and
culturally biased because it became the de facto language of communication without any
discussion, and it served only certain nations more than others.
The second approach offered by Tsuda (2008) is a multilingual. That is to say,
there is no need to impose one language in communication for the sake of equality
between people and languages. This approach considers a language “as an important
component of one’s identity, pride, dignity, not just as an instrument” (p. 53).
Furthermore, linguistic issues are considered as a human rights issue. Therefore, Tsuda
(2008) proposed the Ecology of Language Paradigm model, which perceives the
linguistic issue not only as human right issue but also as environmental issue because the
global ecology of language has been disturbed as we have seen in the case of Linguicide.
The third approach is Global Scheme, which demands a creation of international
law to protect languages. According to a report from UNESCO that was adopted in 2001,
improvements have been made in the promotion of cultural diversity. In 2005, UNESCO
adopted, by an overwhelming majority of its delegates, the Convention on the Protection
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression; only the United States and Israel
opposed the agreement (Tsuda, 2008). In the same vein, the approach also advocated for
global ways of redistribution of power and resources through global taxes such as an
Internet tax—on Internet users—to remedy the digital divide; a Tobin tax, for
international speculative financial transaction; and finally, an English tax. The English
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tax would be levied on communication that uses the English language as the language of
international communication. This fund would be allocated to the nations with less power
as an effort to support affected communities. It is another way of the same principle of
reparations for the racial oppression and slavery mentioned in the work of ThompsonMiller and Feagin (2008) faced by African nations by colonization and also by African
Americans in the United States by laws such as the Jim Crow laws.
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Chapter 3 Methodology and Methods
I used critical discourse analysis (CDA) as my methodology. It was not an easy
decision because initially I wanted to capture every aspect and angle of the issue, but a
decision had to be made. However, I must to distinguish between discourse analysis (DA)
and CDA. The purpose of DA is to examine the language patterns in use, depending on
the researcher’s approach and the understanding of language and discourse. DA has two
major views related to language: The first considers language as a structure and the
second as functional. To illustrate, the structural view considers language as referential in
which meanings are transmitted through the language. In other words, language is above
the sentence and clause level. In the functionalist perspective, language is seen as a
foundation for social reality as meanings are not transmitted but rather are created by
communicators, which in part creates social reality (Shiffrin, 1994). In other words,
discourse in the functional view is a system where social functions are realized via taking
a social constructionist view, not a referential view.
It is also important to understand the researcher’s point of view and approach to
DA. That is to say, DA can be categorized into four approaches (Taylor, 2001): first, the
language itself, not the language in use, which parallels the structural view of discourse
(language as referential). The remaining three approaches examine the language in use,
but they are not identical because they define context differently. The second approach
defines context in interpersonal situations, such as lying or arguing. The third depicts it as
social and cultural, and it analyzes the language in use in situations when a difference in
power relations exists, such as professor-student, doctor-patient, or superior-subordinate.
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And the fourth approach focuses on context in the larger society and on historical
structures, such as imperialism, colonialism, inequalities, or capitalism, etc.
CDA adopts the fourth approach as its methodology because it looks at discourse
at the macro level and from a historical perspective. Fairclough and Wodak (1997)
recognized the following eight principles as the characteristics of CDA, which
correspond with the fourth approach of discourse analysis:
1. CDA addresses social problems.
2. It considers power relations as discursive.
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture.
4. Discourse does ideological work.
5. Discourse is historical.
6. There is a mediated link between text and society.
7. CDA is interpretive and explanatory.
8. CDA is a social action.
It is imperative to analyze these principles, because they make CDA unique. The
second, third, fourth, and eighth principles clearly suggest that language cannot be
considered referential in CDA, but rather should be considered as functional because
language in this understanding generates power, does ideological work, and causes social
actions while the referential view reflects only what is out there. Principle No. 5 is a key
difference because it connects the past and the present in the understanding of discourse.
To illustrate, CDA takes into account different contexts, such as historical, political,
economic, cultural, and social. Finally, the first principle deals with the idea of
reproduction when it looks at social problems that stem from unequal power relations. In
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this sense, CDA focuses on power relations, domination, unequal power structures, and
discrimination, among others. In other words, it attempts to interpret the reproduction of
social problems that emanate from the eight issues cited above. Here are some examples
of what CDA has been used to analyze: Hoey (1996) analyzed the definitions of men and
women in an English dictionary; newspaper articles on illegal immigration in the United
Kingdom (van Dijk, 1996); the political discourse in countries such as the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France in their parliament or congress, (van Dijk, 1997); how
magazines represent women transitionally; the phenomenon of education discourse about
the marketization of university education (Fairclough, 1995); and educational and
scholarly discourse (Aronowitz, 1988; Apple, 1979; Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu et al.,
1994; Giroux, 1981).
CDA adopts theoretical and methodological perspective to discourse. That is to
say, it is not a method or a theory that can be applied to social problems (van Dijk,
2001a). For this reason, researchers must conduct a thorough theoretical analysis of the
social problem in question in order to choose which discourse and social structures are to
be analyzed. Once that has been done, the researcher must come up with a suitable
research method that is dependent on the characteristics of the data, on research
question(s), and on the researcher’s philosophical or theoretical positions. Because CDA
does not offer specific procedures or pathways in analyzing discourse but rather offers a
perspective or framework, the researcher must generate appropriate methods for analysis
that correspond with their theoretical conceptualization of their study. Therefore, CDA
differs from positivistic research (Taylor, 2001) because the latter separates theories from
methods in the sense that well-established methods would produce objective or bias-free
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knowledge. In other words, CDA integrates theories and methods (Wodak, 2001b), which
make theories inform methods, and those methods should not conflict with the theories.
What is the difference between DA and CDA? The latter analyzes discourse
critically or what van Dijk (2001a) called “discourse analysis with attitude” (p. 96). CDA
follows epistemological and ontological assumptions that stem from Western Marxism
and focuses on cultural issues under capitalism. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) argued
that CDA is grounded by Marxist theories of the Frankfurt School, Gramsci, Althusser,
Volosinov, and Foucault’s discourse perspectives. The meaning of critical or critique,
according to Fairclough (1995), was to uncover or demystify the relationships of
interconnected things. It is due to concepts such as hegemony, ideology, and power that
CDA and critical studies focus on as they are not visible or obvious. Critical studies aim
to investigate the status quo or what is called common-sense because ideology represents
itself as such and because hegemony is maintained by social consent. It is what has been
naturalized in a society that might be problematic. CDA as a qualitative research aims to
critique how meanings are made. Furthermore, CDA aims to understand and explain
social norms and inequality, and it also questions how power, through language, is
realized in a society.
CDA attempts to connect the micro (discourse) with the macro (society and its
structure and stratification/power), which seems not to be obvious (Fairclough, 1995; van
Dijk, 1993, 2001a, 2001b; Wodak, 2001a). The question then becomes: What mediates
discourse and society? It appears that the definition of the CDA approach determines this
aspect. For instance, on one hand, for Halliday (1994), the critical linguist, Hodge and
Kress (1993) considered the ideological function of grammar and via linguistic aspects,
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such as vocabulary, grammatical structures, or word choice, to be the mediator between
discourse and society. On the other hand, for van Dijk (1993), it was a shared social
cognition that mediated text and power structure—and that is the position I take in this
analysis.
Discourse Research and Social Structures
In this research, I focused on educational discourse, even though it was a difficult
task to precisely isolate from other discourses, such as political and economic, because
they are intertwined and closely connected. The second part of van Dijk’s question when
using CDA as a methodology was: What is the social structure that interested me as the
researcher? The social structures that interested me were those of the Broader Middle
East and North African (BMENA) countries and the social consequences resulting from
the partnership with the Group of 8 (G8) countries. BMENA region included Arab and
Arabic-speaking countries in North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
Sudan, Tunisia), Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates), in addition to Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria,
and Yemen. The G8 countries were Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Russia,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The G8-BMENA Partnership was formed in 2004, and the official rationale
behind its establishment was defined at length by the U.S. Department of State as the
following:

From an idea of partnership to a growing reality, the Broader Middle East and
North Africa (BMENA) Initiative represents genuine co-operation between the
G8 and European nations and the governments, business and civil society of the
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region, in order to strengthen freedom, democracy and prosperity for all. The
leaders of the G8 industrialized nations and countries of the BMENA launched
the Partnership for Progress and a Common Future - a blueprint for how G8 and
Middle Eastern countries could best work together to support indigenous calls for
reform - at the G8 Sea Island, Georgia, summit in June 2004. Since then, a
number of supportive nations and international financial institutions have offered
to support and lead various initiatives elaborated at Sea Island, and the role of
civil society has become increasingly significant.
Governments and people of the region have expressed their wish to see
democracy and freedoms expanded. The inaugural Forum for the Future in Rabat
in December 2004 established a process of dialogue among G8 and regional
governments in pursuit of these aims and underwrote seven
ambitious initiatives formulated at the Sea Island summit. Since the first Forum,
civil society groups and lead partner countries have made significant advances in
this agenda and focused on transparency of governance, women in the workplace,
legal reform and human rights.
The yearly Forum for the Future is a centerpiece of the BMENA partnership by
providing an international venue to support the reform voices in the region. The
Forum permits the partners and other supportive countries and organizations to
engage on political, economic and social reform on a regular basis. (U.S.
Department of State Archives, 2001-2009, para. 1)
In looking at this partnership, my approach was to understand the underlying agenda of
this initiative, which included anything related to education and educational policies and
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reforms produced by the governments of these countries and their representatives. The
time frame I chose for my analysis began at the establishment of this partnership in 2004
through its final meeting in 2013. I included official documents produced by the G8, by
BMENA countries, and by the civil societies in their annual meetings that I was able to
access online and by contacting several international organizations. These include any
documents pertaining to education and educational policy published by G8 and BMENA
countries from 2004 to 2013 from their annual meetings. My research questions guided
and limited my study.
Research Questions
1. How has the G8 and the Broader Middle East and North African (BMENA)
Partnership affected and shaped educational and social reforms in the region since
its establishment in 2004?
2. What type of discourse was deployed to perpetuate hegemonic and hierarchical
relationships that sustain unequal status between the G8 and BMENA countries?
3. How do the G8 representatives control the BMENA public discourse?
4. How does such discourse control the mind and the action of the BMENA
countries, and what are the social consequences of such control?
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
As stated, van Dijk (2001b) proposed that critical discourse analysis (CDA) does
not follow a specific research direction nor does it follow a unitary theoretical
framework. We can have different types of critical discourse analyses due to the
previously cited eight principles that guide CDA, which result in diverse theoretical and
analytical approaches. That is to say, the analysis of news conferences or newspapers is
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different from the analysis of daily conversations, even though there is an overarching
theoretical and conceptual framework. This is because of the type of questions that
specifically address discourse structures and how they are deployed in the process of
reproduction of dominance, and this can be found in newspapers, reports, and even in
conversations. Consequently, scholars of CDA highlight vocabulary that addresses the
notions of dominance, power, institutions, reproduction, and social order, among others.
With this in mind, I focused on the following four concepts to develop a critical and
theoretical framework that related or mediated discourse, cognition, and society.
Macro vs. Micro. The reason for choosing the CDA as my research methodology
was because I intended to bridge the gap between the micro and macro levels of analysis.
It is this relationship between the two that forms one unit of every conversation or
experience we have or observe. On one hand, micro analysis addresses language use,
word choices, and verbal interaction. And on the other hand, macro analysis focuses on
dominance, power, and inequality between social groups or even between nation states.
For example, when a group such as the G8 held an annual meeting, it was micro-level
discourse and social interaction that occurred between the G8 countries and BMENA
representatives. But at the same time, it was macro-level in nature because the outcome
might have produced a fundamental piece of policy or educational reform that could
contribute to unequal status. The outcome also could contribute to the BMENA countries
continuing to function in a consuming end and also could contribute to sustaining
dependence on the West and on the existing hegemonic relationship. I used four aspects
for my analysis to showcase how I bridged the gap between the micro and macro
analyses in my study.
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Members/groups: Members of the G8 groups (ministers of education, finance,
etc.) used discourse as representatives of group(s), institutions, or countries, and
consequently, groups may act through their representatives.



Actions/process: The action, process, or recommendation taken by individuals are
an integral part of the social group or institution



Context/social structure: The annual meeting of Forum for the Future, led by the
G8, represented a discursive interaction between all parties involved and was a
foundation for a social structure seen in news conferences and in publications. In
this scenario, it was a local and global context that constricted or shaped the
discourse.



Personal/social cognition: Representatives of both the G8 and the BMENA
nations have personal and social cognitions that might also be shared by the group
they created. In essence, it created a group culture and social cognition that
influenced the individual discourse and resulted in a joint action by the entire
group.
Power as Control. The notion of power, especially social power, is an integral

feature of CDA (van Dijk, 2001b), especially social power and in my analysis group
power, the G8. We can look at power in terms of the ability to control or dominate other
groups and their actions. The G8 would have more power or less power, based on the
degree of influence on the acts or the minds of the BMENA countries. The G8’s ability to
control was generated from a superior position (privilege) in scarce resources, such as
fame, status, money, and for my specific purpose, knowledge, experience, and access in
the educational setting.

103

Different types of power are worth mentioning, but the type of power I am
interested in is not coercive but rather is the power that is seen as natural or as commonsense by the dominated groups. Power, in my understanding, is not absolute because the
dominated group may have the option to resist domination and also might see power as
legitimate or in extreme cases, as necessary for success because of the deeply rooted
submission to the hierarchical nature in our world. I also examined the idea of soft
governance that appears in many international group meetings.
Dominance is crystalized in the types of laws, policies, norms, and even
expectations that at the end of the day become natural for dominated groups or countries.
This is what Gramsci (1971) called hegemony, which is not an obvious abuse of power
but rather occurs when the dominated group adheres to the wishes of the powerful by
consent. In other words, dominated countries surrender to power as if there are no other
solutions to educational and social problems other than those imported from the West.
For the purpose of my analysis of power and discourse, first, van Dijk (2001b)
suggested that the access to a specific discourse, such as those ministers of the G8
countries because they relied on their nation’s advancement in the realm of education and
science, was a powerful resource in itself that gave perceived legitimacy to control and to
dictate the best way to make improvements in the education field in the BMENA region.
In other words, it was not coercion but rather was agreed upon by the BMENA countries
because the G8 countries were a clear example of success and advancement in the realm
of education. Second, our actions are controlled by our minds, and if the G8 could
influence the minds of BMENA ministers, then the G8 could also control their actions
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directly or indirectly. In short, those who can control discourse eventually can control the
minds and actions of the less powerful group(s).
Public Discourse. Controlling public discourse is a prevailing symbolic power
source that is represented in access to knowledge and information. van Dijk (1996)
categorized the types of control as the following: first is active control, which is seen in
everyday talk, such as conversations with friends, family members, or colleagues; and
second is passive control, in which we do not have control over matters such as media
discourse or the type of interaction between ordinary people and police officers, tax
inspectors, or bosses, and that is because people are told what to believe in and what to
do.
More relevant to my research interest was the social power represented in the G8
because it had more access and control over the public discourse. Social power is the type
of control we see in different fields: teachers controlling educational discourse,
professors’ scholarly discourse, attorney’s legal discourse, etc. In other words, the more
access, control, proprieties, and influence a group has over the discourse, the more power
it has. It is a discursive definition of the most important aspect of social (group) power.
Therefore, it is one important aspect of CDA to examine the power dynamic in any given
context.
I was able to understand the context of discourse when I considered van Dijk’s
(2001b) definition of context as “the mentally represented structure of those properties of
the social situation that are relevant for the production or comprehension of discourse” (p.
356). This included the definition of the situation at hand; actions; general settings, such
location and time, individuals involved and their cognitions, or realization to include their
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ideologies; knowledge; goals; and opinions. In order for the powerful group (G8) to
control the context, it must control one or more of these aspects. For example, it must
control the place and time for meetings, the participants (countries) who should or should
not attend, and the expected outcome from the interaction.
Another pivotal feature of group power is to control the structure of talk and text
in addition to the content. A dialectical relationship exists between text and context, and
we can see that in the powerful group when it chooses a discourse genre such as when a
teacher requires an answer from a student or when a judge requires an answer from a
defendant.
To put it in perspective, powerful groups (speakers) have more control or less
control over context of discourse at the expense of other groups with less power, and the
powerful may abuse their power. Such a scenario could be worse when that abuse is
considered legitimate or natural. van Dijk (2001b) cautioned that one must not consider
the text or talk as the primary embodiment of power relations between groups, but rather
the context is the primary embodiment of power relations because it can shape or
reinforce the type of relationship.
Mind Control. I appreciate this aspect of van Dijk’s (2001b) and Gramsci’s
(1971) understanding of mind control. van Dijk (2001b) claimed that the first major form
of power is the control over the public discourse and that mind control (hegemony) is the
second, which reproduces dominance. Thus, people and less powerful groups acquire
their beliefs, opinions, and knowledge from different sources: first, discourse that has
been considered legitimate, trustworthy, and credible, such as experts, professors, media,
scholars, or for my study, the G8 and BMENA ministers. Second, in some instances,
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participants or less powerful groups are required to attend certain events (for different
reasons), such as on-the-job training programs, job instructions, and for my study, the
G8’s annual meetings. Third, some discourses are conducted in a closed fashion that may
exclude the public or media, which prevents any alternative narrative. Fourth, participants
in dominant discourses may not have a counter discourse that could challenge the
dominant discourse or information. With this in mind, CDA tools helped me analyze
domination, production, and reproduction of hierarchical relationships between the G8
countries and the BMENA region.
Research in Critical Discourse
Critical discourse analysis has proven its validity in many fields of study where
we see power and domination. For example, van Dijk (2001b) shed light on how CDA
can be used in studying gender inequality because it addressed explicitly discursive
dominance. CDA also examined media discourse from different angles, such as linguistic
tools that are apparent when we see transitivity in syntax, speech acts, lexical structure,
and modality. The benefits of such research were to point out that in the media discourse,
syntactic variations were used in events to de-emphasize the agency, responsibility, or
perspective by passively constructing specific sentence. To illustrate my point, I included
an excerpt from the British House of Commons that was cited in van Dijk’s work (1997):
We do not have vast numbers of Americans entering this country on a false basis
to secure permanent residency. The whole point of this legislative change is to
direct it at where the problem lies—people from west Africa, not from America....
We are talking about country of origin, culture, and religion. Those factors are
important, and they cause great anxiety to our constituents. (p. 49)

107

We notice the concept of othering in this previous quote, even though it was unwisely
very explicit; it is as if the speaker warns about black immigration, and it has to be
stopped. The political elites sell this rhetoric to the public because black immigrants
come to Britain on a false premise while white Americans do not, and even if they do, the
assumption was that they will be accepted and integrated, which will maintain the
whiteness of the United Kingdom. van Dijk shared many examples of more subtle
statements that created divisive public sentiments, which controlled the public discourse,
and there is evidence of this now in the United States when listening to U.S. presidential
candidate Donald Trump.
Keeping in mind that CDA aims to investigate the relationships between power
and discourse, CDA provides a complex theoretical framework to analyze power and
domination and their reproduction by text and talk. However, van Dijk (2001b) claimed
that gaps remain ambiguous in the framework, such as the interface between discourse
structures and social cognition in the local and global contexts, even though they appear
in notions of ideology and power. A second gap exists between the linguistically oriented
studies and social studies, because social studies hardly engage in discourse analysis, and
linguistic studies ignore the power abuse and inequality that are considered theories of
sociology. Therefore, integrating the two approaches helped my study to arrive at a more
comprehensive and satisfactory form of CDA.
Domination Shift
After reading many critical studies, whether they are under the banner of CDA or
not, I noticed a shift from overt group domination to a covert professional and
institutional domination (Danet, 1984; O’Barr et al., 1978; Bradac et al., 1981; Ng &
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Bradac, 1993; Wodak, 1984). I am interested in the latter because of its apparent
legitimacy and neutrality, or the portrayal of such by the dominant public, media, and
political discourses that work together to reproduce and perpetuate the status quo of
hierarchical structures between nations. When we look at power and dominance, we find
that both are associated with different social and public domains, such as law, science,
education, media, and politics, among others. These domains are controlled by elites in
those neutral professional institutions through their discursive and active engagements in
power reproduction in these domains. One may ask: Who loses in this scenario because it
is common sense that the more advanced group in any domain would have an advantage
in creating the rules, agendas, and outcomes? The problem I see with this premise is that
there is a continued dependency on the dominant group from the target population,
whether they are students, clients, or citizens of a certain nation or an entire region such
as BMENA, neglecting the fact that lasting solutions cannot be borrowed from such
foreign institutions. I believe they need to be generated from within.
Overview of Methods
“A route that leads to the goal” is the original Greek meaning of the word method
(Kvale, 1996, p. 4). Therefore, I planned to achieve my goal of describing, analyzing,
critiquing the status quo of the G8-BMENA Partnership, and the ramification of such a
collaboration on educational policy and on BMENA societies. I investigated how
ideologies and hierarchical structure, through discourse, were created and maintained in
this social group. I believe that adopting CDA as my methodology enabled me to achieve
the goal. I chose this partnership because it was mainly created after the tragic trauma of
9/11 that befell not only the United States but affected the entire world. The inception of
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G8-BMENA Partnership was in 2004 led by the United States and other European
countries, along with some Islamic countries, under the banner of the war on terrorism
(Rizvi, 2004). While every decent human being would agree on the premise and purpose
of this cooperation, I strongly believed that the manner was not suitable for a sustainable
positive outcome and, I may add, was not beneficial for the BMENA region, people, and
eventually the world.
From the many critical discourse analysis approaches that I learned about
(Fairclough, 1989; Fairclough, 1992; Fairclough, 1995; Fowler, 1985; Wodak, 1996; Lee,
2000; van Dijk, 2005; van Dijk, 2009; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009), I adopted van Dijk’s
(2009) socio-cognitive CDA as my analysis approach. My reason for using his approach
was because of the nature of interactions as it investigates the dynamics between
cognition, discourse, and society. van Dijk (2001b) mainly focused on stereotypes,
domination, elite power abuse, reproduction or prejudice, and resistance from dominated
groups. Most importantly for my study, I examined discourse control and its dimensions
because once a group controls the discourse, it gains access to power. van Dijk (2005)
accounted for the production and comprehension of discourse when he called it (Kdevice), which is short for personal, interpersonal, institutional, group, national, and
cultural knowledge. van Dijk (2009) suggested that we achieve social cognition via
collective mental representations resulting from consensus through interaction between
groups and discourse structures.
According to van Dijk (2009), individual cognition is learned by dynamic
constructs (social representation), which include values, concepts, images, and norms that
are shared in social groups. These social representations are activated and maintained by
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discourse. It is, therefore, pivotal for my study to analyze global and local structures
relevant to education in the G8 and BMENA meetings and in subsequent local meetings
available to the public. The aspects I focused on in my analysis were coherence, lexical
and topic selection, implication, and policy borrowing or generation. I relied primarily on
van Dijk’s (1997) approach to investigate the opaque relations between power, context,
ideology, and discourse by analyzing opinions, attitudes, and the socially constructed
knowledge by the G8 and BMENA representatives. This approach was useful for my
study because it examined the constructed knowledge in different social groups with
different status levels and cultural perspectives. Therefore, it is important to highlight
what constitutes a group; it is a group when there are shared knowledge, problems,
concerns, objectives, social representations, and social identity—keeping in mind that
ideological power in van Dijk’s opinion can take many forms, occurs in different
situations, and is not limited to the dominant group.
Data Collection Process
I collected publicly available texts generated from the G8 and BMENA meetings
starting from the inaugural meeting in 2004. This included official reports, declarations,
recommendations, civil society recommendations, statements, summaries, and any
document I found for the Forum for the Future. The annual meetings were hosted and led
by a different country each year, either from the G8 or BMENA countries. I am aware
that these documents discussed numerous issues, but I concentrated on education,
educational policies, and social ramifications. It was important for me to analyze these
documents from a critical perspective by looking at the type of relationship between the
members of this coalition, focusing on power, dominance, hegemony, production and
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reproduction of power, and overall influence in shaping BMENA societies and
educational policies.
My research questions helped me to be more focused when I analyzed the
documents: (1) How has the G8 and the Broader Middle East and North African
(BMENA) Partnership affected and shaped educational and social reforms in the region
since its establishment in 2004? (2) What type of discourse was deployed to
perpetuate hegemonic and hierarchical relationships that sustain unequal status between
the G8 and BMENA countries? (3) How do the G8 representatives control the BMENA
public discourse? (4) How does such discourse control the mind and the action of the
BMENA countries, and what are the social consequences of such control? In addition to
these questions, I explored the role of globalization and the English language, either in
communication or as a needed tool for a more successful and stable Middle East and
North African region.
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Chapter 4 Background
The purpose of this study was to understand the type of relationship between the
Group of Eight (G8) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) by
critically analyzing an initiative created in 2004 by the United States called G8-BMENA
Partnership. The purpose of establishing the partnership was to reform the region
educationally, economically, and socially. The following research questions informed and
guided my study: (1) How has the G8 and the Broader Middle East and North African
(BMENA) Partnership affected and shaped educational and social reforms in the region
since its establishment in 2004? (2) What type of discourse was deployed to
perpetuate hegemonic and hierarchical relationships that sustain unequal status between
the G8 and BMENA countries? (3) How do the G8 representatives control the BMENA
public discourse? (4) How does such discourse control the mind and the action of the
BMENA countries, and what are the social consequences of such control?
I used critical discourse analysis (CDA) as my methodology to analyze the
publicly gathered documents that were published online in different governmental
websites. This chapter will include description of these documents. It will include my
coding system and analysis criteria. Answers for the research questions will be addressed
in this chapter, and they will be concisely stated in my closing remarks in Chapter 5 to
bring clarity to the reader regarding my overall findings and understanding.
Documents
I found 41 documents from two major sources: first, official documents, reports,
declarations, and statements, and they are categorized under official discourse. These
official documents were produced by either the G8 governments or their representatives
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and also by BMENA governments or representatives. The second set of documents was
produced by civil society organizations from the BMENA region. Both sets of documents
were generated in their official annual or preparatory meetings between 2004 and 2013
after the establishment of the G8-BMENA Partnership. Those documents were publicly
available online.
By collecting data from these sources, the intent was to achieve a greater
understanding of the partnership as well as the scope of interests that each entity had
regarding the promised educational, economic, and social reforms for the BMENA
region.
Coding System
I developed a coding system that emanated from my background in critical
research and CDA, focusing on domination, power relations, and reproduction. I read the
documents in chronological order, starting with no previous code system because I did
not want to impose a coding system that might not be present in the data in the first place.
Saldana (2013) showed a process of coding as the following: the first cycle of coding can
be a range from one word, phrase, or an entire paragraph or page that captures the
attention of the researcher. The second cycle of coding can be the same phrases,
passages, or units coded previously or even a larger portion up to that point of the
analysis. In essence, these codes provided me with a critical link between the text and the
meaning, whether obvious or hidden. With this in mind, I think it is a subjective process
that cannot be evaded, but in order for me to gauge my subjectivity, I decided to recruit
two doctoral students and ask them to read one document (Al Hayat Arabic Newspaper,
2004) and code it using my coding system; but the difference was in their understanding
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of the codes and obviously their different social, economic, and educational backgrounds.
I came up with nine major codes and three sub-codes under the umbrella of
hegemony/hierarchical (See Table 1) for more information about the codes and their
meanings to me. I met with the two participants once and explained my rationale behind
the coding system, and they were given Table 1 as explanation in case they needed it
while coding the document. I coded 18 instances in the given document, and after
checking the document, the two participants returned a week later. I found that we had an
overall agreement in coding the same passages of about 80% of the time. It was not
intended to be an inter-rater reliability test but rather an effort to check my subjectivity
level in the coding process.
Table 1
Codes and Their Meaning
Code

Hegemony/hierarchical

Meaning

The imposition of dominant culture on subordinate groups.
It is not an obvious abuse of power, but rather the dominated
groups are consenting to this domination, and some consider it as
the only option for advancement (ideological work, macro level,
mental colonization). I adopted Gramsci’s definition of
hegemony.

Subcodes:
Control

Control is defined by concrete actions, i.e., providing financial
assistance, which in essence would control the agenda, outcomes,
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etc. It also means controlling time, location, and membership in
the G8-BMENA Partnership.

Power

Power shows political, economic, and educational might through
advancement in such fields. For example, industrialized
democracies would have the perceived legitimacy through their
power to impose their views of reform on the less advanced
nations in different fields, such as education.

Subgroup

Subgroup (Othering): It appears when there is a conflict between
groups internationally or locally. For example, when a
government interacts with a civil society organization, one sees
the subtle language use that shows hierarchical relationship.

Manipulation

This is when an advanced country, for example, pushes for an
economic project supposedly for the benefit of a less advanced
country. It is obvious that there will be some economic benefits to
that country, but the major beneficiary will be the advanced
country.

Ambiguous

It shows unclear statements that may contradict with the overall
purpose of the partnership in this research (G8-BMENA).
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Low expectations

Suggesting basic education, or vocational training, is what the
region needs now, as opposed to taking the lead to reach
maximum potential.

Self-interest

When there is a real indication from a statement that the major
beneficiary is the advanced nation (G8).

Exclusion

Excluding a country(s) or an organization because it is likely they
may block an initiative and the overall agenda of the advanced
nations. It is a representation of group power.

Discrepancy

It contradicts previous statements, or if followed, it will not result
in the goal of liberation from outside control.

Lexical

Words or phrases that indicate superiority or a hierarchical
relationship in the analyzed text.

Positive

Real investment in a local community (knowledge economy,
knowledge creation, as opposed to knowledge consumption,
investing in local infrastructure and research).
The opposite would be continuous dependence on Western
nations and continuing to be on the receiving end.

Note. This coding system was created specifically for the purpose of analyzing the G8BMENA documents
117

Data Organization Method
I used Dedoose, a web-based research tool that can be used in qualitative and
mixed-method research. It has the option of uploading my documents and organizing
them according to my two descriptors, which were discourse type (official and public)
and second, year of publication (Figure 2).

Discourse Type

Year

Official
Discourse

2004-2013

Public
Discourse
Figure 2. Descriptors used to categorize the data.
Dedoose also gives the option of adding codes to text and of exporting excerpts from the
data. It was a useful tool in providing quantitative angles to my analysis by showing the
frequency and percentage of occurrences observed for each code.
Partnership Background
The purpose of this analysis is to uncover the power relation that existed between
organizations and countries and to be more specific, to uncover the power relations in the
G8-BMENA Partnership and their proposed economic, educational, and social reform for
the BMENA region. I looked at the social problems that were addressed by the official
entities and civil societies, and there was an agreement between the two that the region
has major educational, economic, and social problems, such as:


High illiteracy rate, 40% among adult Arab population.
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A combined GDP of 22 Arab countries, which was less than that of Spain.



More than 50 million people will enter the job market by 2010.



If the current unemployment rate does not improve, it will be 25% by 2010.



Only 1.6% of the population has access to the Internet.



Some 51% of adult Arabs demonstrated a desire to emigrate (United Nations
Development Program, 2002)
These indicators, among others, put the region and the world on high alert,

especially for security reasons. Thus, the G8-BMENA Partnership was born under the
auspices of the United States and some European countries. My reason for choosing this
partnership was because of the power relations between the West and East and the
continuous hegemonic nature of this relationship, whether previously in the overt
colonization or now because of globalization. On February 13, 2004, a draft of the
partnership was leaked by an Arabic newspaper, Al Hayat (Al Hayat Arabic Newspaper,
2004). The surprise leak exposed again the U.S. hegemony in the region, and it was
scandalous because none of the Arab nations were involved in the drafting process of this
partnership and its agenda even though it was about their own region. Sharp (2005)
stated:
Arab governments, such as Egypt and Jordan, expressed frustration over not
having been part of the drafting process [emphasis added] and expressed their
dismay over having to find out about the proposal through the media rather than
through consultations with the U.S. government. (p. 2)
Nevertheless, we all understand the political leverage the United States has to create the
initiative and describe the status of the region and prescribe a remedy. This showed
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clearly the type of hegemonic and hierarchical relationship at hand, but there is more to
be said regarding the partnership and its orchestration. One may ask: If the partnership is
for the good of the region, its population, and the world, then what is the problem if the
United States created it?
One of the other problems in the creation was naming the partnership, as it was
called the Greater Middle East (GME), which stirred unwanted reactions, because it is
such a large region that contains Arab, non-Arab, Muslim, and non-Muslim populations,
and a one-size-fits-all approach would not work. Thereafter, some local governments
such as Jordan and Egypt offered their concerns regarding the proposed reform.
However, the name was changed to attract more appeal in the region without touching the
essence of the previous draft to become the G8-BMENA, even though the region was
even more diverse with major differences in education, religion, economic status, and
political environment. But again, the manner in which the partnership was created shows
the power, control, and the interests of the United States in the region and the required
changes. Is it for the best for the region? Is it for the benefit of the West? Is it for both?
Questions remained to be answered.
Data Analysis
The analysis showed that in eight out of the nine categories that were coded in
this project, the official discourse (dominant discourse) has the edge in the frequency of
coding (see Figure 3), except for the positive code. To give some perspective to what
were the sources of the texts that were analyzed, it included statements from both the G8
and BMENA countries through their official representatives, such as ministers of finance,
education, and foreign affairs. The public discourse was produced by civil society’s
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organizations that were chosen across the BMENA region; they were comprised of
academics, lawyers, and other professionals in different fields. However, they do not
necessarily claim to represent the population or their individual regions because only
elections do that.
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Figure 3. Frequency of codes in both discourses.
It is important to highlight the difference in the number of documents produced
by the partnership because the total number of documents analyzed was 41, only nine of
which were produced by civil societies (21.9%). If anything, that proportion gives us an
indication of discourse control by the G8-BMENA governments. With this in mind, it
seems to be a great irony that with this limited access to discourse by the civil society
representatives, they evidently were higher in the positive category. The positive category
indicates investment in an indigenous knowledge economy, knowledge generation,
research, and development. It seems that the officials (G8-BMENA) leaned toward
maintaining the status quo of keeping the BMENA region in the consuming end, not in
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the producing end. Figure 3 showed the overall coding results, but each category will be
analyzed separately later in the chapter.
As observed, the greatest number of occurrences was in the concept of hegemony
and hierarchical, from both official discourse (G8-BMENA) and public discourse (civil
societies). In other words, this showed interest in maintaining the existing hegemonic
relationship, which speaks to the effects of discourse control via mind control. The
following excerpt serves as an example of my interpretation of hegemony and the
hierarchical nature of the document:
With these goals in mind, we [G8] tried to reinvigorate the BMENA process by
giving civil society and private sector equal seats at the table with their
government counterparts at all BMENA events [emphasis added], including the
Forum, and focused the citizen-government dialogue on specific, country-based
collective problem-solving. (2012 G8-BMENA Initiative, 2012, p. 5)
The statement here is by a G8 representative, which showcases the hegemonic interaction
because the G8 is functioning from a superior position in solving conflicts between
governments and their civil societies. The G8 controlled the scope, defined the issue, and
prescribed the remedy to move forward, and this is astonishing to me because it is a local
issue in the first place that needs to be dealt with by the local governments and its people
and organizations. The following comment represents the same hegemonic relation but
from a different source, civil society.
We CSOs [civil society organizations] from the region are accused of being too
much Western oriented. Let us be Eastern oriented and bring positive experiences
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[emphasis added] from East towards the region. (National Human Rights
Committee, 2011, para. 12)
In this excerpt, we notice the representative of civil society that I hoped would offer a
solution from within but instead offered another version of reliance on other nations to
solve the local problems. I do not call for cutting collaborations with other advanced
nations, but it is an issue when it is either heading West or East as suggested by the civil
society representatives and not within or at least the neighboring countries, which in my
estimation would help the region to collaborate in local problem solving.
The following two excerpts show first the serious weakness of the partnership and
the BMENA region.
. . . during the opening session of the 7th Forum for the Future, [BMENA
representatives] held Canada accountable for hindering the progress on the final
declaration [emphasis added]. (National Human Rights Committee, 2011, para. 7)
G8 and Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) countries failed to come
up with a joint declaration with Canada being held responsible for the failure
[emphasis added]. (National Human Rights Committee, 2011, para. 1)
And second, the statement unwisely illustrated clearly the hierarchical type of
relationship the G8 has with the region because one single country, Canada, which does
not have dominating presence in the BMENA, has the power to cause the failure to the
meeting of that year. But again, group power is crystalized in this scenario because
Canada alone cannot deviate from the G8 agenda. Another disappointing fact that spoke
to the low expectations of the partnership was to produce a joint statement to probably
score a political point or to improve public relations. Furthermore, 27 BMENA
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independent countries that seek reform cannot produce their own statements, regardless
of the disagreement with Canada, but again this shows the superficial kind of partnership
at hand. I introduced the negative impact of globalization in Chapter 2 that the BMENA
region suffers from, and again with the following statement, as we see the invasion of
Western values as if they are a prerequisite factor in reform.
In addition to the educational value of these kinds of interventions, participants
are exposed to American values, culture, and democratic institutions [emphasis
added]. (U.S. Department of State, 2008, para. 20)
Also troubling is the wording of American values, culture—which makes me wonder
which values and culture are referenced. The statement also implied that the local values
and culture may prevent the needed progress, which invariably is fallacious, in my
judgment, because it not only is untrue, but it causes mental colonization and more selfflagellation. That is because a culture cannot be antithetical to reform and progress, but
rather, political and economic circumstances contribute to stagnation.
Power and control were second in the total number of codes, which indicates the
gloomy condition of the partnership during the time period of the analyzed documents,
2004-2013. Take, for example, the following statement to illustrate my rationale in
coding them as such.
Furthermore, there are, at present, approximately 90,000 computers in schools,
distributed all over the country—a figure, which, according to the Ministry of
Education, is expected to increase in the near future. Partners in the Jordanian
initiative include: Cisco Systems, Dell, Hewlett-Packard and France Telecom,
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amongst others [emphasis added]. (Office of Her Majesty, Press Department,
Dead Sea, 2005, para. 8)
I coded the previous statement as power, control, and self-interest because the G8 has the
financial and technological power to provide Jordan with the technology, and I speculate
there might be benefits from the effort to Jordan, but I am certainly not interested in
receiving the computers but would liked to have seen the computers made in Jordan or
any other place in the region. In other words, the partnership did not advocate for
building Jordan’s infrastructure to be able to invest in local companies to manufacture its
own products. The statement shows self-interest because the companies are American
and French, which would improve their sales and improve their technologies, not
Jordan’s.
Research Findings
My research findings revealed that the analyzed documents of the G8-BMENA
Partnership for the years 2004-2013 have nine major themes (codes) and three subthemes
(subcodes), which I introduced in Table 1. These codes are relevant to my research
methodology: critical research analysis as they unpack domination and power relations
embedded in the documents. The total number of documents analyzed was 41. Thirty-two
documents were produced by official entities, either by the G8 or BMENA officials,
while the remainder were produced by civil society organizations. The purpose of
analyzing documents from both sources is to investigate where these two sources connect
and disconnect in the proposed reform.
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In the following section, I introduce the meaning of each code, the total number of
occurrences in both official and public discourse, and provide excerpts from the
documents that represent each code and my reasoning for coding as such.
Hegemony/hierarchical
Hegemony/hierarchical is the major theme found in the data, which focused on
macro-level domination with the consent of the dominated groups (BMENA countries
and civil societies). However, in many instances I found evidence of micro-actionable
statements that contributed to the macro-level domination, such as financial or political
power, which in essence controls the agenda and discussion regarding the proposed
reform that the G8-BMENA sought.
The analysis produced 260 instances of hegemonic relationship from both the
official discourse and public discourse. Showing the percentages and frequencies of each
code serves to highlight the dominance of concepts in the analyzed documents. For
example, the concept of hegemony was observed significantly higher in the official
discourse with 85% (221 occurrences), while hegemony was less apparent in the public
discourse with 15% (39 occurrences). In other words, having the percentages helped me
recognize the entity that has control over the discourse and in what respect as well. The
following excerpt published by the G8 research group, shows macro-level domination:
The Greater Middle East Initiative, unveiled by the United States [emphasis
added] at the 2004 Sea Island Summit in June, was motivated by the U.S. led
desire to stem the threats of political instability [emphasis added], economic
stagnation and terrorism in the Greater Middle East. (Broader Middle East &
North Africa Initiative, 2005, p. 11)
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This excerpt showed the unilateral action taken by the United States to unveil the
partnership, which is a clear indication of a hierarchical relationship between the United
States and the entire region. It also highlighted the U.S. desire behind the partnership as
the most important factor—not what the region actually needs for reform. It is considered
hegemonic because the action is taken by the United States because it has the power to
unveil the partnership with no indication that the region has any control over the action or
the process. van Dijk (2001b) considered action or process control as a macro-level
domination, which is represented in the discourse control. The following figure shows the
frequency of macro hegemonic instances found in official discourse and in public
discourse.
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Figure 4. Number of coded statements as hegemonic/hierarchical relationship observed
in the analyzed documents produced by G8-BMENA and civil societies.
Subcodes
The following three subcodes represented a second level (micro) of hegemonic
relationship between the G8 and BMENA countries that appeared in both types of
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discourses, and they are characterized by actionable statements that meant more benefits
for the G8 or simply when statements dictated the outcomes in an obvious manner. This
is why they are coded under the umbrella of hegemony and hierarchical theme.
Control. It is defined by concrete actions, such as providing financial assistance,
which in essence controlled the agenda of meetings and the expected outcomes from the
partnership. It also meant controlling time, location, and membership of countries in the
G8-BMENA Partnership, such as the number of BMENA countries was 23 (Federal
Ministry of Education and Research Oman, 2005), and by 2012, there were 27 (Chatham
House, 2013). The total instances of control were 68, a figure that appeared in all
documents from 2004-2013. Some 86% of control indications were from the official
discourse (59 occurrences), while control was 13% in the public discourse (nine
occurrences). As observed in these percentages, the official discourse once again
produced the highest number of controlling statements, which is an indication of the
governments’ attitudes in dominating discourse relying on their economic and political
power. Here is an example of control in one of the official documents:
Establish together with our partners a Forum for the Future to:
Provide a ministerial framework [emphasis added] for our on-going dialogue and
engagement on political, economic, and social reform in a spirit of mutual respect;
Bring together in one forum foreign, economic and other ministers of the G-8 and
the region on a regular basis . . . [emphasis added]. (The White House Office of
the Press Secretary, 2004, para. 2)
In that comment, we observe the official discourse (G8) controlling not only the level of
representation (ministers) but also controlling the scope and frequency of discussions
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instead of a having a free choice by the concerned entity (BMENA) because the reform
affects its region, not the G8. It a representation of what van Dijk (2001b) highlighted
regarding controlling discourse context, which not only is limited to controlling time,
space, and membership, but it went further to control ideologies, knowledge, goals, and
opinions.
Power. It showed political, economic, and educational power represented by G8
advancement in those fields, which essentially portrayed the G8 countries as legitimate
entities entitled to impose their views of reform and to decide what the reform should
involve. The alternative would be a scope of reform generated from within the region.
The analysis showed that power was tagged in the documents 53 times in total.
Official discourse produced 49 instances, or 92.5%, while the public discourse showed
power-related statements of only four occurrences or 7.5%. The percentages here
accurately depicted the power relations that existed between governments and civil
societies and this is why governments produced 92.5 % of the power statements.
Consider, for example, the following statement:
The United States is sponsoring [emphasis added] "partnership schools" to
enhance the quality of primary and secondary education, and conducting teacher
training and providing classroom materials [emphasis added] for early childhood
education in Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, and Qatar. (The White House Office of the
Press Secretary, 2004, para. 97)
This statement shows the financial power of the United States, which gave the U.S. the
authority or legitimacy to sponsor a school for a specific purpose (teacher training) and to
provide class materials for students. Power here represents hegemonic influence on less
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powerful countries in the region, which in essence keeps the region on the receiving end
by accepting the financial assistance and in return influencing ideology and opinions in
the reform. In other words, the financial power determined the kind of reform, which may
not necessarily offer a substantive reform that meets the region’s needs.
Subgroup. Subgrouping was recorded when there was a conflict between groups
internationally (between the G8 and the BMENA countries) or locally (between BMENA
countries and civil society organizations). For example, when a government interacts
with a civil society organization, I observed a subtle language structure that showed a
hierarchical relationship. It also can be considered as othering. The total number of
subgrouping (othering) instances was 31. Again, the official discourse produced the
majority of subgroupings with 74.2% (23 occurrences), and with 25.8% for the public
discourse (eight occurrences). The percentage here is higher for the official discourse
because governments have more economic and political power, and therefore, they were
able to exclude civil societies or limit their involvement in the partnership. Looking at the
following two excerpts will showcase this type of interaction:
With these goals in mind, we tried to reinvigorate the BMENA process by giving
civil society and private sector equal seats at the table with their government
counterparts at all BMENA events [emphasis added], including the Forum, and
focused the citizen-government dialogue on specific, country-based collective
problem-solving. (2012 G8-BMENA Initiative, 2012, p. 5)
The G-8 could: Encourage the region’s governments to allow [emphasis added]
civil society organizations, including human rights and media NGOs, to operate
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freely without harassment or restrictions. (Al Hayat Arabic Newspaper, 2004,
para. 12)
These two statements show hierarchical and hegemonic relationships in an obvious
manner, not only between the BMENA and civil socities but also by having the G8 work
as a mediator between them because it has leverage over the two. The comments also
show the unequal representation of the civil societies from the inception of this
partnership as they have been othered and the G8 attempts to reconcile the two from a
superior position. Figure 5 shows the three subcode frequencies and source of discourse
from the analyzed documents.
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Figure 5. Number of coded statements as control, power, and subgroup (othering)
observed in the analyzed documents produced by G8-BMENA and civil societies.
Manipulation
Manipulation was recorded in these situations when we have statements by G8 or
BMENA countries to numb countries, organizations, and peoples’ emotions regarding the
partnership, because they appeared to offer solutions and hope for reform. Manipulation
was tagged 13 times. Official discourse produced 11 occurrences (84.6%), while public
discourse produced only two counts (15.4%). This shows that the governments were
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involved in manipulating discourse more often than civil societies to maintain legitimacy
in controlling the discourse. Statements were coded under this category after I found
historical background about this partnership and realized that the real intentions behind it
were to further exploit the region economically and politically. The following statement
shows a misleading promise:
We [G8] declare our support for democratic, social and economic reform
emanating from that region [emphasis added]. (The White House Office of the
Press Secretary, 2004, para. 1)
This is just one of many examples that gives the reader the impression of the region’s free
will in adopting reforms in governance and socioeconomic spheres and covertly holds the
region responsible for the outcomes (either success or failure). In other words, if the
reform efforts that emanated from the region were not successful, it was due to the efforts
put in the reform by the region. However, I have established that the partnership was
fully created and designed by the United States with European support without any
consultation with the region (Sharp, 2005), which essentially neglected the fundamental
needs for progress. I believe manipulative statements were embedded in the discourse to
brighten the public image of the partnership, and it may also cause a rift between local
populations and their governments. Figure 6 shows the frequency of the recorded
manipulation instances from both discourses.
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Figure 6. Number of coded statements as manipulation observed in the analyzed
documents produced by G8-BMENA and civil societies.
Ambiguous
Ambiguous statements were coded in some of the analyzed documents when
statements could be interpreted in multiple ways. It is also possible that the statements
were intentionally made ambiguous to avoid any commitments from the partnership.
Ambiguous statements were found 12 times. Again, the official discourse dominated the
majority of such statements with nine occurrences (75%), while ambiguous statements
occurred three times (25%) in the public discourse. The frequency of codes as observed
was higher in the official discourse because governments appeared to exert efforts to
maintain relations with the civil societies’ representatives to sustain public appeal even if
it meant superficial reform outcomes. Consider, for example, the following official
statement:
Ministers affirmed the importance of the continuation of informal dialogue
[emphasis added]. (2012 G8-BMENA Initiative, 2012, p. 9)
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I take issue with the informal dialogue because at the end of the day, such statements
were not binding and I considered them to be toothless statements because they do not
obligate the parties involved to commit to any reform. What made matters worse was that
the informal dialogue was mainly among the representatives of civil societies and in rare
cases with BMENA government officials. It was ambiguous, because how do we expect
an already othered low-status groups such as the civil societies to produce serious reform
efforts in an informal dialogue. The following figure shows the frequency of the
ambiguous statements along with their source.
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Figure 7. Number of coded statements as ambiguous observed in the analyzed documents
produced by G8-BMENA and civil societies.
Low Expectations
Some statements were coded as such when I had higher expectations than what
the partnership had considered to be an accomplishment, such as producing a joint
declaration or advocating for basic education. The total number of instances was 15, and
the official discourse, yet again, produced 10 occurrences (66.7%). The public discourse
had five occurrences (33.3%). These numbers indicate that the official discourse both
dominated the expectation discourse as well as produced a greater number of low
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expectations than the public discourse. The following statement clearly shows the low
expectation or lack of seriousness in reform effort:
At the Forum, we achieved a historic outcome: a consensus declaration
[emphasis added] (for only the second time in BMENA’s nine-year history).
(2012 G8-BMENA Initiative, 2012, p. 5)
The phrasing of the sentence is embarrassing, to say the least, especially from a
governmental entity. This is because this was during the ninth annual meeting, which was
preceeded by serveral meetings, workshops, travel between countries that cost massive
amounts of money, and the historic outcome was a joint declaration, —not resolving the
Arab-Israli conflict or developing technological capacity in the region. It shows us the
low expectations set for the partnership. It seems to me and to some of the civil societies
that this partnership is a public relations gathering only to serve hidden govermental
goals under the false hope of helping the region and its people. To put it in perspective,
we have 35 countries from both the G8 and BMENA regions, and they considered a
consensus declartion as a historic outcome, because it happened only twice in the life of
this partnership. Figure 8 shows the number of statements of low expectation that
appeared in both discourses.
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Figure 8. Number of coded statements with low expectations observed in the analyzed
documents produced by G8-BMENA and civil societies.
Self-interest
The meaning of self-interest in this coding system is when I believed the majority
of benefits, such as political and economic advantages, are for the G8 countries, not for
the BMENA region. However, this does not deprive the BMENA region from all
benefits, because it may gain some. That is to say, if the partnership is for the region, then
the formula needs to be flipped where BMENA gains the maximum economic, political,
and educational benefits, not the contrary. Self-interest statements were observed 25
times in total, 23 of which were observed in the official discourse, which equates to 92%,
while it was produced only two times (8%) in the public discourse. This shows that
government officials were able to dominate the discourse and therefore produced more
statements that benefited the G8 countries more than the BMENA region. Take, for
example, the following statement:
Promoting financial excellence and supporting efforts in the region to integrate its
financial sector into the global financial system [emphasis added], including by:
providing technical assistance to modernize financial services, and to introduce
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and expand market-oriented financial instruments. (The White House Office of
the Press Secretary, 2004, para. 95)
The global logic in economics is prevalent in the statement and the partnership in general,
which is a response to the global demand to have BMENA countries' sign free trade
agreements (Noi, 2011) mainly for the purpose of opening those countries’ markets for
the United States and Europe to sell their products. Secondly, the BMENA countries will
gain minimial benefits compared with the G8. It is important to observe the phrasing of
the statement (to modernize finincial services), which implies that the G8 is tirelessly
working for the benefit of the region and dangerously nothing is mentioned about the
reciprocal nature of trade agrements. In other words, the region will be obligated to
consume more Western products, which prevents it from establishing its own industries.
The following figure shows the number of tagged statements that represented more
benefits to the G8 countries.
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Figure 9. Number of coded statements with greater interests for the G8 countries
observed in the analyzed documents produced by G8-BMENA and civil societies.
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Exclusion
Exclusion was coded when there was a group with more power to exclude another
group, and this happened either between the G8 and BMENA countries or between civil
societies and BMENA countries. Exclusion was found occasionally (10 times)
throughout the data. Official discourse produced four occurrences (40%), while it was
observed six times in the public discourse (60%). It seems that in the public discourse,
civil societies’ representatives were able to document the behavior of either the BMENA
or G8 countries as they often refer to them in a way that shows leverage and lower status.
Here is an example of such interaction:
The representatives of the civil society presented a number of recommendations
to the preliminary meeting of the Forum for the Future last September in New
York. What became of such recommendations? Were they discussed? What was
the stance on them? Did the governments respond to such recommendations?
Were some of them adopted? Or were they “archived”? Up to the moment the
civil society did not receive any response! [emphasis added]. (2012 G8-BMENA
Initiative, 2004, p. 2)
This statement by the civil society shows the othering concept and frustration because
they were not real partners on an equal footing in the reform efforts. Civil societies
conducted their parallel meetings and then submitted their recommendations to the
official entity, which has the liberty to address the concerns of the civil societies or not
because they control the final publications and media outlets. This scenario is a crystal
representation of discourse control by the dominant group, as van Dijk (2001b) described
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in his view of critical discourse analysis. Figure 10 shows the number of coded
statements representing exclusion.
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Figure 10. Number of coded statements as exclusion observed in the analyzed documents
produced by G8-BMENA and civil societies.
Discrepancy
Discrepancy was coded when a mismatch or a conflict was found in statements, in
either the official discourse or public discourse, with the overall purpose of the G8BMENA Partnership, which are educational, political, and socioeconomic reforms. The
total number of discrepancies observed was 25. The official discourse produced the
majority of that number, with 22 occurrences (88%), while the remaining three
occurrences were from the public discourse (12%). According to the frequency observed,
the official discourse was able to infuse the discourse with more discrepant statements
than the public discourse, which essentially contradicted the overall purpose of the
partnership. An example of discrepancy is seen in the following text:
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However, due to tensions between the United States and Egypt [emphasis added]
over the arrest of Egyptian opposition party leaders, this meeting has been
postponed [emphasis added]. (Broader Middle East & North Africa Initiative,
2005, p. 13)
That comment shows how fragile the partnership is. This is because of a disagreement on
a political issue, the United States has the power to cancel what is supposed to be an
important meeting that addresses extremism and socioeconomic concerns in the region
due to the arrest of some opposition leaders, even though the United States has been
backing the Egyptian government and for decades has been providing financial support.
In other words, the statement shows discrepancy with the overall purpose of reform
because the meeting includes political reform among other issues and it was canceled,
which in essence does not serve the region in general or the opposition leaders in
particular. Figure 11 shows the number of statements that contained discrepancies with
the overarching purpose of the partnership.
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Figure 11. Number of coded statements as discrepant observed in the analyzed
documents produced by G8-BMENA and civil societies.
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Lexical
Lexical issues were coded when I noticed overt or covert indications of
superiority or higher power reflected in word choices, which organized groups in a
hierarchical fashion. Analyzing lexical structure is an important feature of critical
discourse analysis approach (van Dijk, 1997). The total number of coded lexical issues
was 27. Official discourse produced the majority of those instances with 22 occurrences
(81.5%), while the public discourse produced only five instances (18.5%). This showed
that the official discourse had the liberty to use whatever language it saw fitting in
interactions without considering the important effect of language use in reform buy-in.
Here is an Arabic text that was produced by the United States government that shows the
issue:

سبتمبر ويتضمن الخطوط/ أيلول20 في ما يلي بيان الحقائق الذي أصدرته وزارة الخارجية األميركية يوم
.[ الذي سيعقد في نيويوركemphasis added] العريضة للمعلومات األساسية وجدول أعمال االجتماع
)U.S. Department of State, 2004, para. 3(
Here is the translated quotation that appeared in the document:
Below is a fact sheet issued by the U.S. State Department on September 20 and it outlines
the guidelines and the agenda of the meeting [emphasis added] to be held in New York.
(U.S. Department of State, 2004, para. 3)
In this excerpt, we see the lexical problem where the partnership did not even try
to convey the message covertly, which shows that the United States was taking an
undisputable charge in deciding, not only when and where the meeting would be held but
also outlined the guidelines and the agenda for the meeting for 27 independent countries.
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Figure 12 shows the number of lexical issues found in the documents, along with their
source.
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Figure 12. Number of coded statements with lexical issues observed in the analyzed
documents produced by G8-BMENA and civil societies
Positive
It is not my intention to minimize the positive recommendations or statements
produced by all parties involved in the G8-BMENA Partnership; but the consideration of
a positive or real reform is subjective, because in my understanding, real reform occurs
when there is, for example, an agreement on a scientific partnership or when there is an
investment in research and development. On the other hand, the G8-BMENA Partnership
considered producing a joint declaration or providing classroom materials as a reform or
an achievement. Therefore, positive code was added only to statements with real reform
efforts that matched my definition, such as an investment in an indigenous knowledge
economy, knowledge creation (not consumption), and capacity building. With this in
mind, positive statements were tagged 41 times in total. Official discourse produced 20
occurrences (48.8%), while 21 instances were from the public discourse (51.2%). This is
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the only code where the public discourse had a slight edge in the frequency with about
2% difference. This outcome gave me some hope that both the government and civil
societies representatives were seeking real reforms even though it was not as high in
priority as I would have hoped. The following comment serves as an example of what I
consider to be a positive or real reform:
Developing a scientific and practical index for measuring the progress of
the Arab states [emphasis added] in the process of reform and issuing an annual
report thereon. (2012 G8-BMENA Initiative, 2004, p. 13)
That comment represents one example of a positive outcome in my analysis, because it is
not advocating for reliance on international agencies (United Nations) to provide annual
reports about the progress status of the region. On the contrary, it seeks developing a
local agency that analyzes the status of the Arab countries in the scientific field. It is a
natural progression, starting with a needs assessment (deficiency) and then moving
forward to create locally inspired and developed solutions for those deficiencies. The
following figure shows the number of coded positive statements and their sources.
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Figure 13. Number of coded statements positive (real reforms) observed in the
partnership documents produced by G8-BMENA and civil societies.
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Educational Discourse
It is of paramount importance for this research to demystify the underlying agenda
for the G8-BMENA Partnership and its annual meetings. I achieved that end through
analyzing official documents generated by the governments from both G8 and BMENA
regions with some input from civil societies. The scope of reform in the partnership
included three major areas: educational, economic, and social. It is important to highlight
the main reason for this partnership because it was launched to counter extremism that
emanated from the BMENA region, which threatens peace and stability, not only in the
region but in the world and in particular, the United States.
In the wake of 9/11, many nations collaborated to face the evil threat not only to
the West but also to the region, and what makes matters worse is that those extremists
hijacked our faith for their own twisted agenda and found global media that gave them an
avenue to spread fear. Under the banner of war on terrorism with political and economic
alliances that have been created, education has to be addressed. I do not disagree with
that premise, but I do disagree with the agenda and the manner that created this
partnership.
Two types of discourses emerged: (a) education for the labor market (material),
and (b) security or political discourse (rhetorical), which in essence created a new
hegemonic relation between the G8 (the United States in particular) and the BMENA
countries, which were represented in a covert institutional and professional domination.
This speaks to the domination shift from overt coercive group domination to a more
subtle one (Danet, 1984; O’Barr et al., 1978; Bradac et al., 1981; Ng & Bradac, 1993;
Wodak, 1984), and it appears legitimate because of the global threats we all face. So,
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how does the double-sword hegemony appear in the G8-BMENA? We already know who
had control and power in creating the entire partnership. Not only that, the analysis
showed the G8 control over the agenda, scope, region, countries, agreements,
declarations, along with the ability to deem the outcomes to be a success or failure. And
finally, we know about the G8 benefits of selling educational materials and curriculum to
the BMENA region. These arrangements usually are carried out by international
organizations and NGOs that publicize information to influences international agendas
for reform. Lingard (2000) stated in this regard:
The effects of globalization on the state, education policy, and schools are
mediated yet again by local cultures, histories, and politics. Globalization maps
onto local practice in contingent, contested, inflected, and thus unpredictable
ways. (p. 102)
Globalization comes with contestation as a main characteristic because when looking at
the 41 documents, the majority of them address the labor market and its connection to
education (material), which now has created a global logic to incorporate the privatesector as major partner in educational reform. The influence of this connection between
education and the private-sector is seen in the developed policies by the BMENA.
Therefore, there is a conflict between the global and the local logics, but the weight of the
global logic has more influence due to the funding resources allocated to it and the
political power that supports it.
It is observed time and again that the reform includes teacher training and Basic
Education Curriculum (BEC), which includes teaching English language as a life skill.
The issue here is that these elements are closely tied to the labor market to create more
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jobs, while the real focus should be on education as liberation from local and Western
domination. In other words, it advocates for a narrow educational philosophy, which may
provide a short-term objective as opposed to an educational view that addresses larger
issues such as political exploitation, social stratification, and a dominant economic
model. The partnership did not advocate to reform fundamental issues that contribute to
the region’s stagnation, such as like social justice or equity, but rather it advocated for
capitalism and a neoliberal educational agenda, which in essence keeps the region
dependent on the G8 for its political and economic stability. I must point out that this
could not have happened without local conscious or unconscious support.
Language use in G8-BMENA Meetings
Globalization and hegemony use a certain rhetoric soft governance as Dale (1999)
believed that they use noncoercive and discursive techniques to gain confidence and buyin from governments. It appeared to be the case in the G8-BMENA Partnership through
their collaboration in two major areas:
I.

Labor market and its relation to education:
o Creating partnerships with the private sector
o Teacher training
o Entrepreneurship

II.

Perceptions and language use:
o Best practices
o Relevance of education
o Education relations to prosperity
o Targets
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These premises are representative of a dominant global understanding, which
defines education and its purpose in a society, and it also defines development and what it
looks like. However, the G8-BMENA recommendations were not created in the BMENA
region, and they may conflict with the local vision or understanding of reform. Lawn
(2006) indicated that a soft governance approach would use soft tools such as
conferences, seminars, and advisory groups to rally the target audience, which was the
case in the partnership at hand.
When the partnership discusses educational, social, and economic reform, we
have to understand that the political context in the G8 that generated the agenda for the
BMENA region is immensely disconnected from the region it supposedly wants to help.
Therefore, when reading the documents and discussions between G8 ministers and their
BMENA counterparts, we notice that they almost speak two different languages because
priorities are different. An example was when Canada blocked a joint declaration in an
annual meeting because there was a disagreement on the major obstacle in the face of any
kind of reform and I may add, world peace: the conflict between Palestine and Israel. In
other words, the G8 is focusing on the symptoms of the issue but not on the issue itself.
Take, for example, the following statement by the minister of foreign affairs of the
United Arab Emirates:
ال يمكنكم أن تأتوا إلى المنتدى وتتكلموا مع المنطقة وتقولوا نحن نتناول فقط األمور التي نريد أن نتناولها
 أي شيء اقل مما جاء في البيان الرئاسي للمنتدى في،وال نريد تناول األمور التي تريدون انتم تناولها
(Farhat, 2011, para. 21) . لن نقبل به2009 المغرب عام
Translated quotation that appeared in the document:
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You cannot come to the forum and engage in a dialogue with the region and say we are
dealing only with the issues that we want to deal with, and refuse to discuss the issues
that we want to be addressed, anything less than what came in the presidential statement
of the Forum in Morocco in 2009, will not be accepted. (Farhat, 2011, para. 21)
As far as educational reform, a great analogy that I can draw from what Kaldor
(1981) addressed regarding the baroque arsenal, which talked about the weapon industry
in the time of peace where manufacturers of weapons gain many benefits, such as money,
jobs, infrastructure, success, expansion, and development, and those weapons will be
used elsewhere. By the same token, this scenario can apply to educational reform
suggested in the partnership because when the G8 (center) transfer best practices,
education models, curriculum, institutions, accreditations to the BMENA region
(periphery), it will take years to be received and implemented. With this in mind, the
region will receive outdated products baroque educational arsenal that not only was
designed in a different environment and culture, but also was delivered years later, which
in essence may hinder any possibility of building local infrastructure. This scenario
makes the region continue to slip further on a global level and continue to strain the
national resources and also benefit the G8 countries on many levels. This shows the
relationship between the center and the periphery where the “centers grow stronger and
more dominant and the peripheries become increasingly marginalized” (Altbach, 2006, p.
24).
I am not suggesting that establishing best practices, monitoring, accreditation, and
quality assurance agencies is a bad idea, but I think it falls under secondary issues for the
BMENA region. I believe the real concern is the mental control (colonization) that causes
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the region either to fail to be productive in developing indigenous knowledge economy,
or it has been actively and intentionally blocked from real development because this has
transpired in the apparent dependence on the G8 in all areas of reform. One would ask:
When would the cycle end? Especially when we observe the unbelievable status of the
BMENA where these countries mainly consume outdated knowledge, among other
products, and the partnership ironically suggested increasing the number of students
scholarships to the West and suggest that students do community service in the West, not
in their homeland where the help needed most, as stated in this statement “. . . [students]
perform community service while in the United States, and have the opportunity to take
part in a number of enhancement activities designed to heighten their awareness of civic
responsibility and leadership” (U.S. Department of State , 2008, para. 23). It also worsens
the brain drain situation the region suffers from as the (United Nations Development
Program, 2002) report indicated that 51 percent of adult Arabs showed interest in
emigrating to the West.
The analysis showed the role of the hegemons in the BMENA region consisting
of key players not only from the G8 but also from within who have the ability to lobby
for support and to participate in creating plans, agendas, defining problems, and
recommending solutions that may or may not achieve the wanted outcome for the entire
BMENA region or individual states. Ritzer (1996) talked about the idea of
McDonaldization of higher education by offering similar courses, qualifications, training
courses, and even in establishments such as quality control. Some may argue that the
burger may travel well, but it is not the same as in educational or social reforms. Altbach
(2006) highlighted the role of universities in modern societies regardless of locations, as
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the place where locals debate controversial issues that affect their region. Altbach (2006)
advocated for keeping them independent from local or international hegemonic entities to
result in successful outcomes. Therefore, when looking at the role of the G8-BMENA
Partnership and the real role of a university, we see conflict because the G8 focuses on
the labor market (material) issues while universities should function as an avenue for a
cultural discourse that stems from critical engagement in local issues.
The analysis showed some agreements on transactions for curricula delivery from
the G8 to the BMENA region, which showcases an exchange of material and money but
that does not mean an exchange of ideas. That is to say, without real commitment to longterm scientific partnership or collaboration, without capacity building in research and
development, reform will not occur in the region. In addition, the region will not be able
to contribute to the world knowledge economy, and the region might remain in a
relationship characterized by being a recipient of programs and degrees created
elsewhere. The alternative scenario would allow the region to be creative in helping the
rest of the world to tackle common problems facing humanity.
It is important to clarify my position on the economic development and labor
market needs in the region, because I believe they are important aspects in societies’
stability and advancement, but the issue in this research is about knowledge ownership
and production. Robertson et al. (2007) addressed the philosophy of learning as it rests in
the ability to develop new capacities that would bridge the learning divide between the
West and Rest. Development and education reform for that matter rely on the innovation
approach that gives the BMENA region the ability to practice with new ideas and
technologies in order for the region to begin to develop its own capacity. If we look, for
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example, at the four following pillars recognized by the World Bank (2003) as the
cornerstones for knowledge society: (a) information and infrastructure, (b) economic
incentive and institutional regime, (c) innovation systems, and (d) education and learning,
we realize these pillars are lacking in the G8-BMENA Partnership.
In other words, a knowledge society is primarily dependent not on the physical
abilities but rather on the use of ideas and on the application of technologies. That is to
say, a knowledge society follows a cycle that starts with knowledge creation, acquiring
that knowledge, and ends with the transmission of and usage of the knowledge by
individuals or organizations. Essentially, “the knowledge economy is transforming the
demands of the labor market in economies throughout the world” (World Bank, 2003, p.
1). This position will flip the current arrangement between the labor market and
education, where we put knowledge economy at the heart of any reform, making the
educational apparatus inform the labor market, not the contrary.
Another important observation that cannot be ignored is the fact that of the data
collected for this research, only one of the 41 documents analyzed was published in
Arabic, and the rest were published in English. Keep in mind that the majority of
BMENA countries have Arabic as their native language. This is ironic because the reform
is about the region, and the official language used in the annual meetings was English.
That is just one tool of controlling the official and public discourse, as van Dijk (1996)
stressed to pay attention to this aspect when we analyze power and domination in talk and
text. It also highlights how the G8-BMENA Partnership is actively marginalizing the
very population that it supposedly is intending to help by using a foreign language and
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ignoring the importance of the native language on so many levels, as was elaborated on in
Chapter 2.
Political Discourse
The G8-BMENA Partnership did not emerge from a vacuum, but as mentioned, it
was because of the 9/11 tragedy, or at least this was the official reasoning espoused by
the United States. We cannot analyze its foundation without looking at preceding events
in the region, especially the illegal invasion of Iraq. The invasion had done a great deal of
damage to the credibility of the U.S. efforts in the reform before it even started, or to say
the least, it limited the support from the region and from the major European allies.
Furthermore, it weakened international law because of the unilateral action taken by the
United States in the war (Girdner, 2004). In other words, the military power diminished
or harmed the political power deployed in the G8-BMENA Partnership. Erhan (2005)
claimed that there was not real agreement among the G8 countries regarding the planned
goals for the BMENA Partnership. Therefore, the initiative remained covertly a U.S.-led
project, and this is one of the reasons for its unsuccessful outcome in promoting
democracy, human rights, good governance, freedom, and prosperity considering for the
sake of argument that those are the real objectives for the partnership. In other words,
Europe maintained public relations with the United States by providing superficial
political support, which is a representation of group power and domination thorough
professional institutions, as illustrated by van Dijk (2001b).
The name of the partnership was Greater Middle East (GME), which was met by
great suspicion in the region because it echoed previous efforts to create a New Middle
East. An article by a retired American colonel titled Blood Borders, published in the
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American Armed Forces Journal (2006), included a changed map of the region, which
reflected the hidden intention of the United States for the region. That intent was not
aligned with the declared promise of the G8-BMENA Partnership. Figure 14 shows the
before and after of the New Middle East map.
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Figure 14. Middle East before and after Blood Borders Map.
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The countries that win more territories are Afghanistan, Arab Shia State,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Free Baluchistan, Free Kurdistan, Iran, Islamic Scared State,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen. The losers are Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait,
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the West Bank.
According to Nazemroaya (2006) and Peters (2006), the U. S. claimed the map does not
reflect the Pentagon vision for the region, although the map was used for training in the
NATO Defense College, the National War Academy, and other military planning circles.
Such information could limit any possible success of the partnership, in addition and
most importantly the fact that the change is imposed by the United States, neglecting the
internal dynamics and the necessity for a needed reform that stems from within.
The analysis showed the following major weaknesses, from a political angle, that
characterized the G8-BMENA Partnership:


A one-size-fits-all approach in a very diverse region in addition to the prescriptive
nature of it in a very untrusting political climate.



Lack of coordination with other programs that aspire to achieve similar goals,
such as the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). This partnership will be
discussed briefly in the next section.



The G8-BMENA Partnership was drafted and created in the United States,
without consultation with the region.



The serious weakness was about the Arab-Israeli conflict, which I believe to be
the major obstacle for any reform on all levels because it provides a breeding
ground for extremism and delays any developmental and reform efforts.
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The analysis showed distrust between the two major powers (the United States
and European countries) who have many inserts in the region, i.e., political, security, and
economic, among others, which ultimately caused the failure of the G8-BMENA
Partnership. The United States used a rapid transformation in the region via its military
power (Iraq war 2003), and then used BMENA as another vehicle for transformation
(political power). Europe, on the other hand, used a more gradual transformation
approach when it created EMP.
One may wonder that because the EMP, led by the EU and G8-BMENA, led by
the United States agreed on the main principles to reform the region educationally,
economically, and socially, would they have more commonality than differences? Are
they competing or complementing each other’s efforts? It is a sad reality, mainly because
the region seems to be an object controlled by different actors for either common or
different purposes, and both the EMP and G8-BMENA claim that their project is for the
benefit of the region. Has the region lost its agency in reforming itself? Is the region that
weak to be objectified by both Europe and the United States?
The BMENA and EMP partnerships may have a lot in common with respect to
the future of the region, but there is evident competition between the two. Noi (2011)
shed light on the divergent political, security, and economic concerns between the United
States and Europe. We see the competition in several instances, as discussed in Noi’s
(2011) work:


Madrid Middle East Peace Conference 1991, where the United States kept
pushing Europe away from the process to prevent any political role in the
conflict.
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Europe and the United States diverged on the U.S. policy of isolation and
containment under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, and Europe was
involved in dialogue with Iran, which opposed the U.S. policy at the time.



Europe initiated the Barcelona Process without inviting the United States.



The U.S. unilateral war in Iraq, which negatively impacted European States
and divided them.



Launching the G8-BMENA Partnership by the United States without real
consultation with Europe or without using the existing EMP, which was
founded nine years earlier.



A superficial involvement of Europe in the BMENA Partnership.

The economic factor intensified the competition between the United States and EU and
their partnerships to control the region, and this can be seen in some of the statements
found in the BMENA-analyzed documents:
Turkey is providing technical assistance to facilitate the implementation of free
trade agreements, including training on WTO issues [emphasis added]. (2012 G8BMENA Initiative , 2012, p. 17)
. . . improved business climates and open and free trade economies [emphasis
added]. (2012 G8-BMENA Initiative, 2009, p. 3)
. . . EU to launch discussions on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Agreements [emphasis added]. (2012 G8-BMENA Initiative, 2011, p. 4)
The wording of these statements may show that the G8 is consumed with the economic
reform in the region, but frankly, the fallacy of free trade, open markets, and privatization
seems only to open the region’s market to sell goods produced in the United States and
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Europe, and this is the main reason for the competition between the two major powers,
which ultimately resulted in the failure of the BMENA Partnership. Noi (2011) showed
such evidence in the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) established by the United States with
some BMENA countries and with the FTA that Europe established with the
Mediterranean and Middle East countries. We may not see with the naked eye the depth
and the efforts that took place in planning and establishing such partnerships just by
reading final declarations from the BMENA, but now we could because we analyzed
other sources that addressed the historical background of the region and the context in
which these partnerships emerged. This is why analyzing the discursive and historical
context is a hallmark of critical discourse analysis as stressed in the work of Fairclough
and Wodak (1997) and van Dijk (2001a).
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Chapter 5 Discussion
In this concluding chapter, I address the research problem, the purpose,
significance, major results, research implications, and direction for future research. The
research problem at hand is that periphery countries around the world, and especially for
this research the BMENA region, do not have free will to embark political, educational,
or economic reforms, which results in social conditions and ramifications that impede
developments in the region. My literature review and data analysis showed that the main
reason for unsuccessful reform efforts was due to multiple levels of hegemony and
special interests of the dominant groups, both in the G8 and BMENA. In other words, I
discovered two layers of domination: First, the G8 dominated the BMENA
representatives and populations, and second, the BMENA representatives dominated the
civil societies and the public, resulting in a trickle-down domination effect.
The purpose of the research was to establish a deep understanding of educational,
political, and social challenges facing Saudi Arabia in its foundation and then use that
understanding as an example for my targeted region of analysis, BMENA. I moved to
investigate globalization and its challenges in the realm of education, society, and
economy because global Western powers did not only shape the Saudi context, but also
shaped the entire BMENA region. Moreover, this analysis showed that the partnership is
influencing the region’s reform today. It was my interest to include an important tool
used by globalization, the English language, which has many damaging effects in the
region.
From this analysis, it was evident that critical research was limited in the region
because of the small number of regional resources, publications in Arabic, and the local
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critical researchers that I was able to have access to. Therefore, the significance of my
study relies, first and foremost, on the contribution to the resistance discourse in both the
Saudi context and the BMENA region in general. The research also provided a counternarrative to the dominant discourse stemming from either official or public entities that
favored in a larger sense the status quo. I do not believe that the partnership attempted to
seriously engage in long-lasting developments but instead offered temporary solutions for
permanent problems.
The research questions below have guided me in addressing serious concerns in
the BMENA region because they tackled educational, economic, and social problems,
which are in desperate need for reform.
1. How has the G8 and the Broader Middle East and North African (BMENA)
Partnership affected and shaped educational and social reforms in the region since
its establishment in 2004?
2. What type of discourse was deployed to perpetuate hegemonic and hierarchical
relationships that sustain unequal status between the G8 and BMENA countries?
3.

How do the G8 representatives control the BMENA public discourse?

4. How does such discourse control the mind and the action of the BMENA
countries, and what are the social consequences of such control?
These questions also investigated the role of G8-BMENA as an international
professional institution that promised to generate a reform that comes from within the
targeted region and is not affected by external influence. Furthermore, I attempted to
unpack techniques that the G8 used to rally BMENA governments to be part of reform
efforts in their region. It is important to note that my analysis did not paint the region
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through its representatives as victims but rather as responsible participants in the
generated outcomes or lack thereof by both being actively and passively involved in this
partnership. Moreover, the study discussed the types of discourses generated in this
partnership and examined who and what controlled the discourse, what techniques were
used, and the consequences of such control. These questions have been addressed in
Chapter 4 and I will address them concisely in this Chapter in the closing remarks
section.
Levels of Hegemony
In order for me to understand hegemony in the region, I needed to dissect the
concept of hegemony into layers, relying on my understanding of research by Gramsci
(2000), Apple (1990), and Bourdieu (1977). The result gave me the knowledge to divide
hegemony in the region to three levels, which I believe will help me in my future work in
the realms of dommination, power relations, and reproduction. I do not claim that these
levels are completely islolated, but rather, they are intertwined. The first level of
hegemony was observed in the literature review, which I called level one or micro
hegemony. I considered it as such because it was internal, within a country, such as Saudi
Arabia (Chapter 2). It appeared in my research when the Saudi government, at its
foundation, used the most sacred tool—the religion of Islam—for the people in achieving
its needed political outcome by establishing the country in 1932. The government
represented itself as the true representative of the pure version of the faith (Unitarian) and
therefore domesticated the people to achieve that purpose with the consent of the masses.
It is considered a hegemonic relationship between the government and the people because
the unification of the land does not necessarily represent unification of hearts and minds
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of all people with diverse backgrounds. It also did not result in equality or equity on a
wide range of issues.
Education was a major domain for competition between the government and the
religious establishment in the Saudi example and therefore, a collation was made to
impose a political and a social agenda, which created an oligarchy ruling system (Abir,
1988). The two parties created a two-fold educational system (traditional and secular) to
establish their legitimacy and to impose their views at the cost of education quality,
infrastructure, equity, and upward social mobility. This was present in one dominant view
of education and religion, ignoring different cultural backgrounds and understandings
under the banner of unifying the country, and people largely accepted the premise. It is
not a new phenomenon because we observe the rhetoric now in the war on terrorism
because dominant groups usually use scare tactics to rally populations behind special
causes. I found that level one of hegemony is not limited to internal forces because local
hegemons join forces with foreign powers when they have a common goal or when their
interests meet at the expense of the local population advancement. However, hegemony
here did not represent itself as such but rather used a discourse that disguised the real
intentions, using patriotism as a vehicle. This created a sense of parochial nationalism,
which added local conflicts, such as tribalism, and regionalism, saddled with a rentier
economy.
The second level of hegemony (macro) was found in this study when there were
clear international political, educational, and economic interests in the region. It is a
macro-level domination that showed obvious power in different fields, a scenario that
forced weak nations to join coalitions or sign treaties. Globalization from above is the
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catalyst for this type of hegemony; it affects societies in two major ways, either by a
homogenizing them or heterogenizing them. I established that adhering to one or the
other is not the right reaction to this power because we need to analyze globalization
dialectically; globalization, as was established in Chapter 2, has economic, educational,
and cultural dimensions. Furthermore, globalization comes in two forms: First, there is
globalization from above and in this sense, it supports domination and exploitation of
others; and second, there is globalization from below, where it helps activists to resist
globalization by using its tools. This is the dialectic nature of globalization because it can
empower and oppress individuals or nations simultaneously.
The third level of hegemony is an ideological one—and I consider it the most
dangerous because it is self-imposed. To be more specific, it is a result of mind control by
people in power where the dominated people consent to domination and considers it
necessary for their success. It was observed in this study in educational choices made in
the Saudi example in establishing modern education or in the global level in adopting
English as the language of science and the language of the world. It is portrayed in this
view as a natural phenomenon, not as a man-made phenomenon, which could be
rectified. English dominated both the official discourse and the public discourse in the
analyzed documents. In other words, I depict this type of hegemony as if marginalized
people’s consciousness is functioning as an independent agent for domination and
reproduction. It seems that marginalized people in many places and especially in the
BMENA region are unconsciously accepting a lower status because this is the only status
they know, and therefore, they do not produce an alternative vision. Moreover, it appears
that there is a consciousness conflict; one is seeking independence, freedom, and the
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ability to decide for oneself, and the other becomes repressed swiftly by unconsciousness
or by false consciousness. Figure 15 will demonstrate my understanding of hegemony
levels that emerged from this study and it is important to note that they are connected
because my research showed that each level is supported by the other. Questions emerged
regarding these levels of hegemony are: What level we should tackle first? Shall we start
with the most dangerous (ideological) as a top-down approach or bottom-up? These
questions remain to be answered in future research.

Level 3 (ideological)
Self-imposed

Level 2 (macro)
Global Hegemony

Level 1 (micro)
Internal Hegemony
within a country

Figure 15. Levels of Hegemony observed in the G8-BMENA Partnership
Research Implications
Theoretical Implications
In both the official discourse (dominant) and the public discourse, the concept of
hegemony was prevalent because it produced the highest number of codes in my analysis.
I consider this type of hegemony as level three because it is mental and ideological
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because officials and representatives of civil societies relied on imported solutions for
local problems. That is to say, the G8 government officials wanted to maintain their
control over the discourse which essentially controls the outcomes, options, and opinions
of both BMENA officials and civil societies representatives. Not only that, both BMENA
officials and civil societies representatives became part of this partnership for different
reasons, which evidently did not come to fruition in the needed reform nor did it improve
the relationship between them. Here, I consider potential good response to this global
power represented in the G8 by using the concept of globalization from below because it
gives the region the necessary tools (Internet, emails, transportation, etc.) provided by
globalization from above to create a regional movement that aligns itself with
globalization as hybridization (Pieterse, 1994), which would unify the region against the
current dominant model. This dominant model has widened the gap not only between the
center and the periphery but also between different classes in the BMENA societies, in
the quality of education, and in social mobility.
I believe the BMENA region has an identity crisis caused not only by the effects
of globalization because humans have always been global and lived side by side, but also
by mental colonization. It is a realization I gained from this research that the region needs
to engage in a process of constructing an identity to create a meaning for itself in order
for it to generate reform options emanate from within. This process of identification
entails a necessary system of difference (self vs. other) because it is an important part of
constructing an identity. It is a dialectical process that includes self-other (differencessimilarities). On one hand, the region needs to identify what makes it different, and on the
other, it needs to identify what it has in common with the others in order to construct its
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own identity. This comes with a caveat because we must not overemphasize the
differences and neglect the similarities because it is a dialectical system of differences
and similarities, and excessive emphasis on one will cause malfunction. It is a balanced
approach that recognizes the differences (multiplicity of others), while at the same time
finds similarities.
Based on the data analysis, the G8-BMENA was the dominant group in which
they controlled the discourse as it was evident by, first, the number of documents
produced and, second, by the frequency of codes added in eight of nine categories; that
category was the positive category because the public discourse was slightly higher (49%
vs. 51%). It was surprising to me that both the official discourse and the public discourse
were more connected than disconnected by having more in common in their views
regarding educational, economic, and social reforms. I came to the research with an
impression that the official discourse (BMENA countries) would be more reliant on the
G8 countries in this partnership and thought that the public discourse (civil societies)
would be seeking more local solutions to local problems. Unlike what I had expected,
both adhered to the G8 agenda without real, active involvement in its creation, and they
were passively at the receiving end. To add insult to injury, the G8 was functioning from
a superior position as an arbitrator because in many instances, the BMENA
representatives met only with the civil societies when the G8 representatives were
present. The alternative would have been a meeting between the two local parties where
they solved issues together. It is like when the American Congress has a gridlock, we do
not expect Europe to intervene, let alone the BMENA region to bridge the gap between
Democrats and Republicans, because at the end of the day it is a local American issue
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and it has to be solved locally without foreign influence. In addition, Europe also was
minimally involved in the partnership for one reason or another, but my analysis showed
that the reason for its involvement was to maintain the power and control of the Western
group over the region in a superficial collaboration with the United States.
I believe both the official and the public discourses fall under the third level of
hegemony described above, which represents mental colonization and falseconsciousness that stemmed from decades of colonization and now is under another
project known as globalization. This consciousness is considered false when it
perpetuates the status quo of domination and inequality and when it makes subordinate
groups (or countries, in this study) lose its agency in determining their future. I argue that
false consciousness made these countries incapable of taking action against the causes of
their subordination. Cunningham (1987) referred to false consciousness as “harbouring of
false beliefs that sustain one’s own oppression (p. 255), and that is why this level of
hegemony is the most dangerous in my analysis. The BMENA region is involved in the
globalization project, whether willing or unwillingly, to maintain the superstructure of the
world (hierarchy) where the West remains at the top and the Rest occupies a lower status.
The top of the hierarchy seems to exert what is necessary to remain in that position by
compromising with the G8 countries (group power) to achieve a common goal of
political and economic exploitation. In other words, the game remains the same, but the
rules change to serve a similar purpose. For example, game-changing tactics appear when
we see domination shift from a hard power (military) to a soft power (political) through
establishing professional institutions and partnerships because these institutions project a
facade of genuine interests in the well-being of the region. Keep in mind that the
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partnership produced only two joint declarations (low expectations), and when the region
pushed for addressing the single political issue (Arab-Israeli conflict) that caused all of
the deterioration and extremism in the region, Canada was responsible for the failure of
the seventh annual meeting. It is important to note that the region pushed for the political
reform for this issue adhering to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338
(Secretary Powell and Moroccan Foreign Minister Benaissa, 2004), which was again
created by the major powers, and nonetheless it was refused. It makes me wonder: Is it
intended to maintain the conflict as senseless as it sounds to give the major powers
leverage and access to maintain power and control over the region?
Social Implications
I claim that the social ramifications are many, first, maintaining a culture of
dependency in almost all aspects of life—educational, economic, political, and social—
because as represented in the analysis only a fraction of the reform suggested advocated
for local solutions. I have led to believe that the partnership has worsened the Arabs
mentality because of its continues reliance on Western models and points of view. These
views were reproduced in the partnership by local elites—or what I referred to in Chapter
2 as the transnational class because it has more in common with the elites in New York or
London more than with their own people. This created a chain reaction because if people
in BMENA want to move up in society, they must adapt to the dominant global logic and
its way of thinking. It is an ideological work that seems to gain strength, and some
consider it to be unstoppable.
Second, only one of the 41 documents that were gathered and analyzed in this
project was published in Arabic, which I considered to be a major issue in my literature
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review: the spread of the English language, because most nations in the region use Arabic
as their native language. I consider the absence of publications in Arabic as alienation to
the very same people and to the region the G8 is trying to reform. It is the neoliberal story
that portrays English as a neutral tool and as a transparent language (Pennycook, 1994)
for international communication to make it less threatening to the 75% of the world
population that either does not speak the language or for whom it is a second or foreign
language. Here we see an alignment between this view of English and the view of
globalization as a natural phenomenon.
It is a perfect representation of Gramsci’s (2000) understanding of cultural
hegemony observed in the portrayal of the English language as a tool, because if it is a
tool, then people rationalize its necessity in international communication, and in return, it
does not threaten their linguistic, national, or ethnic identities without engaging in its
historical background. In other words, it reinforces the English language powerful
position with the consent of the BMENA officials and the civil societies representatives
forgetting that it is an imposed language, which limits involvement from the most
affected people who undeniably are in need of reform.
However, position of the English language needs to be looked at dialectically,
because first, when organizations choose English as a medium of communication, doing
so could empower activists and researchers in the context of globalization from below.
That is because it provides them the opportunity to rally international activists and critical
thinkers from around the world to bring an international perspective for a common issue,
and it provides access to resources and information. Second, using English could also
oppress people because it can alienate the majority of those who do not have the language

169

capital. Therefore, we need to look at the English language from oppressing and
empowering lenses because if we look at it only from an empowering dimension, then we
obscure its hegemonic role in a society, and if we look at it from its oppressive dimension
and reject it, then we lose its potential in supporting globalization from below. At the end
of the day, English is a reality in our lives, but if it has to be taught, it should be taught in
a critical way that empowers its users and does not have to be a prerequisite for
advancement at all levels.
Political Implications
My analysis unexpectedly revealed a greater political challenge facing the region.
As stated previously in the research, educational, economic, and social issues are hard to
precisely isolate because those domains influence each other greatly. However, through
the critical lens I used in analyzing the documents, I found more troubling political
agendas aiming to change the current political map of the region, which would not only
drag the region into another wave of serious conflicts, especially sectarianism, but also
would expose the region to higher level of dependency on the West through new
alliances. It is my assumption that these new alliances would focus on political issues to
create superficial stability but would not address educational, economic, or social
challenges that now face the region. While the U.S. government denies the allegations of
a new Middle East map, we observe today many serious indications of recent movement
in the region, such as the Arab Spring, Syria’s condition, Iraq, the new American-Iranian
relationship, and the current American-Russian conflicting agenda in the region. These
developments sadly do not promise a brighter future.

170

If we examine the genesis of the G8-BMENA Partnership, we find that the United
States used the Arab Human Development Report of 2003, as discussed in Chapter 4, as
its backbone to engage in the reform effort due to high rates of illiteracy (40% of all, or
65 million people), and an unemployment rate of 25%. However, the United Nations
Human Development Report of 2015 showed the unemployment rate in the Arab states
was the highest in the world, at 29%, which is higher than the 2003 level. Further, it
showed Internet usage minimal increase from 1.6% in 2003 to 4% in 2015 compared with
81% in developed countries. Those statistics speak to the dysfunctional types of
partnership analyzed in this research.
Methodological Implications and Further Research
This study is limited due to the fact that I used official documents produced by
government officials and by representatives of civil societies and regarded them as
official discourse and public discourse, respectively. As a matter of fact, this arrangement
made sense for my analysis, but analyzing these documents from 35 countries while
considering these documents as representative for all countries under the impression that
they had equal opportunity in influencing the drafting process of documents may have
given me only a general understanding of this type of partnership. And at the same time,
it did not reveal the smallest details in the discourse and the level of participation of each
country. In other words, we already know that the official entity had control over the
discourse of the partnership, but I am not certain if the official discourse was overly
controlled by the G8, the BMENA representatives, or by a specific country, and the
research did not reveal if the BMENA countries were involved in the partnership only for
public appeal and not for real reform. On the other hand, considering civil societies as
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true representatives of the public discourse may have swayed my analysis because those
representatives—even though they do not work or represent the governments in this
partnership—may not necessarily represented the people’s discourse. That is to say, there
were no elections to choose the representatives; instead, they were chosen by an official
entity. Take, for example, this statement from 2012 annual G8-BMENA meeting:
At the Forum for the Future in Tunisia, we had strong ministerial and other highlevel participation from BMENA and G-8 countries, as well as representatives
from international organizations and international financial institutions. Forty-five
civil society and private sector leaders were selected from over 125 participants
[emphasis added] to present their platforms and dialogue with ministers. (p. 5)
In other words, I could not ascertain the criteria under which civil societies were chosen
from the rest of the 125 participants. This was not clarified in any of the analyzed
documents, even though some of the civil societies do not claim that they represent the
public. Therefore, it is my claim that they brought a different angle to my research in
identifying discourse control and hegemonic relations not only between the G8 and
BMENA countries but also between the partnership and civil societies and the public as a
whole. This means I was not able in this research to exhaust all public discourse, but the
public discourse that I did examine was a representation of another entity other than the
dominant. It is also important to consider that unequal political and economic powers
exist between countries in the region, and that might have affected their representation in
the annual meetings on both the official and public levels and may also blocked a counter
discourse. For example, Afghanistan may not have equal representation as Saudi Arabia
or Egypt.
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Furthermore, I limited my study to critically analyze documents produced by an
international entity to examine power relations between the G8 and BMENA countries as
an example of power relations between the West and East. Even though my methodology
gave me the ability to uncover important information and global structure that reinforces
itself in a different fashion, I think it may not have been entirely appropriate considering
what is at stake, not only for the region but also for the world. While I argued that
hegemonic influence was found in both types of discourses on different levels, that does
not prove with certainty or eliminate its existence in the larger official discourse or the
people’s discourse. Put simply, first, adding another layer of macro-level analysis by
including higher level of governments representations, and second, including people’s
discourse (not the public discourse by civil societies) could have resulted in more
accurate representation of both official discourse and the people’s discourse.
Therefore, it may have been more appropriate to employ a critical ethnographic
approach to investigate the concept of hegemony in the region from three angles: the
official, the public, and the people, to give me a macro understanding of the situation. It
is almost impossible to engage in such a research with all of the 27 BMENA countries
that participated in the partnership, but taking one country that may have all or most
commonalities with the rest of the region might be a goal of future research. While
ethnography contributes to the sum of knowledge, it came under great criticism because it
was considered an academic exercise (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994) with little
constructive value. This is the reason to suggest that utilizing critical ethnography
because it could have been a better approach for this type of research. Madison (2005)
depicted critical ethnography as:

173

Critical ethnography begins with an ethical responsibility to address processes of
unfairness or injustice within a particular lived domain. By ‘ethical responsibility’
I mean a compelling sense of duty and commitment based on moral principles of
human freedom and well-being, and hence a compassion for the suffering of
living being. The conditions for existence within a particular context are not as
they could be for specific subjects; as a result, the researcher feels a moral
obligation to make a contribution towards changing those conditions toward
greater freedom and equity . . . the critical ethnographer resists domestication and
moves from ‘what is’ to ‘what could be.’ (p. 5)
This means disturbing the status quo by exposing power and control dynamics in
marginalized communities. It means identifying my privileges, my skills, and resources
as a researcher to counter a dominant discourse and to bring the marginalized voices
forward. Furthermore, critical ethnography contributes to the local and global knowledge
of emancipation and it supports a discourse of social justice. If we do not do that, then the
alternative would be a continuous dialogue stemming from uncritical thinking
characterized by conformity, which at the end of day prevents subordinate communities
and countries from imagining new possibilities. It is an approach that not only focus on
the use and abuse of power but also calls for action and practice. This is why Barbour
(2007) called for leadership training for ethnographers not just to critically understand
power relations but also to create clubs and partnerships for actions for the concerned
people in both marginalized communities as well as critical researchers worldwide.
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Closing Remarks
According to my analysis, the G8-BMENA Partnership did not have a good start
from the inception, mainly because it was drafted and designed elsewhere and did not
generate the support needed to be fruitful, even on a superficial fashion. It was the
military power that preceded its foundation by the invasion of Iraq in 2003 that created
negative sentiments for some of the BMENA governments, civil societies, and the public,
which prevented some reforms from materializing. The U.S.-led partnership used a
political power (soft power) to create a superficial collaboration with the G8 countries to
work with the United States in its effort to shape educational, economic, and social
reforms in the region by simply focusing on the labor market demands. This had provided
the region with small projects concerned with illiteracy rates, unemployment issues,
security, and opened the region’s markets further to the United States and Europe. As
stated, these issues rank as a second-level concern because real reform should have
originated from the region and with a genuine interest by the G8 to march toward
successful reforms.
In my assessment, the partnership showed an obvious control over the region’s
educational, societal, economic, and political spheres, which is not a new phenomenon.
That is to say, a hundred years ago, a more coercive agreement was struck between two
major powers at the time (Britain and France): the infamous Sykes-Picot agreement of
1916, which drew the border map for the entire Middle East region. To make matters
worse, at least on self-esteem and psychological levels, Sykes-Picot even designed the
flags of many countries (Aljazeera, 2014). The G8-BMNEA may have taken a softer
approach in changing the region, but the future does not look promising, especially after

175

the surface the Blood Borders map in the American Armed Forces Journal (2006) by
Ralph Peters, as he is considered the American Sykes-Picot for the region. The new
Middle East might be an undergoing project led by the United States covertly, and
perhaps the Arab Spring facilitated that endeavor, and yet again we see the Blood
Borders suggesting that the Sykes-Picot agreement was a deformed effort served the
European interests in 1916, and the new borders will help correct that deformity (The
Huffington Post , 2015). In other words, it is good for the region, and the region is
passively waiting for the change.
My analysis showed the G8-BMENA Partnership used soft discourse to numb
people’s emotions, either civil society organizations or the general public to achieve its
hidden purposes. It used international organizations such as the World Bank to highlight
the miserable condition in the BMENA educationally, socially, and economically (United
Nations Development Program, 2002). It also highlighted the security concerns and the
threat of terrorism if no action was taken by the local governments and the possible
ramifications, such as overthrowing its leaders. It pinned the local governments into a
corner, either to join the partnership and be part of it to publicly save face, and in return
there would be some benefits for the region. Keeping in mind that BMENA governments
need political, military, and economic support either to keep the status quo as is or at least
to prevent it from worsening. Here, we observe the concept of smart power (Girdner,
2004) that combines both hard power, military action and soft power, political influence
to maintain the hegemonic relationship.
According to van Dijk (2001b), understanding of group power, it was observed in
the partnership that the G8-BMENA discourse was controlled by the official group
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consisting of the G8 and BMENA countries. First, controlling the discourse is a symbolic
power that was reflected in the number of documents produced by the G8-BMENA
Partnership, which was 32 (78%) of the 41 of documents. This showcases the clear
domination by governments over the discourse.
The nature of the discourse observed in the partnership is what van Dijk (1996)
described as a passive discourse, like the type we see in interactions between ordinary
people and with police or with judges because it shows that both BMENA representatives
and civil societies did not have control in the interaction because they were passively on
the receiving end. Furthermore, the G8 had more access to discourse and therefore was
able not only to control the discourse but also to control the properties and influence the
partnership dynamics. However, van Dijk (2001b) cautioned us from considering only
text control as the embodiment of power relations in a group interaction, but rather it is
the context control that matters because it reinforces the dynamics of a relationship.
Context here means “. . . the mentally represented structure of those properties of the
social situation that are relevant for the production or comprehension of discourse” (van
Dijk, 2001b, p. 356).
van Dijk (2001b) explained the concept of discourse control and its relation to
mind control so eloquently, stating that the first step of control is to control the dominant
discourse, which was the case in this study. The second step is through mind control,
which in essence reproduces dominance in a given society. Consequently, the BMENA
governments and civil society organizations with their lower status, come to acquire their
beliefs, options, and knowledge from powerful organizations, such as the G8, for
different reasons. First, G8 discourse was considered legitimate and trustworthy because
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it was produced by advanced nations in all areas of the proposed reform, such as
education and economy. Second, because the partnership was created by the United
States, the BMENA governments then were required to be part of the annual meetings
and to come with joint declarations to at least save face and show their populations that
they were working to improve people’s lives. Third, civil society organizations
contributed to the general discourse, but they are at the lowest level of power, and when
their discourse deviated dramatically from the general guidelines established by the
partnership, they were blocked or othered. This was observed in many instances
throughout the analysis; nonetheless, the civil societies were able to produce slightly
more long-lasting positive recommendations. In other words, the dominant group had the
ability to suppress a counter discourse or at least to marginalize it. Fourth, the G8BMENA dynamic was interesting, to say the least, because the governments met together
in a close fashion, and the civil societies conducted parallel meetings, which was a clear
observation of exclusion. Here are two comments that speak to the group power in
exclusion and othering:
Unfortunately, the Arab world, except for Morocco, did not witness such
frameworks and mechanisms allowing direct interaction between the government
and the representatives of the civil society. Most of the Arab states reject dialogue
on equal footing with the civil society actors unless in an international or
regional non-Arab forums! [emphasis added]. (2012 G8-BMENA Initiative, 2004,
p. 2)
Consequently, serious inquiries arise among the circles of the civil society
regarding the added value of the direct participation in the proceedings of the
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Forum for the Future. Why not then restricting such participation to mailing the
recommendations of the civil society [emphasis added] for saving efforts and
money and avoiding delusion of the public opinion that the civil society is a real
partner in the Forum. (2012 G8-BMENA Initiative, 2004, p. 11)
As far as the social consequences of domination, I can draw from personal experience
and recent interaction (A. Abumilha, personal communication, September 1, 2016) with
12 international students from five countries (Brazil, China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South
Korea, and Taiwan) to whom I introduced my research. All are in the United States to
pursue their educational dream, and it seemed that they have given up on their countries.
They see Western education as the best option for professional, social, and economic
success. They needed more English language teaching because they want to advance
along the professional and socioeconomic ladder. They needed Western degrees and
qualifications because the students believed they would provide them with social and
cultural capital or what Bourdieu calls habitus. They thought reform comes only through
adapting to the Western model beyond education. It was astonishing to me when I told
them that I hoped in my lifetime that our countries would limit sending students to the
United States or Europe because each country can build its own capacity in medicine,
science, engineering, technology, and the next generation can produce knowledge from
their homeland using their native languages. The reaction of these 12 international
students was hard to describe, but I can claim that they were shocked because they
considered my vision not feasible nor realistic. That is the social consequence that I am
afraid of when marginalized people lose even the hope to change the status quo. It is the
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mental colonization that scares me the most, and that, I believe, is the ultimate barrier to
reform in the BMENA region and in all marginalized nations.
Limitations
The major limitation in this research was the unavailability of identical documents
for each year of the needed analysis from 2004 to 2013. That is to say, for example, the
G8-BMENA Partnership did not produce a joint declaration or a chair’s summary for
their annual meetings every year. Even though I contacted governmental organizations
and civil societies in the United States, Canada, Germany, Oman, Tunisia, and Egypt, but
those correspondences were not fruitful in either gaining access to the needed documents
or at least to understand the reasoning for their unavailability to the public. I was able to
find documents for each year from 2004 to 2013, but they were not identical. Another
obstacle I faced was the fact that I was not able to collect any documents for the years
2014, 2015, and 2016 or any reliable information, and therefore, I was not able to
establish any general conclusions regarding the fate of the G8-BMENA Partnership. It
seems that the partnership dissolved without any announcement to its followers or
researchers.
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